KATHY L. HOSKINS VS. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS; DISABILITY APPEALS COMMITTEE OF KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS; AND KENTUCKY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION OF JULY 9, 2010, WITHDRAWN
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000905-MR
KATHY HOSKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HON. THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01420
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS;
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS; DISABILITY
APPEALS COMMITTEE OF THE
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS;
AND KENTUCKY EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WHITE, SENIOR JUDGE: Kathy Hoskins, a former dispatcher for the Kentucky
State Police (KSP), appeals from a Franklin Circuit Court order affirming the
decision of the board of trustees (Board) of the Kentucky Retirement Systems to
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Senior Judge White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
deny her disability retirement benefits. This case comes before this Court for
reconsideration based upon Hoskins’ petition for rehearing.
In our previous review, we affirmed the circuit court order based upon
Hoskins’ failure to comply with the statutorily imposed filing deadline. The
hearing officer’s findings of fact stated that Hoskins’ claim for benefits was filed
on March 5, 2004. The statute of limitation ended on February 28, 2004.
However, Hoskins actually filed her motion within the prescribed statutory period.
The hearing officer’s finding of fact was erroneous. Hoskins failed to file a motion
to correct the mistake and failed to indicate the mistake in her brief. Hoskins also
failed to ensure that the properly date-stamped documents were included in the
appellate record.
During our review of record, we discovered the date in the hearing
officer’s findings of fact and had no reason to believe that the claim was not filed
outside of the 24-month period. The appellant bears the burden of assuring all
relevant documents were provided to the appellate court. Fanelli v.
Commonwealth, 423 S.W.2d 255, 257-58 (Ky. 1968). Although we did not
address the grounds relied upon by the circuit court, appellate courts may affirm on
separate grounds not relied upon by the trial court. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 122 S.W.3d
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588, 589 (Ky. App. 2002). Therefore, we affirmed the circuit court’s order.
Hoskins timely
petitioned our Court for rehearing. The motion was granted.
I. Factual Background
In 1987, Hoskins began her employment with the KSP as a dispatcher.
She was eventually promoted to the position of office supervisor. Her duties
included sedentary duties, such as: clerical tasks, ordering supplies, inventory, and
supervising secretarial staff. Her last day of employment with KSP was on
February 28, 2002. Hoskins amassed a total of 182 months of membership in the
Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS).
During her employment, Hoskins missed significant periods of work
due to injuries that she sustained in a 1989 car accident. Although Hoskins
returned to work after the accident, she took periodic leaves of absence due to her
injuries and surgeries.2
On December 6, 2001, Hoskins filed an application for disability
retirement with KERS. In the application Hoskins claimed that she suffered from
arthritis in her hands, feet, and arms, tendinitis in her left arm, vision problems, lost
sense of smell, an anxiety disorder, high blood pressure, chronic sinusitis, chronic
fatigue, obsessive compulsive disorder, and severe depression. She further claimed
that her job made her mental illness worse.
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Hoskins underwent a total of fifty surgeries related to the injuries that she sustained in the 1989
car accident.
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Hoskins’ first application for disability retirement benefits was
denied. Although the hearing officer found that Hoskins had greatly suffered as a
result of the injuries that she received in the automobile accident, the officer found
that Hoskins was able to perform the duties of her position, both physically and
mentally. This denial was upheld by the Board and the Franklin Circuit Court.
Hoskins’ first application is not at issue in this appeal.
Hoskins filed a timely, second application for disability retirement
benefits, in which she claimed that she suffered from arthritis, tendonitis,
fibromyalgia, chronic depression, an anxiety disorder, loss of vision, hiatial hernia,
acid reflux, irritable bowel syndrome, allergies, severe sinusitis, and hypertension.
Once again, the hearing officer recommended the denial of Hoskins’
application in an order entered on May 25, 2007. The officer found that:
[t]he objective medical evidence does not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hoskins is totally and
permanently incapacitated from her former job duties by
reason of any physical or mental health condition, nor
that she is likely to remain so for a period of not less than
12 months from her last date of employment.
