GRIFFIN (WILLIAM TID), ET AL. VS. LINDEN (R. DEAN)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: APRIL 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000970-MR
WILLIAM TID GRIFFIN; HARTLEY
BLAHA; RONALD BOWMAN, JR.;
STEVEN STENGELL; JEFF VARNER;
CHAD ESTES; AND ALLIED ENERGY
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-003347
R. DEAN LINDEN, PH.D.
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2009-CA-001917-MR
R. DEAN LINDEN, PH.D.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-003347
WILLIAM TID GRIFFIN; JEFF VARNER;
HARTLEY BLAHA; RONALD BOWMAN, JR.;
STEVEN STENGELL; JAMES E. SHANE;
ALLIED ENERGY; AND CHAD ESTES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: In this consolidated appeal, the parties appeal an order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court that granted in part and denied in part a motion to
compel arbitration and stay proceedings pursuant to the Kentucky Uniform
Arbitration Act (KUAA), KRS Chapter 417. The issues presented are whether
KRS 417.050 violates the separation of powers doctrine by permitting an
interlocutory appeal and whether the scope of the arbitration agreement is
sufficiently broad to cover the claims presented.1
The dispute is between members of a limited liability company,
Gryphon Environmental, LLC, a company engaged in the designing and
development of waste treatment products for municipal systems. William Tid
Griffin, Hartley Blaha, Ronald Bowman, Jr., Steven Stengell, Jeff Varner, Chad
Estes, Allied Energy, and James E. Shane (the members), collectively own 51
percent of the membership interests in Gryphon, and R. Dean Linden, Ph.D. owns
approximately 47.2 percent.
1
Pursuant to KRS 418.075, Linden notified the Attorney General of his challenge to KRS
417.050, but the Attorney General has declined to intervene.
-2-
Linden filed the present action in January 2009 against the members,
alleging claims for mutual or unilateral mistake, fraud in the inducement, fraud,
defamation, abuse of process, declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duty, Blue
Sky violations, and requesting an accounting and an injunction. He averred the
following facts to support his claims.
Linden served as manager of Gryphon. In late 2008, Linden and
Griffin had disputes regarding Gryphon’s management and operation. After
realizing that Gryphon needed additional capital, Linden arranged for outside
parties to invest, but Griffin refused to acquiesce in the arrangement. Linden
alleges that Griffin’s refusal was for the purpose of facilitating the members’ plan
to “freeze out” Linden and, therefore, was a breach of his fiduciary duties. He
further alleges that the members held secret meetings and met with the
corporation’s counsel to discuss their freeze out plan and to propose an amended
operating agreement and private placement memorandum for Gryphon. An
amended operating agreement was eventually signed by the members in late 2008,
which Linden alleges contains false and fraudulent statements of fact.
Linden further alleges that, in late 2008 or early 2009, the members
falsely accused him of stealing from Gryphon and that Griffin filed criminal
charges against him for the purpose of inducing Linden to limit his managerial role
in Gryphon or to cause the remaining members to believe Linden had engaged in
criminal activity.
-3-
An arbitration clause contained in the amended and restated operating
agreement is the subject of this appeal. It provides:
If any dispute shall arise between the Interest
Holders as to their rights or liabilities under this
agreement, the dispute shall be exclusively determined,
and the dispute shall be settled, by arbitration in
accordance with the commercial rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
The clause further describes the number of arbitrators, the method for their
selection, the finality of the arbitrator’s decision and the allocation of costs. It
concludes in bold print capital letters:
EACH OF THE INTEREST HOLDERS HEREBY
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS PROVISION
CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THEIR RIGHT TO
COMMENCE A LAWSUIT IN ANY
JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO THE
MATTERS WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE
SETTLED BY ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED IN
THIS SECTION 21.7.
There is no dispute that Linden signed the amended and restated operating
agreement.
