DIXON (DAVID H.) VS. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HARLAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000941-MR
DAVID H. DIXON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY PAYNE, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00774
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
HARLAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: David H. Dixon (Dixon) appeals from the trial court’s
dismissal of his complaint and imposition of a restraining order. On appeal, Dixon
argues that he was not required to issue summons and the trial court erred when it
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
dismissed his complaint for failure to timely do so. He also argues that the trial
court erred when it ordered him to remove certain photographs from his website,
since those photographs were already part of the public record. Finally, Dixon sets
forth what he believes should take place on remand. The Board of Education of
Harlan County, Kentucky (the Board), argues to the contrary. Having reviewed the
parties’ briefs, the record, and relevant law, we affirm.
FACTS
The dispute between Dixon and the Board has been pending, in one
form or another, and in both state and federal courts, since 1996. However, the
record we have before us begins on October 26, 2005, with Dixon’s complaint and
appeal of an order entered by a three-member tribunal.2 Although what occurred
before then is not necessarily pertinent to this Opinion, we believe it is helpful to
an understanding of what brought the parties before us.
In 1996, the Board dismissed Dixon as a teacher. We take our
recitation of what else occurred prior to 2005 from the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals Opinion in Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2007).
At the time Dixon lost his job, he was in his 26th year of
teaching carpentry at Cumberland High School. He also
maintained a studio in downtown Cumberland that
2
We note that there apparently are two circuit court files, one with a 1996 case number, which
has not been provided to us on appeal, and one with a 2005 case number, which has been
provided to us on appeal. Some pleadings and orders from the 1996 case file are in the record
before us as attachments to pleadings filed in the 2005 case file. Furthermore, it appears that
some pleadings and orders entered after 2005 that are referred to by the parties in their pleadings
must have been placed in the 1996 case file because they are not contained in the 2005 case file.
Because some documents are missing, the procedural history is somewhat vague and we have
made some assumptions from what we have before us. However, the documents that apparently
were not filed in the 2005 case file are not necessary to our decision.
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allowed him to satisfy his lifelong passion for
photography. Dixon is considerably accomplished in the
field, having received several awards for his work. He
was allowed to pursue his alternative career as a
professional photographer with the official permission of
the school.
At least in the beginning, the photo shoot at issue in the
present case was completely innocent. Dixon, operating
with school approval, had offered students the
opportunity to come to his studio on October 24, 1995 to
retake their senior yearbook pictures. S.C. was one of the
students who took Dixon up on his offer. She and another
female student arrived at the studio around 6:00 p.m. that
evening. Ultimately, the other girl left, and S.C. and
Dixon found themselves alone together. In at least some
of the pictures that Dixon then took of her, S.C. was
wearing no clothing from the waist up, although her
nipples were covered either by her hair or a “fishnet.”
Dixon received a letter almost five months later
informing him that he had been suspended by the school
pending termination of his contract. The letter, authored
by then-Superintendent of the Harlan County School
System Grace Ann Tolliver, cited Dixon's having taken
“topless” photographs of a student. This was deemed to
be “conduct unbecoming a teacher” within the meaning
of Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. (KRS) § 161.790(1)(b). . . .
A long and complex road of hearings, appeals, remands,
and lawsuits ensued. Because Dixon's claims stem
principally from alleged due process violations during his
state proceedings, this procedural history is far more
relevant than the factual background to the issues
involved in this appeal. The district court's concise
summary of the relevant state proceedings reads as
follows:
To terminate Dixon's contract, a tribunal
was convened by the Harlan County School
Board to hear the charges against Dixon.
Susan Lawson, the school board's attorney,
presented evidence against Dixon, including
several groups of photographs which
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showed S.C. without any clothing above the
waist. Dixon admitted to taking some of the
photographs, arguing they were not “nude”
because the student's nipples and part of her
breast were covered with either hair or a
fishnet. Dixon adamantly denied taking
other photographs which were more
revealing, stating that the photographs were
not his.
The tribunal unanimously found Dixon
guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher and,
by a 2-1 vote, upheld Tolliver's
recommendation that Dixon be terminated.
