BONNER (BRYCE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000502-MR
BRYCE BONNER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-001298
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a Jefferson Circuit Court order that
denied a motion for costs related to a DNA analysis and expert services provided
for Bryce Bonner’s criminal defense despite the court’s earlier finding that Bonner
was indigent and entitled to have DNA testing and analysis paid pursuant to KRS
31.110(1)(b).
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
KRS 31.110 is part of the comprehensive statutory scheme governing
the Commonwealth’s public defender system contained in KRS Chapter 31. KRS
31.110(1)(a) provides that a needy person is entitled: “To be represented by an
attorney to the same extent as a person having his or her own counsel is so
entitled[.]” Consistent with that assurance, subsection (1)(b) provides that the
needy person is “[t]o be provided with the necessary services and facilities of
representation including investigation and other preparation.” The issue presented
is whether the trial court had authority to rescind its prior orders finding that
Bonner was entitled to KRS Chapter 31 funds.
In 2005, after Bonner was charged with multiple counts of rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and unlawful imprisonment, he submitted an
affidavit of indigency and requested relief pursuant to KRS 31.110(1)(b). Because
a relative had selected and paid for private counsel to represent Bonner, he did not
seek the appointment of counsel but sought to have DNA testing paid in
preparation for his defense.
At an indigency hearing, Bonner testified regarding his income and
financial resources. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order granting Bonner
indigency status for the purposes of KRS 31.110(1)(b). However, the various
laboratory services providers contacted by defense counsel requested additional
assurance from the court that payment would be made. Thus, defense counsel
sought a clarification of the trial court’s order.
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On March 31, 2005, the trial court issued an order again finding that
Bonner was entitled to expert expenses pursuant KRS 31.110(1)(b) and,
specifically, “DNA analysis and any testimony regarding same.” However, the
laboratory that agreed to provide the services, DNA Diagnostic Center, required a
more specific order before commencing the DNA testing. Thus, on April 12, 2005,
the trial court issued yet another order that stated:
The Court having GRANTED Defendant, Bryce Bonner,
indigency status for purposes of KRS 31.110(1)(b).
Under KRS 31.110(b), the Commonwealth shall pay for
the DNA analysis. The bill for the DNA analysis
services, to be conducted by DNA Diagnostic Center,
205 Corporate Court, Fairfield, Ohio 45014, shall be paid
by Jefferson County, Kentucky, Fiscal Court, 531 Court
Place, Louisville, Kentucky 40202.
In reliance on the trial court’s explicit language, defense counsel secured
DNA Diagnostic Center’s services and from September 29, 2005, through March
10, 2006, the requested services were rendered.2 After completion, an invoice for
$2,875 was presented to the Jefferson County Fiscal Court.
Although the Jefferson County Fiscal Court did not object to the trial court’s
order requiring it to pay DNA Diagnostic Center, it refused to pay the invoice.3
After the fiscal court refused to pay, defense counsel sought directive from the trial
court regarding responsibility for payment.
2
A jury trial commenced on March 14, 2006. Bonner was found guilty of two counts of firstdegree rape, two counts of first-degree robbery, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of firstdegree burglary and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. A final judgment and sentence was
entered on June 1, 2006.
3
Because the fiscal court did not formally object to the circuit court’s order, we can only assume
that its reason was its belief that under the current statutory scheme, it was not responsible for
payment.
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On April 13, 2006, over one year after the trial court’s initial finding and
order that Bonner was indigent and ordering KRS 31.110(1)(b) expenses, the trial
court rescinded its prior orders. Without conducting a further evidentiary hearing
concerning Bonner’s indigency, the trial court held that because private counsel
represented Bonner, he was not entitled to expert expenses pursuant to KRS
Chapter 31.