After Linden filed his complaint, the members moved to compel arbitration
under the operating agreement and KRS 417.060. Following a hearing, the trial
court issued a written order wherein it found that all business-related claims were
subject to arbitration. However, the trial court found that the abuse of process and
defamation claims were unrelated to the operating agreement and, therefore, not
subject to arbitration. The trial court further held that it retained jurisdiction to
address motions for equitable relief but cautioned Linden that an injunction may be
-4-
impractical or inappropriate. Nevertheless, Linden subsequently filed a motion for
a temporary injunction.
Pursuant to KRS 417.220(1)(a), the members filed a notice of appeal from
the trial court’s order denying part of its arbitration request and then filed a motion
seeking that the trial court vacate its order setting a hearing on Linden’s motion for
temporary injunction because a notice of appeal had been filed from the trial
court’s arbitration order. The trial court granted the motion stating that “the Court
has sent some of the claims in this case to arbitration and the claims it did not send
to arbitration have now been appealed. There is nothing left here in Jefferson
Circuit Court.”
Linden filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court requesting that
the trial court be directed to exercise jurisdiction over his motion for a temporary
injunction. This Court denied the petition and Linden appealed to the Kentucky
Supreme Court.
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, Linden v. Cunningham,
2010 WL 5258474 (Linden I), the Supreme Court affirmed. Relying on City of
Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990), the Court held that the
filing of a notice of appeal by Griffin divested the trial court of jurisdiction to rule
on Linden’s motion for a temporary injunction. However, there was
fractionalization among the Court with Justice Noble concurring in result only and
Justices Scott, Cunningham and Venters dissenting. Justice Scott’s dissenting
opinion explained the potential quagmire created by the decision as follows:
-5-
The problem created by applying the “general rule” to
interlocutory appeals is it deprives the trial courts of their
necessary case management authority. Thus, under the
majority's approach, once an interlocutory appeal is filed,
the trial court no longer has the ability to manage its
cases and proceed in a fashion it determines suitable for
the parties-while the appellate courts resolve tangentially
related issues.
Finally, I recognize that most trial judges will stay all
appropriate proceedings rather than attempting to try the
remaining parts of the case while other connected issues
are on appeal. However, in the rare scenario where a
judge decides to plow ahead anyway-disregarding the
conventional wisdom of waiting until the appellate issues
are resolved-our rules have other means in place by
which the parties can seek appropriate relief from the
appellate courts to halt these exceedingly rare situations
(i.e., a writ of mandamus or prohibition under CR 76.36
or for intermediate relief under CR 76.33). Thus, our
rules provide an adequate means with which to preserve
order without creating “chaos” in the court that still has
other necessary matters to attend to. And why else would
we have these rules of relief if an appeal of an
interlocutory order totally disposed of a trial court's
jurisdiction?
Thus, while the trial court here acted prudently during
the pendency of the appeal when it refused to adjudicate
the cases not ordered to arbitration, the majority's
statement reflecting its loss of jurisdiction goes too far
and establishes a dangerous and chaotic precedent.
Having provided the factual and procedural background, we turn to the
issues presented. The initial issue is whether KRS 417.220(1)(a) is
unconstitutional.
WHETHER KRS 417.220(1)(a) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
-6-
KRS 417.220(1)(a) provides in part that “[a]n appeal may be taken
from: [a]n order denying an application to compel arbitration made under KRS
417.060 . . . .” Linden argues that because the statute permits an appeal from an
interlocutory order, the General Assembly has interfered with the Supreme Court’s
authority to “prescribe . . . rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice”
as proscribed in Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The separation of powers doctrine emanates from Sections 27 and 28 of the
Kentucky Constitution. Section 27 provides that:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments,
and each of them be confined to a separate body of
magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which
are judicial, to another.
Section 28 states:
No person or collection of persons, being of one of those
departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted.
When read in conjunction, the two constitutional provisions preserve the concept
of three distinct departments of government and the fundamental principle that the
legislature cannot invade the province of the judiciary. American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 379
S.W.2d 450, 453-454 (Ky. 1964). Thus, the Court’s rule making power, which
includes our rules of civil procedure, is “firmly rooted within the Constitution.”
Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1984).
-7-
The fallacy in Linden’s contention is that he ignores Section 250 of
the Kentucky Constitution which vests the General Assembly with the power to
“enact such laws as shall be necessary and proper to decide differences by
arbitrators, the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties who may choose that
summary mode of adjustment.” By definition, arbitration is not a judicial function:
Under our Constitution, it is a legislative matter.
On similar reasoning, this Court has previously rejected a constitutional
challenge based on the separation of powers doctrine to the KUAA. In Dutschke v.
Jim Russell Realtors, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 817, 824 (Ky.App. 2008), the Court stated:
We first note that, as previously discussed,
Section 250 of the Kentucky Constitution specifically
vests the legislature with the power to enact necessary
and proper laws to establish an arbitration system in
Kentucky. It follows that it was not a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine for the legislature to enact
the KUAA.
The power of the legislature to enact the KUAA necessarily includes the power to
provide the process for judicial review. Consistent with Dutschke, Linden’s
constitutional challenge is without merit. We now turn to the substantive issues
presented by both appeals.
THE VALIDITY OF
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
In 1984, Kentucky adopted the KUAA wherein it specifically validated
arbitration agreements.2 KRS 417.050 reads in part:
2
As relevant to this appeal, the KUAA and the Federal Arbitration Act contain identical
provisions so that federal law is deemed persuasive.
-8-
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy
to arbitration or a provision in written contract to submit
to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of
any contract.
Following the adoption of the Act and consistent with the General Assembly’s
directive, our Courts have consistently expressed that arbitration agreements are
favored. See e.g., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Abner, 260
S.W.3d 351, 353 (Ky.App. 2008). As stated in Valley Const. Co., Inc. v. Perry
Host Management Co. Inc., 796 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Ky.App. 1990):
The burden of establishing the existence of an
arbitration agreement that conforms to statutory
requirements rests with the party seeking to enforce it,
but once prima facie evidence thereof has been presented,
the statutory presumption of its validity (KRS 417.050)
accrues, and the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut the presumption then shifts to the party seeking
to avoid the agreement, Marciniak v. Amid, 162
Mich.App. 71, 412 N.W.2d 248 (1987), and this is a
heavy burden.
However, the Act recognizes that such agreements are subject to the general
rules of contract. KRS 417.050 contains a savings clause that provides that
arbitration may be avoided “upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of
any contract.” Linden argues that his allegations of fraud in the inducement and
mutual and unilateral mistake are general rules of contract that invalidate an
arbitration agreement.
-9-
We do not comment on the merits of Linden’s claims and only address
whether the issues of fraud in the inducement and mistake are to be decided by the
court or the arbitrator.
In Louisville Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2004), the Court
interpreted the savings clause to apply “only when the allegation of fraud goes to
the making of the arbitration clause itself rather than the underlying contract in
general . . . .” Id. at 854. The Court explained that permitting a party to avoid
arbitration by pleading fraudulent inducement in the underlying contract would
“vitiate the primary benefit of arbitration, the expeditious and inexpensive
resolution of disputes, and would effectively eviscerate the arbitration statute.” Id.
at 856, (quoting Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Company, 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967)). In Consultants
and Builders, Inc. v. Paducah Federal Credit Union, 266 S.W.3d 837, 839840 (Ky.App. 2008), the Court elaborated on Louisville Peterbilt, Inc. Quoting the
United States Supreme Court, it stated:
More recently, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 1208, 163
L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006), the United States Supreme Court
addressed legal or equitable “[c]hallenges to the validity
of arbitration agreements[,]” and divided such challenges
into two categories:
One type challenges specifically the validity
of the agreement to arbitrate. . . . The other
challenges the contract as a whole, either on
a ground that directly affects the entire
agreement (e.g., the agreement was
fraudulently induced), or on the ground that
-10-
the illegality of one of the contract's
provisions renders the whole contract
invalid.