The tribunal based this decision on
unanimous findings that Dixon participated
in guiding S.C. in the poses in which she has
no clothes above the waist, that S.C. never
told Dixon she was 18, and that Dixon took
all of the photographs and those photographs
were unaltered. Dixon's own counsel at the
hearing, JoEllen McComb, admitted that
Dixon took photographs of S.C. without any
clothing above the waist.
Dixon appealed the decision to the Harlan
Circuit Court. However, after an
approximate eight year delay (the reasons
for which are unclear), Judge R. Cletus
Maricle ordered a re-sentencing of Dixon,
finding that the instructions given by the
hearing officer were erroneous and that
additional mitigating factors should be
considered. Judge Maricle determined that,
under Kentucky law, the tribunal should
have been explicitly informed that in
addition to upholding or vacating Dixon's
termination, the tribunal could have imposed
a lesser punishment even with its finding of
conduct unbecoming a teacher. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed, and
clarified that “[t]he trial court upheld the
finding of conduct unbecoming a teacher but
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remanded for additional findings that may or
may not result in the imposition of a lesser
sentence.” The state appeals court further
noted that no additional proof was to be
taken.
On September 26-28, 2005, the resentencing was held with Michael Head
serving as the hearing officer. The evidence
from the previous hearing held eight [years]
earlier . . . was put into the record over the
objections of Dixon's counsel. Head then
instructed the new tribunal to make findings
of fact as to S.C.'s age representation to
Dixon and as to who suggested the poses, as
per Judge Maricle's August 15th Order. The
tribunal was then given the correct
instructions, and upheld Dixon's
termination.
Id. at 668-70 (citing Dixon v. Clem, 404 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963-64 (E.D. Ky. 2005)).
Specifically, the second tribunal stated in its final order that the only issue
before it was the “sentence” to be imposed on Dixon. The tribunal also stated that,
pursuant to pre-hearing orders, it could only consider the evidence that had been
presented to the first tribunal. Based on its review of that evidence, the second
tribunal concluded that Dixon “admitted he took pictures of [S.C.], a student of his,
with no clothes on above her waist.” Furthermore, the second tribunal found that,
whether S.C. suggested the poses or agreed to them, Dixon should not have
permitted the situation to arise, and had engaged in “conduct unbecoming a
teacher.” A majority of the second tribunal then agreed that the Board’s
termination of Dixon’s contract was appropriate. However, one of the members
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thought that Dixon should have been permitted to take leave sufficient to permit
him to retire with full benefits.
As noted above, Dixon appealed the second tribunal’s order by filing a
complaint in circuit court. In his complaint, Dixon argued, among other things,
that the hearing officer at the tribunal impermissibly refused to permit Dixon to
present evidence that had not been presented to the first tribunal; that the tribunal
reviewed photographs that had been fraudulently altered; that the hearing officer
impermissibly participated in the tribunal’s deliberations; that the hearing officer
incorrectly instructed the tribunal with regard to what findings of fact it was
required to make; and that the tribunal failed to connect Dixon’s photographic
work with his work as a teacher. Although Dixon argued at great length before the
circuit court and argues at great length before us that the photographs were altered,
“fake,” and/or fraudulent, he did not raise any issue with regard to the authenticity
of the photographs when he appealed from the first tribunal’s order. He did,
however, testify before the first tribunal that he did not believe all of the
photographs were his.
On December 1, 2005, the circuit court affirmed the second tribunal’s order.
In doing so, the circuit court noted that, when it remanded the matter after the first
tribunal’s order, it ordered the tribunal to “make specific findings of fact
. . . and to consider all mitigating circumstances in imposing the same or a lesser
permissible penalty based upon a determination of conduct unbecoming a teacher.”
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Furthermore, the court noted that it “did not grant leave for either party to take
additional proof.”
It appears that Dixon then filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate and the
Board filed a motion to confirm the second tribunal's final order. On May 27,
2006, the court granted Dixon's motion to vacate and the Board's motion to
confirm, and the court adopted the second tribunal's final order. It is unclear why
Dixon did not appeal from that order or what occurred to keep that order from
becoming final and appealable. What is clear is that the Board filed a motion to
dismiss and, because Dixon threatened to post the photographs on a website, the
Board filed a motion seeking a restraining order. Judge Payne, sitting as a special
judge, ultimately granted the Board's motion to dismiss and ordered Dixon to
remove any photos of S.C. from his website. Judge Payne also ordered Dixon to
"cease and desist from dissemination of the evidentiary materials that were placed
under seal." This appeal followed.