Following receipt of the trial court’s order, defense counsel forwarded a
copy to DNA Diagnostic Center. However, DNA Diagnostic Center did not
pursue payment for the services rendered until March 13, 2008, when defense
counsel received an invoice. Thus, on March 26, 2008, defense counsel filed a CR
60.02 motion requesting that the court enforce its orders entered on March 31,
2005, and April 12, 2005, requiring payment to DNA Diagnostic Center by the
fiscal court. The Commonwealth did not object to the motion.
Despite its previous orders and no objection by the Commonwealth,
the trial court denied the motion on the basis that counsel was not a party in
interest and, therefore, had no standing to seek CR 60.02 relief. It further found
that the facts and circumstances did not rise to the level necessary to merit granting
extraordinary post-judgment relief. Finally, because Bonner was represented by
private counsel, the trial court concluded that Bonner should pay the expert’s
expenses.
Initially, we address the issue of standing. The issue was not presented by
the Commonwealth below and is not presented to this Court by the
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Commonwealth. Nevertheless, because the trial court found that defense counsel
lacked standing, comment is necessary.
Apparently, the trial court construed the motion to be pursued for the benefit
of defense counsel based on counsel’s statement that DNA Diagnostic Center sent
her the invoice. However, the issue presented by the motion was whether the trial
court’s orders issued prior to the DNA testing and analysis entitling Bonner to
KRS 31.110(1)(b) funding could be rescinded by the court’s subsequent order.
The defendant is the interested party where an indigent defendant seeks funds to
pay for reasonable and necessary defense preparation. Thus, defense counsel
properly pursued the motion naming Bonner as the movant. Therefore, the trial
court’s finding that defense counsel lacked standing is without a factual or legal
basis.
The Commonwealth presents a single argument to this Court. It contends
that defense counsel improperly filed a CR 60.02 motion and, instead, was required
to file a writ of mandamus seeking compliance with the trial court’s orders.
However, because the Commonwealth did not object to the CR 60.02 motion, the
issue it presents to this Court is waived. Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76,
84 (Ky. 2000).
Before discussing the substantive issue presented, clarification is useful.
There is no issue presented regarding whether DNA Diagnostic Center’s fees were
reasonable and necessary and no evidence that Bonner was not indigent when the
trial court rescinded its prior orders finding him entitled to KRS 31.110(1)(b)
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funds. Moreover, we do not address whether Bonner was precluded from seeking
KRS 31.110(1)(b) funds because he had private counsel. The issue presented is
straight-forward: When is a trial court’s determination that a defendant is no
longer entitled to KRS Chapter 31 indigency status effective? Although the
current fact situation differs, we have guidance from this Court’s decision in
Department of Public Advocacy Com. of Ky. v. Patrick, 765 S.W.2d 36 (Ky.App.
1989).
In that case, the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) appealed
a judgment ordering it to pay an attorney for a defendant’s representation. DPA
contended that the trial court acted outside its authority and jurisdiction because it
previously found the defendant ineligible for indigency status. This Court held
that although pursuant to KRS 31.120 the trial court was required to determine
indigency at each stage of the proceedings, absent evidence that the defendant’s
indigency status had changed, the trial court was without statutory authority to
reconsider its prior indigency order. Id. at 37.
McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1994),
also guides our decision. The Court addressed the question of “who must pay” for
expert witness fees incurred on behalf of indigent defendants.4 Relevant to our
discussion, the Court advised that defense counsel should seek advance
authorization for payment of KRS 31.110 expenses.
4
The case was decided prior to the 2002 amendments to KRS Chapter 31, including the repeal of
KRS 31.200 entitled, “Expenses chargeable to county and to public advocate.”
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Furthermore, we cannot overstate the importance of
the process of advance authorization. With this opinion,
we hold that it is the duty of trial counsel (as counsel did
in this case) to move for advance authorization of
expenses which he considers properly chargeable to the
county under the law as we have stated it. Likewise, we
declare it to be the duty of the trial court to attempt to
specifically and timely find that an expense is
“reasonable and necessary,” or not. Employing the KRS
31.110(1)(a) guideline suggested above, this
determination should be made in accordance with other
applicable law and independently of the question of who
must pay. If a trial judge is unable to grant or deny preauthorization, he must state his reasons in writing for the
record.