The Board accepted the hearing officer’s recommendation on August
6, 2007. On May 5, 2009, the Franklin Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s
decision. This appeal follows.
II. Analysis
On appeal Hoskins claims that the Board erred in the following ways:
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(1) the Board’s conclusion was not based upon sufficient evidence; (2) the Board
erroneously required Hoskins to show a change in condition from the time of the
first application to the second; (3) the hearing officer erroneously relied upon
medical records; (4) the Board erred by refusing to grant preference to the
testimony of Hoskins’ treating physician; and (5) the hearing officer failed to make
sufficient findings of fact. After a very careful review of the record and applicable
case law, we affirm.
A. Standard of Review
Hoskins suggests that the proper standard of review in this case is
whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion. This contention is
erroneous.
When the decision of the fact-finder is in favor of the
party with the burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on
appeal is whether the agency’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, which is defined as evidence of
substance and consequence when taken alone or in light
of all the evidence that is sufficient to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable people. Where the factfinder’s decision is to deny relief to the party with the
burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so
compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to
be persuaded by it. In its role as a finder of fact, an
administrative agency is afforded great latitude in its
evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of
witnesses, including its findings and conclusions of fact.
Causation generally is a question of fact. A reviewing
court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of an
agency on a factual issue unless the agency’s decision is
arbitrary and capricious.
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McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2004).
(citations omitted).
Therefore, our review of the Board’s decision denying Hoskins disability
benefits must question whether Hoskins presented evidence that was “so
compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it.” Id.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Hoskins claims that the Board’s decision was not based upon sufficient
evidence. Instead, she argues that the medical records and testimony presented
conclusively show that she is permanently and wholly disabled.
Employees may qualify to retire on disability if they meet the
requirements of KRS 61.600. In addition to time and service requirements, KRS
61.600 (3) provides:
Upon the examination of the objective medical evidence
by licensed physicians pursuant to KRS 61.665, it shall
be determined that:
(a) The person, since his last day of paid
employment, has been mentally or physically
incapacitated to perform the job, or jobs of like
duties, from which he received his last paid
employment. In determining whether the person
may return to a job of like duties, any reasonable
accommodation by the employer as provided in 42
U.S.C. sec 1211(9) and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 shall
be considered;
(b) The incapacity is a result of bodily injury,
mental illness, or disease. For purposes of this
section, “injury” means any physical harm or
damage to the human organism other than disease
or mental illness;
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(c) The incapacity is deemed to be permanent; and
(d) The incapacity does not result directly or
indirectly from bodily injury, mental illness,
disease, or condition which pre-existed
membership in the system or reemployment,
whichever is most recent. For purposes of this
subsection, reemployment shall not mean a change
of employment between employers participating in
the retirement systems administered by the
Kentucky Retirement Systems with no loss of
service credit.
Although medical evidence existed to support Hoskins’ claims of
permanent physically disability, each KERS physician that reviewed her file
recommended denial. To support their denial, the KERS physicians noted the light
physical nature of the position. Further, the medical records indicated only some
limitations in range of motion, mild tenderness, and mild to moderate osteoarthritic
changes. The evidence also indicated that physical complaints, such as
hypertension, irritable bowel syndrome, and her hiatial hernia, were adequately
controlled by medication and dietary changes.
The presence of conflicting evidence alone is not enough to reverse
the Board’s decision. As previously stated, we must only question whether that
evidence was so compelling that a reasonable person could not arrive at the same
conclusion. McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 458. Our review of the record does not
indicate that such compelling evidence existed here. Therefore, we find no error in
the Board’s decision.3
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Hoskins presented a vast amount of evidence concerning her mental health condition.