We set forth additional facts below as necessary in our analysis of the issues
raised by Dixon on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Dixon raises primarily issues of law on appeal, our review is de
novo. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001). With this
standard in mind, we address the issues raised by Dixon below.
ANALYSIS
1. Prohibition from Dissemination of Photographs
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We first address whether the trial court erred in ordering Dixon to remove
photographs of S.C. from his website. In support of his argument, Dixon states
that, although previously sealed, Judge Maricle removed that seal, making the
photographs part of the public record. However, Dixon mischaracterizes Judge
Maricle's order.
In his December 21, 2004, order, Judge Maricle stated "that all parties and
their counsel shall have access to all exhibits filed in the instant case in the Harlan
Circuit Court Clerk’s office. Parties and counsel may inspect exhibits and have
copies and prints made from the exhibits at a nearby location provided they are
accompanied by a person from the Harlan Circuit Court Clerk’s office while these
copies or prints are being made.” This order permits the parties and their
counsel to have access to and to copy the photographs, but only under extremely
limited circumstances. It does not make those photographs part of the public
record, nor does it permit the public to have access to or copy the photographs.
Dixon's argument to the contrary is without merit.
We note Dixon's argument that the court's order violates his First
Amendment rights. However, that argument could and should have been made at
the time the photographs were placed under seal. Because Dixon has not argued
that placing the photographs under seal was constitutionally inappropriate, we will
not address his First Amendment argument.
Based on the preceding, we hold that the circuit court did not err in ordering
Dixon to cease and desist from disseminating the photographs through his website.
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2. Issuance of Summons
We next address whether Dixon was required to issue summons in order to
timely perfect his appeal of the second tribunal's final order. KRS 13B140(1)
provides that
All final orders of an agency shall be subject to judicial
review in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
A party shall institute an appeal by filing a petition in the
Circuit Court of venue, as provided in the agency's
enabling statutes, within thirty (30) days after the final
order of the agency is mailed or delivered by personal
service. If venue for appeal is not stated in the enabling
statutes, a party may appeal to Franklin Circuit Court or
the Circuit Court of the county in which the appealing
party resides or operates a place of business. Copies of
the petition shall be served by the petitioner upon the
agency and all parties of record. The petition shall
include the names and addresses of all parties to the
proceeding and the agency involved, and a statement of
the grounds on which the review is requested. The
petition shall be accompanied by a copy of the final
order.
Dixon filed his petition within thirty days of the second tribunal's final order
and served copies on counsel for the opposing parties. However, he did not serve
copies on the parties, and he did not cause summons to issue until nearly four
months after he filed his complaint. Because Dixon did not cause summons to
issue within thirty days of the second tribunal's final order, the circuit court
dismissed his complaint. Dixon argues that the circuit court erred because he was
not required to obtain issuance of summons to initiate his appeal. The Board
argues that Dixon's appeal of the second tribunal's final order was an original
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action and is therefore governed by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR),
which require issuance of summons to initiate an action.
Having reviewed the record, we agree that the circuit court properly
dismissed Dixon's action for four reasons. First, we note that "[w]here a statute
prescribes the method for taking an appeal from an administrative action and the
time in which the appeal must be taken, these requirements are mandatory and
must be met in order for the circuit court to obtain jurisdiction to hear the case."
Frisby v. Board of Educ. of Boyle County, 707 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. App. 1986).
As set forth above, KRS 13B.140(1) requires an appealing party to serve "all
parties of record." It does not state that an appealing party shall serve the parties or
their attorneys. By serving only the parties' attorneys, Dixon did not strictly
comply with the mandatory requirements of KRS 13B.140(1). Therefore, even if
service on the parties was the only requirement to initiate an appeal in circuit court,
Dixon did not meet that requirement.
