BOOKER (JON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 15, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001953-MR
JON BOOKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-000725
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Jon Booker appeals from the denial of his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing by the
Jefferson Circuit Court. After a review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and
the applicable law, we agree that Booker was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
three issues raised in his RCr 11.42 motion and, accordingly, affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
On February 11, 2003, Jermaine Smith was murdered in an apparent home
invasion which led to the arrest of four defendants. One defendant, Maurice
Gasaway, told the police that Booker was the “trigger man.” Gasaway later
entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth whereby he asserted that his
statement to the police was the truth and agreed to testify against Booker. A
second defendant, Thomas Board, entered a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth, which contained a factual account of Booker shooting the victim.
The third defendant, Shaunt Gasaway2 likewise entered a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth and agreed to testify against Booker. Faced with the likely
testimony of his three codefendants, Booker agreed to plead guilty instead of
proceeding to trial in a capital murder case.
Booker pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty years for murder, five years
for burglary in the third degree (amended), and five years for criminal mischief
(amended). All sentences were to run consecutively for a total of thirty years;
however, the sentences for burglary and criminal mischief were to be probated
after the maximum serve out for murder.
Thereafter, Booker filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion which was later
supplemented by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy. On September
14, 2007, the trial court entered its opinion and order denying Booker’s RCr 11.42
2
Maurice Gasaway’s son.
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motion without an evidentiary hearing. In denying Booker’s motion, the court
reasoned that Booker did not indicate what testimony the witnesses would have
given as required by RCr 11.42; that defense counsel undertook an adequate
investigation; that Booker did not demonstrate any behavior before the court to
question his mental state, especially as he asked a number of pertinent questions
during the proceedings as evidenced by the plea colloquy on the record; and
because he signed AOC form 491.1, which evidences that his plea was knowingly
and intelligently made. It is from this order that Booker now appeals.
On appeal, Booker presents three arguments. First, that his guilty plea was
not knowing or voluntary for three reasons: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to interview multiple witnesses; 2) that faced with the possibility of the
death penalty he became depressed and paranoid; 3) he was misadvised about his
parole eligibility date, and if he had been properly advised he would not have
entered his guilty plea. Secondly, Booker argues that the cumulative errors of trial
counsel warrant reversal. Third, Booker argues that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because he alleged material issues of fact which cannot be
conclusively resolved by the record. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court
did not err in denying Booker’s RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
With these arguments in mind, we turn to the applicable law.
At the outset, we note that a valid guilty plea is often said to waive all
defenses other than the indictment charges no offense. Quarles v. Commonwealth,
456 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1970). The plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent
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choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986), citing North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). “There must be an
affirmative showing in the record that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily
made.” Sparks at 727, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). “[T]he validity of a guilty plea is determined
not reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it is taken but from the
totality of the circumstances.” Sparks at 727, citing Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565
S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court set the seminal standard for assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel. The second prong of Strickland, i.e., prejudice,
was refined in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203 (1985), when assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims when a guilty
plea has been entered. In Hill, the Court determined that a defendant was required
to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. 474
U.S. 52, 102 S. Ct. 366 at 367.
Our Kentucky Supreme Court in Sparks, supra at 727-728, set forth the
proper standard to be used when a defendant challenges the effectiveness of his
counsel’s advice after a guilty plea has been entered as:
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A showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective in
enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal
alternatives in deciding to plead guilty [and such
showing] has two components: (1) that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside
the wide range of professionally competent assistance;
and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously
affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the
errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 80 sic 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
Cf., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Id. at 727-728. See also Hill, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366 at 367, “[when a]
defendant enters a guilty plea upon counsel's advice, the voluntariness of the plea
depends on whether the advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.” The voluntariness of an unconditional guilty plea is
important and competent advice from counsel is necessary for a defendant to enter
such a plea because the entry of such a plea waives almost all of a defendant’s
rights.
On the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing was proper, Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001), is controlling. Under Fraser, a
hearing on the issues raised in an RCr 11.42 motion is required if there is a
material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively
proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. Id. at 452. With these
standards in mind we turn to the parties’ arguments.
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Booker first argues that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary due to
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to interview multiple witnesses. Those
witnesses included codefendant Maurice Gasaway, who recanted his police
statement; two other witnesses, Desean Dickey and Aaron Jones, who both
reported hearing gunshots but did not see the shooter; and the lessee of the
apartment, Virginia Brewer.
In the attached affidavit to the pro se RCr 11.42 motion, Brewer stated that
Booker was an occasional resident at her home, and had access and permission to
stay at and use the apartment where the murder occurred.3 Booker alleges that trial
counsel failed to investigate and properly advise him that, based on the permission
given by Brewer, Booker would not have faced the statutory aggravator of burglary
and, thus, he would not have plead guilty.4 The Commonwealth does not address
the issues raised by Brewer’s affidavit. Additionally, the trial court’s order does
not address Brewer’s affidavit.5 Given Brewer’s affidavit, we agree with Booker
that the issue concerning the burglary charge and its use as an aggravator6 in a
capital murder case requires an evidentiary hearing. A material issue has been
raised that cannot be conclusively resolved by an examination of the record.