However, the evidence indicated that Hoskins’ condition remained unchanged since her last
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C. Required Change of Condition
Hoskins claims that the hearing officer erred by requiring her to
demonstrate a change in condition between her first application for benefits and
her second application for benefits. KRS 61.600 allows applicants to refile for
disability benefits. In order to do so, however, the applicant must only show that
new evidence was presented which would justify the award of benefits. KRS
61.600 (2).
Although a change in condition is not required, the applicant cannot
relitigate the same facts and issues under the doctrine of res judicata. E.F.
Prichard Co. v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 314 Ky. 100, 234 S.W.2d 486 (Ky.
1950). “The doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of the same issues in
a subsequent appeal and includes every matter belonging to the subject of the
litigation which could have been, as well as those which were, introduced in
support of the contention of the parties on the first appeal. Id. at 487-88. The
Board properly refused to consider evidence and arguments which were presented
in the first application. We find no error in this decision.
C. Medical Records
Hoskins claims that the hearing officer erred by relying upon medical
records. She claims that medical records are generally not relied upon because
they are based upon hearsay and not taken under oath. Further, Hoskins claims
application for benefits. The Board concluded that this claim was barred by res judicata. We
agree. Our analysis is discussed further in subsection C of this opinion.
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that the hearing officer is a lay person incapable of interpreting the medical
records. We disagree with these arguments.
Medical records are often relied upon by hearing officers in
administrative proceedings. KRS 13B.090 (2) specifically permits “the submission
of evidence in written form if doing so will expedite the hearing without
substantial prejudice to any party. KRS 13B.090 (1) states that hearsay evidence is
admissible if it is the type of evidence that reasonable and prudent persons would
rely on in their daily affairs.” McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 459.
While the records appear to contain test results and x-rays, they also
contain notes written during the course of treatment from physicians. Hoskins
failed to articulate why the evidence in this case required a degree or specialized
knowledge. Nothing indicates that the hearing officer interpreted evidence that a
reasonable person could not understand and rely upon. Further, the medical
records fall under the exception to the hearsay rule found in KRS 803(6), which
provides in part:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
“business” as used in this paragraph includes business,
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institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
While Hoskins alleges that substantial prejudice occurred from the
records’ admission, she simply claims that she was prejudiced by an inability to
cross-examine the information. However, Hoskins failed to explain the prejudice.
She did not claim that the records were unreliable or based upon incorrect
information. Therefore, we do not find error in the hearing officer’s reliance upon
medical records.
E. Treating Physician Rule
Hoskins also claims that the Board erred by refusing to give
deference to her treating physician’s testimony. Hoskins cites several out-of-state
cases to support her argument. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court definitively
rejected this proposition in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Bowens, 281 S.W.3d
776 (Ky. 2009). The Court stated, “There is no . . . Kentucky statute authorizing
greater weight to be given to the opinions of the treating physician.” Id. at 784
(citations omitted).
Giving preference to the testimony of treating physicians is not in line
with the agency’s role as fact-finder. “[A]n administrative agency is afforded great
latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses,
including its findings and conclusions of fact.” Aubrey v. Office of Attorney Gen.,
994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky. App. 1998). Our role “is to review the administrative
decision, not to reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim.” Lindall v.
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Kentucky Ret. Sys., 112 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Ky. App. 2003). Certainly the agency
may choose to assign greater weight to the testimony of a treating physician based
upon the physician’s familiarity with the patient’s history. The agency, however,
is under no obligation to do so.
F. More Specific Findings of Fact
Finally, Hoskins claims that the Board failed to make specific
findings of fact concerning fact #6, which provides:
The objective medical evidence does not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Claimant is totally
and permanently incapacitated from her former job duties
by reason of any physical or mental health condition, nor
that she is likely to remain so for a period of not less than
12 months from her last date of paid employment.
The Board’s reasoning and factual basis for this finding is apparent after a simple
review of the entire opinion. The above quote labeled as finding of fact #6 is
simply a summary of points detailed in the body of the opinion.
Accordingly, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James P. Benassi
Henderson, Kentucky
Katherine Rupinen
Frankfort, Kentucky
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