The object, of course, is to significantly lessen the
need for post-trial proceedings to determine whether
services already provided were reasonable and necessary.
The advantages to all parties are obvious. A before-thefact ruling ensures prompt payment to individuals or
facilities to whom compensation is due. (An expert
witness should not “have a dog in this fight,” and be
forced to hire a lawyer to represent his interests at a posttrial hearing, as happened here.) It also eliminates the
risk a public advocate faces in deciding whether to incur
an expense absent pre-authorization. We suspect it will
reduce the number of “fishing expeditions” in which the
defense may be tempted to engage. By now, the point
should be clear.
Id. at 314 (footnote omitted).
Bonner’s defense counsel followed the Supreme Court’s directive and
obtained advance authorization for DNA testing and analysis. As added assurance
that the expenses would be paid, counsel obtained an order specifically directing
that the expenses be paid to DNA Diagnostic Center. Yet, without a finding that
Bonner’s indigency status had changed, the trial court rescinded its prior orders
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creating precisely the post-trial proceedings sought to be avoided by advance
authorization. This is not only an inefficient result, but one that could chill defense
counsel’s ability to prepare an adequate defense.
We conclude that a court has no authority to rescind its prior orders
approving expenses for indigent defendants. The logic of only prospective
application of such orders is obvious: Counsel and experts who act in good faith
must be able to rely on the court’s order approving expenses. Otherwise, counsel’s
efforts to provide a defense for the indigent defendant can be chilled by the
inability to obtain experts and the risk faced in deciding whether to incur an
expense. Id. Thus, if after a hearing pursuant to KRS 31.120, the trial court
determines that a defendant is no longer indigent, its order can operate only
prospectively.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied Bonner’s CR 60.02(f) motion. White v. Commonwealth,
32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.App. 2000)(the standard of review upon the denial of a CR
60.02 motion is an abuse of discretion). The trial court was without authority to
rescind its prior orders finding that Bonner is indigent and entitled to expert
expenses incurred for DNA testing and analysis. As the facts and issues are
presented to this Court, there is no issue presented as to “who should pay” and,
therefore, we do not address whether the trial court properly ordered the Jefferson
County Fiscal Court to pay DNA Diagnostic Center.5
5
The Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender is organized pursuant to KRS 31.060
which provides:
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Upon remand, the order requiring payment by the Jefferson County Fiscal
Court shall be reinstated. Any objection by the fiscal court to the trial court’s order
shall be made by an appropriate timely motion in the Jefferson Circuit Court and, if
necessary, by DPA and the Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender joined
to represent their interests. If the Jefferson County Fiscal Court continues to deny
payment or intervene, then the trial court shall issue a show cause order for
contempt for failure to pay.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings.
STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent.
The propriety of the orders denying the very relief granted by three previous orders
should have been addressed on the direct appeal. The orders about which error is
(1) Each county, urban-county, charter county, and consolidated local government
with a judicial district containing ten (10) or more Circuit Judges shall establish
and maintain an office of public advocacy and submit a plan for the operation
thereof to the Department of Public Advocacy. If the plan submitted is approved
by the Department of Public Advocacy, the public advocate shall grant to the
county, urban-county, charter county, or consolidated local government the
amount to which it would be entitled under KRS 31.050(2) which shall be used as
the Commonwealth's share in defraying the expenses of the program in that
county, urban-county, charter county, or consolidated local government.
(2) A county, urban-county, charter county, or consolidated local government
identified in subsection (1) of this section shall contribute to the funding of the
plan selected and approved in such amounts as the Department of Public
Advocacy shall deem reasonable and necessary.
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alleged were entered March 31, 2005 and April 12, 2005. The Final Judgment and
Sentencing was entered June 1, 2006. Appellant should have included the claim of
error in the direct appeal.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ninamary Buba Maginnis
Louisville, Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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