The Court concluded that three propositions apply to the
issue of whether a challenge to an arbitration provision
should be resolved by a court or by an arbitrator:
First, as a matter of substantive federal
arbitration law, an arbitration provision is
severable from the remainder of the
contract. Second, unless the challenge is to
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract's validity is considered by the
arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this
arbitration law applies in state as well as
federal courts.
546 U.S. at 445-46, 126 S.Ct. at 1209. See also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852,
79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18
L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). So that no misunderstanding
would result, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
“regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal
or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract
as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause,
must go to the arbitrator.” 546 U.S. at 449, 126 S.Ct. at
1210.
Thus, although the court must decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate,
whether the underlying contract is invalid, whether because of fraud or mutual
mistake, is to be decided by the arbitrator. Valued Services of Kentucky, LLC v.
Watkins, 309 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Ky.App. 2009) (disc. review denied).
Linden attempts to avoid the arbitration agreement and submit the issues of
fraud in the inducement and mutual mistake to the Court by an appellate rewrite of
his complaint to frame the issue as an attack on the arbitration clause itself.
-11-
However, we agree with the trial court that the allegations in the complaint target
the amended operating agreement in its entirety and not the specific arbitration
clause.
In his complaint, Linden asserted that the “inclusion of materially different
terms from the original operating agreement was the result of mutual mistake of
the parties and/or the unilateral mistake of the Plaintiff Dr. Linden coupled with
fraud of Defendant Tid Griffin and other Defendants.” Although repeated
averments are made in regard to the amended operating agreement, there is not
even a mention of the arbitration clause in the context of fraud or mistake.
Therefore, the validity of the amended operating agreement is properly subject to
arbitration.
THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The scope of an arbitration clause is an issue to be decided by the court;
however, the decision is made in the context of the General Assembly’s declaration
that the issue be resolved in favor of arbitration. Louisville Peterbilt, Inc., 132
S.W.3d at 855. Accordingly, we address whether Linden’s claims are subject to
arbitration or are to be resolved by judicial decision.
The court’s concern when deciding the scope of arbitration agreements is to
faithfully reflect the reasonable expectation of the parties. Valued Services of
Kentucky, LLC, 309 S.W.3d at 262. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has further
elaborated:
-12-
A proper method of analysis here is to ask if an action
could be maintained without reference to the contract or
relationship at issue. If it could, it is likely outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement. Torts may often fall
into this category, but merely casting a complaint in tort
does not mean that the arbitration provision does not
apply. Even real torts can be covered by arbitration
clauses if the allegations underlying the claims ‘touch
matters' covered by the agreement. We are, however,
aware of the Supreme Court's warning against forcing
unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably
would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would
decide.
Fazio v. Lehman Bros. Inc, 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
The arbitration clause provides for the arbitration of all disputes
“between the Interest Holders as to their rights or liabilities under this
agreement. . . .” Linden’s claims for fraud, declaratory judgment, breach of
fiduciary duty, Blue Sky Law violations, and his demand for accountings fall
squarely within the arbitration provision. Linden alleges that the members
committed fraud, “for the purpose of divesting, among other purposes, of divesting
Plaintiff of his ownership and governance rights in the LLC” a matter directly
addressed in the amended operating agreement. Likewise, his requests for a
determination of the ownership interests of the members and the validity of the
corporate documents not only reference the amended operating agreement but
render its interpretation inevitable. He alleges breach of fiduciary duties by the
members, which are duties created by the amended operating agreement.
-13-
Similarly, the claimed violation of the Blue Sky Laws and demand for accounting
necessarily require reference to the agreement.
Linden offers no evidence to suggest that the claims for fraud, declaratory
judgment, breach of fiduciary duty, Blue Sky Law violations, and his demand for
accountings are not within the arbitration provision. Absent affirmative evidence
such as an affidavit, Linden cannot meet his burden of establishing that the claims
are not subject to arbitration in view of the plain language of the arbitration clause.
Valley Const. Co., Inc., 796 S.W.2d at 368. Because these claims cannot be
maintained without reference to the amended operating agreement, they are within
the scope of the arbitration clause.