We recognize Dixon's argument that the appellate rules indicate that a notice
of appeal may be served on a party's counsel rather than on the party. CR 76.03(1).
However, that rule applies only to appeals to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. It does not apply to petitions for review from
administrative agencies to circuit courts. Furthermore, the rule specifically
provides for alternative service, a provision not contained in KRS 13B.140(1).
Second, KRS 23A.010 grants jurisdiction to circuit courts to review
administrative actions in certain circumstances; however, the statute provides that
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"[s]uch review shall not constitute an appeal but an original action." KRS
23A.010(4). Pursuant to CR 3.01, actions are commenced in circuit court "by the
filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a summons . . . ." CR 3.01.
Because an appeal of an agency's final order is an original action, the civil rules
apply. Pursuant to the civil rules, Dixon was required to file his complaint and
cause summons to be issued to commence his action. He did not timely do so;
therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction.
Third, we agree with Dixon that other administrative appeal statutes
contain language requiring issuance of summons to initiate an appeal while KRS
13B.140(1) does not. See KRS 151.186(1) and KRS 216B.115(2). However,
Dixon is over-reading KRS 13B.140(1)'s silence. CR 1(2) states that the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure govern "procedure and practice in all actions of a civil
nature in the Court of Justice except for special statutory proceedings, in which the
procedural requirements of the statute shall prevail over any inconsistent
procedures set forth in the Rules." As noted above, KRS 13B.140(1) states that a
petitioner shall serve all parties with a copy of the petition. CR 3.01 requires
issuance of summons to commence an action. These are not inconsistent
provisions. In fact, they address two different procedural issues. One, KRS
13B.140(1), addresses who must be served, and the other, CR 3.01, addresses how
an action is commenced. Because these provisions are not inconsistent, a party
who wants to appeal from an agency order under KRS 13B.140(1) must file a
complaint and cause summons to be issued to all parties within 30 days after the
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agency's final order. Dixon failed to do this; therefore, the circuit court properly
dismissed his complaint.
Fourth, we acknowledge that the wording in KRS 13B.140(1) could lead an
appellant to believe that all he need do to initiate an appeal is file a petition and
serve the parties. However, the second tribunal's final order specifically addressed
any potential confusion by warning the parties that "[s]ome courts have interpreted
[KRS 23A.010(4)] to mean that a summons must be served upon filing an appeal
in circuit court." Therefore, Dixon was on notice that prudence dictated issuance
of summons. For the foregoing reasons, we discern no error in Judge Payne's
dismissal of Dixon's complaint.
3. Disqualification of Judge Payne
Dixon argues that Judge Payne "dismissed the case for legally frivolous
reasons and imposed a patently unconstitutional restraining order – all within the
space of twenty-four hours" which justifies his removal. Because we have
affirmed Judge Payne's order, this issue is moot and we need not address it.
However, as set forth above, we note that Judge Payne's reasons for dismissing
Dixon's case were not frivolous. Furthermore, the restraining order was not
patently unconstitutional but merely enforced an already existing order sealing the
photographs. We also note that, while Judge Payne's involvement in this case may
not have been lengthy, it does not take a significant period of time to determine
whether a summons has been timely issued or a court order has been violated.
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Finally, Dixon's statements that Judge Payne's order was based on frivolity,
that he is oblivious, and that he did not take "seriously the restriction of staying
within the bounds of the law" are neither appropriate nor beneficial. We note that
the Federal District Court sanctioned Dixon's counsel because of his behavior
before it and that counsel's lack of decorum with regard to Dixon's state and federal
cases are not isolated events. See Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d at 676-79.
The federal
sanctions apparently had no impact on counsel's conduct. We take vehement
exception to counsel's comments and remind him that, regardless of his personal
feelings, he is bound by the rules of professional ethics which require him to treat
the judiciary of the Commonwealth respectfully.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record, we hold that the circuit court properly ordered
Dixon to cease and desist from disseminating photographs that had been placed
under seal. Furthermore, we hold that Dixon did not timely initiate his action in
circuit court; therefore, the court properly dismissed his complaint.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffrey M. Blum
Louisville, Kentucky
Jonathan C. Shaw
Paintsville, Kentucky
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