3
We note that the victim was not a resident of the apartment.
4
Booker cites Robey v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1997), in support thereof.
Upon remand the trial court will have to address the broken door in light of whether Booker
possessed a key to the apartment given the burglary charge.
5
6
See KRS 532.025.
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
We also agree with Booker that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
concerning Maurice Gasaway. Gasaway recanted his earlier statements prior to the
court’s ruling on Booker’s RCr 11.42 motion. On appeal, Booker argues that, if
his counsel had interviewed Gasaway and counsel learned that Gasaway’s
statement had been coerced, it would have affected Booker’s decision on whether
to plead guilty. This matter cannot be resolved by the record and, as such, Booker
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
As to the remainder of the witnesses, we agree with the Commonwealth that
the failure to interview them does not merit an evidentiary hearing. Desean Dickey
and Aaron Jones reported hearing gunshots but did not see who fired the weapon.
We fail to see how declining to include such witnesses at trial would constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying Booker an evidentiary hearing for Dickey and Jones.
Turning now to Booker’s second argument as to why his guilty plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily made, namely, that faced with the possibility of
the death penalty he became depressed and paranoid, we note that the trial court
found that Booker exhibited no questionable behavior before the court that would
call into question his mental capacity to plead guilty. Indeed, the court found that
the plea colloquy evidenced Booker asking pertinent questions and that Booker
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indicated at the time that he was not under the care of a mental professional. The
court concluded that in light of the record and RCr 8.06,7 trial counsel did not err in
failing to request a competency hearing.
After our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the record
establishes that Booker was competent to plead guilty when faced with the death
penalty. Moreover, a plea does not become involuntary simply because the fear of
a death sentence played a role in the defendant's decision. See Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Booker an evidentiary hearing
on this issue.
We now turn to Booker’s third argument as to why his guilty plea was
not knowingly and voluntarily made, namely, that he was misadvised about his
parole eligibility date, and if he had been properly advised he would not have
entered his guilty plea. The trial court and the Commonwealth rely on the
videotaped plea colloquy to deny Booker an evidentiary hearing on this issue. We
note that a guilty plea entered by a defendant of his own free will does not become
invalid because he did not know all the possible consequences of the plea or all the
possible alternative courses of action. Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500,
7
RCr 8.06 states:
If upon arraignment or during the proceedings there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or her, or to participate rationally in
his or her defense, all proceedings shall be postponed until the issue of incapacity
is determined as provided by KRS 504.100.
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501 (Ky.App. 1982).8 Even if Booker could establish that counsel performed
deficiently by failing to fully advise him of parole eligibility, he cannot show that,
but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea,
but rather would have proceeded to trial, which is required to establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482,
486-87 (Ky. 2001). Booker cannot show that he would have proceeded to trial
when faced with the possibility of serving more than twenty years, including as
much as a life sentence. Consequently, Booker’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim as to parole eligibility lacks merit and the trial court did not err in denying
Booker an evidentiary hearing on this ground.
Last, Booker argues that the cumulative errors of trial counsel warrant
reversal. It is not appropriate for this Court to decide the validity of this argument
in light of our reversal for an evidentiary hearing. As such, we decline to address
this argument.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent this opinion.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: I agree that the affidavits of Maurice Gasaway and Virginia Brewer raise
8
While Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005), abrogated by Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (U.S. 2010), relied upon Turner, we believe that
the recent decision of Padilla, supra limited its holding to matters involving deportation and did
not disturb the validity of Turner.
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issues which cannot be resolved from the face of the record. Likewise, neither
were addressed by the trial court in its September 14, 2007, opinion and order. As
noted in the majority’s opinion, Brewer states in her affidavit that Booker had
access and permission to stay in her apartment.9 Gasaway claims that his pretrial
testimony was coerced and the trial court lacked the benefit of any countervailing
testimony challenging his allegations. The credibility of these allegations is best
addressed in an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion
which reverses based on the claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to fully
advise Booker of the parole or probation consequences of the sentence he would
receive. A guilty plea entered by a defendant of his own free will does not become
invalid because he did not know all the possible consequences of the plea or all the
possible alternative courses of action. Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500,
501 (Ky.App. 1982).
Even if Booker could establish that counsel performed deficiently by
failing to fully advise him of parole eligibility, he cannot show that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea, but
rather would have proceeded to trial, which is required to establish an ineffective
9
Recently, in Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321 (Ky. 2010), the Kentucky Supreme
Court again recognized that, under certain circumstances, one may enter a dwelling with
permission and, upon committing a crime, have that permission revoked, giving rise to a
burglary charge. “For the principle to apply, the defendant must first perpetrate a crime (or other
act) thereby bringing about, by obvious implication, the revocation of his license to remain in the
dwelling or building. He must thereafter remain on the premises with the intention to commit a
crime, which may be the completion of the robbery of any other crime. Only then are the
elements of burglary satisfied under the principle.” Id. at 325.
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assistance of counsel claim. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky.
2001). Booker cannot show that he would have proceeded to trial when faced with
the possibility of serving more than twenty years, including as much as a life
sentence. Consequently, Booker’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to
parole eligibility lacks merit.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
Department of Public Advocacy
Lagrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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