The issue remains whether the trial court properly denied arbitration
of Linden’s remaining claims. Kentucky courts have upheld arbitration provisions
broadly drafted to encompass contract, tort, and statutory claims. See e.g.,
Louisville Peterbilt, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 850; Kodak Min. Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp.,
669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984). In this case, the trial court concluded that the
language “as to rights or liabilities under this agreement” was a limitation on the
claims to be arbitrated that precluded Linden’s claims for defamation, abuse of
process, and request for injunctive relief from arbitration.
An arbitration agreement should not be expanded merely to prevent
piecemeal litigation for the sake of judicial efficiency. Hill v. Hilliard, 945 S.W.2d
948 (Ky.App. 1996). Thus, if the arbitration clause at issue is not sufficiently
broad to include Linden’s claims of defamation, abuse of process and for
-14-
injunctive relief, the trial court properly declined to compel arbitration of those
claims.
In Hill, the Court analyzed an arbitration provision requiring that an
employee “arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between [her]
and [her] firm.” Id. at 950. The Court concluded that the employee’s claims for
sexual harassment, retaliation, and violation of the equal pay law related to her
employment relationship and were subject to arbitration. However, the employee’s
claims that a co-worker had raped, assaulted, and falsely imprisoned her while on a
business trip were not within the ambit of the arbitration clause. The Court
emphasized that the alleged offenses did not arise out of the employment as
required by the arbitration clause. “The mere fact that these tort claims might not
have arisen but for the fact that the two individuals were together as a result of an
employer-sponsored trip cannot be determinative.” Id. at 952.
The defamation and abuse of process claims asserted by Linden are not
within the scope of the arbitration clause. They are the result of Griffin filing a
criminal complaint and not from any act or omission that arose under the amended
operating agreement. The initiation of a criminal complaint against a member of
the LLC is far beyond the normal course of matters covered under the amended
operating agreement and is not a matter that could have been reasonably expected
to be governed by the agreement. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s
observation: “Griffin chose to go outside the customary confines of conversations,
correspondence, and resolutions by involving the court and the threat of non-15-
financial consequences.” The trial court properly refused to compel arbitration of
Linden’s defamation and abuse of process claims.
The final issue to be resolved is whether the trial court erred when it refused
to compel arbitration of Linden’s claim for injunctive relief. We conclude that the
issue before this Court is distinct from the issue presented and decided by the
Supreme Court in Linden I.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court was
divested of subject matter jurisdiction because of the filing of a notice of appeal
from the trial court’s refusal to order arbitration of Linden’s claims for defamation,
abuse of process, and injunctive relief. The issue presented in this appeal is
whether the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction
pending arbitration. Specifically, Linden requested an injunction preventing the
members from interfering with his managerial position, divesting him of any
membership interest, and soliciting any investments in Gryphon. In essence, he
seeks to maintain the status quo.
Thus, while we certainly adhere to our responsibility to comply with the law
of the case as established by our Supreme Court, we do not interpret its opinion to
resolve the issue before this Court.
The amended operating agreement states that any arbitration
proceeding is to be governed by the rules of the American Arbitration Association,
which provide for injunctive relief. Although these rules permit the arbitrator to
grant injunctive relief, they also anticipate that relief may be sought in court.
-16-
American Arbitration Association Rules, Section 34. The issue is whether the
court has subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief after it has referred all
or some of the claims to arbitration.
We would be remiss if our discussion was not prefaced with the significance
of a court’s power to issue injunctions. It is a power vested in the judiciary and, as
explained in Smothers, 672 S.W.2d at 64, is crucial to the effective administration
of justice.
[A] court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause
of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant
of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably
necessary to the administration of justice in the case
before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when
necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject
matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to
make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a
temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal
action.
We are not convinced that arbitration deprives the court of its inherent power to
issue injunctions.
