BURTON (CHRISTOPHER) VS. BURTON (DIANE)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001431-MR
CHRISTOPHER BURTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00159
DIANE BURTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Christopher Burton brings this appeal from Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (decree)
entered in the Adair Circuit Court on July 1, 2009, dissolving the parties’ marriage,
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
awarding custody, establishing timesharing/visitation and dividing certain real
property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Christopher and Diane Burton were married September 28, 1996.
Three children were born of the parties’ marriage – a son on November 4, 2000,
and twin daughters on April 21, 2006. The parties were divorced by decree of
dissolution of marriage entered in the Adair Circuit Court on July 1, 2009.
Pursuant to the decree, the circuit court awarded the parties joint
custody of their three children. Diane was designated primary residential parent,
and Christopher was awarded timesharing/visitation. Specifically, Christopher was
granted timesharing every other weekend and every Tuesday or Wednesday night
until 8:00 p.m. Christopher was also ordered to pay child support in the amount of
$1,157.40 per month and to provide health insurance for the children. The court
further ordered that Diane and the children would remain in the parties’ marital
residence and, in particular:
6. [Diane] and the minor children should have the
use of said home until it is sold as provided immediately
hereinbelow;
7. Each of the parties should commence making
one-half the mortgage payments on said property to
South Central Bank in Glasgow, Kentucky commencing
with the April 2009 payment. Said monthly mortgage
payments shall be made by the parties hereto in equal
amounts to said mortgagee, one-half by [Diane] and onehalf by [Christopher] until the twin daughters attain their
majority or [Diane] co-habits with a male individual,
remarries, dies or ceases to use said house as her
residence, whichever first occurs, at such time, said
residence shall be sold in such a manner as the parties
agree or as the Court orders upon application; . . .
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....
9. The Deed to the subject property should be
redrawn and recorded to reflect that the parties are the
title holders of said real estate to be held by them as
tenants in common[.]
The court determined that Christopher’s 401K and any stock he held in his
employer’s company, Amazon.com, be divided equally between the parties. This
appeal follows.
Christopher contends the circuit court erred by not awarding a more
equal timesharing arrangement with the children. Christopher’s entire argument on
the timesharing/visitation issue is as follows:
[T]he trial court did grant [Christopher] joint custody and
somewhat reasonable visitation with his children,
[Christopher’s] proposed time sharing custody
arrangement would have allowed both parties to more
equally share the financial burdens associated with their
children’s needs, and would have allowed all parties
more available income to devote toward their children.
Christopher’s Brief at 9.
It appears that Christopher is more concerned with sharing the
“financial burden” associated with the children than he is with spending additional
time with the children. Nevertheless, we address Christopher’s assertion that the
circuit court should have granted a more equal timesharing arrangement.
Our review of the circuit court’s award of custody is limited to
whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous or whether the court
abused its discretion. Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1974); Frances v.
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Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2008). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if not
supported by substantial evidence of a probative value. Hunter v. Hunter, 127
S.W.3d 656 (Ky. App. 2003). Our review shall proceed accordingly.
We begin by noting the Supreme Court opinion in Pennington v.
Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008). In Pennington, the Court pointed out that
when parents are granted joint custody with one parent designated the primary
residential parent and the other parent exercising timesharing/visitation, the
arrangement should be referred to as “shared custody.” Id. With shared joint
custody, timesharing “frequently mirrors a typical sole custody pattern where the
child may live with on parent during the week and reside with the other on
alternate weekends.” Id. at 764-765.
Under the precepts of Pennington, we think the custody arrangement
between Christopher and Diane constituted a “shared custody” arrangement. See
id. Moreover, the record reveals that the circuit court adopted the
timesharing/visitation arrangement previously agreed to by the parties during the
pendency of the action. The parties had been operating under this agreement for
several months. Christopher’s motivation for seeking more equal timesharing
appears to be an attempt to reduce his child support obligation. In fact,
Christopher failed to set forth a cogent argument as to how the circuit court erred
in its award of shared custody to the parties. Based upon our review of the record,
we do not believe the circuit court abused its discretion by awarding joint shared
custody with Diane designated primary residential parent and awarding
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Christopher reasonable visitation. As such, we view Christopher’s contention as
being without merit.
Christopher next contends the circuit court erred in its award of child
support and division of marital property. Specifically, Christopher asserts that the
circuit court erred by including proceeds from the sale of Christopher’s restricted
stock units (RSU) in his employer’s company, Amazon.com, as income for
purposes of child support and by simultaneously awarding one-half of the value of
retained RSU to Diane as marital property. Christopher believes that the circuit
court should have either considered the proceeds from the sale of RSU as income
or as a marital asset but not as both.
In the case at hand, the facts reveal that twice every year Christopher
was granted RSU from his employer, Amazon.com. Apparently, Christopher had
the option of selling RSU upon each share’s maturity. According to Christopher’s
testimony, he routinely chose to sell the stock upon maturity, and such cash
amounts were reported on Christopher’s past W-2 tax forms as income. Thus, in
calculating Christopher’s income for child support purposes, the circuit court
considered Christopher’s total income, which included the cash proceeds from the
sale of RSU.
On the other hand, Christopher also retained RSU, which remained in
an account awaiting maturity. These RSU had not been sold and were not included
as income for child support purposes. However, the retained RSU was considered
by the circuit court as a marital asset and equally divided between the parties.
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Thus, there was no “double dipping” as alleged by Christopher. Rather, the circuit
court properly classified the proceeds from the sale of RSU as income and RSU
retained by Christopher as a marital asset. As such, we reject Christopher’s
contention that the circuit court erred in its calculation of child support and
division of marital property.
Christopher finally contends the circuit court erred by allowing Diane
and the children to remain in the marital residence until the twins reached the age
of majority and by requiring Christopher to pay one-half of the mortgage.
Christopher alleges that the marital residence should be sold and the proceeds
divided between the parties.
The circuit court’s division of marital assets is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001). Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190(1)(d) specifically provides the circuit court with
authority to permit the spouse with custody of the children to remain in the marital
resident for a reasonable period. Spratling v. Spratling, 720 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. App.
1986).
In this case, the circuit court ruled that Diane and the children may
remain in the marital residence until the twins reach the age of majority or Diane
remarries, dies, or ceases to utilize said residence. The twins are currently four
years old, which means that Christopher would be required to pay one-half of the
mortgage for the next fourteen years. The total monthly mortgage payment was
$955 and one-half thereof equals $477.50. Over fourteen years, Christopher would
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pay over $80,000 in mortgage payments. Considering this large sum of money and
Christopher’s particular financial condition, we are compelled to conclude that the
circuit court erred by requiring Christopher to pay one-half of the mortgage for
fourteen years. See Spratling, 720 S.W.2d 936. We, thus, remand for the circuit
court to reconsider the proper distribution of the marital residence under KRS
403.190.
For the foregoing reasons, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage of the Adair Circuit Court are affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeremy A. Wood
Danny Butler
Greensburg, Kentucky
Theodore H. Lavit
Joseph R. Stewart
Lebanon, Kentucky
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