There are no reported Kentucky cases addressing whether a court
retains its inherent judicial power to issue equitable relief in cases subject to
arbitration. However, the majority of federal courts, including the Sixth Circuit,
have held that in limited situations, a binding arbitration clause does not preclude a
court from granting emergency injunctive relief. See Drago v. Holiday Isle,
L.L.C., 537 F.Supp.2d 1219 (S.D. Ala. 2007). We are persuaded by the decision in
Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Quester Publishers, Inc., 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir.
-17-
1995), wherein the Court held that trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
grant preliminary injunctive relief in disputes subject to arbitration.
After a thorough review of the relevant case law,
we adopt the reasoning of the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and arguably the Ninth, Circuits and
hold that in a dispute subject to mandatory arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court has
subject matter jurisdiction under § 3 of the Act to grant
preliminary injunctive relief provided that the party
seeking the relief satisfies the four criteria which are
prerequisites to the grant of such relief. We further
conclude that a grant of preliminary injunctive relief
pending arbitration is particularly appropriate and
furthers the Congressional purpose behind the Federal
Arbitration Act, where the withholding of injunctive
relief would render the process of arbitration meaningless
or a hollow formality because an arbitral award, at the
time it was rendered, could not return the parties
substantially to the status quo ante.
Id. at 1380 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We conclude that the
reasoning expressed in Performance Unlimited, Inc. is sound.
Although the purpose of arbitration is to expeditiously resolve the parties’
disputes, the process remains time consuming and presents an opportunity for
mischief. In contrast, judicial relief permits an evidentiary hearing in an expedited
manner and a resulting injunction that can be enforced by the court in which it was
issued. The trial court retains jurisdiction to preserve the status quo until an
arbitration panel can be appointed and the panel reaches a decision. Further, it
retains jurisdiction to enforce any decision reached by the arbitration panel.
Permitting the court to retain jurisdiction to issue and enforce injunctions furthers
the purpose of arbitration by providing an orderly and expedient remedy.
-18-
We are aware of the limitation placed on our holding by our Supreme
Court’s holding that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction upon the filing of an
appeal from a denial of arbitration. Even so, the trial court is in the best position to
conduct evidentiary hearings and provide immediate access to the judicial system.
Not only would the evidentiary record provided by the trial court be informative on
appeal prior to the formation and appointment of the arbitrator or arbitration panel,
the trial court could provide injunctive relief to either party upon request. After the
appointment of the arbitrator or arbitration panel, the trial court would be available
to aid the arbitration panel in enforcement of any recommendations as to injunctive
relief. In contrast, the arbitrator or the arbitration panel has no judicial powers
such as contempt, or to order the freezing of accounts, or to maintain the status
quo.
We anticipate that the Supreme Court will revisit this issue and will have
access to the complete record. It will not be unnoticed that the appellant
immediately filed a notice of appeal. Although perhaps not intended to be such,
this case presents an opportunity for chaos as predicted by Justice Scott. A notice
of appeal can be used as a trial tactic to cause delay and to allow appellants to
maintain control of the corporation to the exclusion of the appellee. During the
pendency of this appeal and the appeal of the writ of mandamus, the status quo has
not been maintained and the record is silent as to whether an arbitration panel has
been appointed or what steps or remedies are being pursued at this time. The
legislature authorized arbitration to encourage expedient dispute resolution; yet,
-19-
the notice of appeal can be another weapon to cause delay. Under the
circumstances, arbitration could likely be a hollow exercise.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief and
emergency relief until such time as a notice of appeal is filed. We do not comment
on whether injunctive relief is proper. That is a decision for the trial court
following an evidentiary hearing. However, based upon the law of the case, after a
notice of appeal is filed, the trial court has no jurisdiction to provide injunctive
emergency relief.
Based on the foregoing, the orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR
APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Kent Wicker
Jennifer A. Schultz
Louisville, Kentucky
Ann B. Oldfather
R. Sean Deskins
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES:
Donald L. Cox
John D. Cox
Louisville, Kentucky
Kent Wicker
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/APPELLANT:
Ann B. Oldfather
Louisville, Kentucky
-20-
-21-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.