GINGERICH (JACOB), ET AL VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND ZOOK (MENNO), ET AL
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RENDERED: JUNE 3, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001493-MR
JACOB GINGERICH; EMANUEL YODER;
AND LEVI ZOOK
v.
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 07-T-02681; 07-T-02873; 07-T-03789;
08-XX-00003; 08-XX-00004; AND 08-XX-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLANTS
APPELLEE
NO. 2009-CA-001046-MR
MENNO ZOOK; DAVID ZOOK; ELI ZOOK;
MOSE YODER; LEVI HOSTETLER; JACOB
GINGERICH; AND DANNY BYLER
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 08-T-00609; 08-T-00637; 08-T-00737; 08-T-01006; 08-T-01074;
08-T-01134; 08-T-01224; 08-T-01309; 08-T-01383; 08-T-01459; 08-T-01525;
08-T-01526; 08-T-01532; 08-T-01713; 08-T-01774; 09-XX-00002; 09-XX-00003;
09-XX-00004; 09-XX-00005; 09-XX-00006; 09-XX-00007; 09-XX-00008;
09-XX-00009; 09-XX-00010; AND 09-XX-00011
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE: Multiple parties bring these appeals as a result of their
convictions2 of violating KRS 189.820, which requires that a slow-moving vehicle
(SMV) emblem, a fluorescent yellow-orange triangle with a dark red reflective
border, be displayed on their horse-drawn buggies. Appellants are members of the
Old Order Swartzentruber Amish religion, and argue that KRS 189.820 is
unconstitutional because it interferes with their ability to freely exercise their
religion.
As members of the Old Order Swartzentruber Amish, Appellants
follow a strict religious code of conduct, or Ordnung, which regulates everything
from hairstyle and dress to education and transportation. Among the tenets of the
Swartzentruber Amish Ordnung are the beliefs that extravagant displays of “loud”
colors should be avoided, as well as the use of “worldly symbols.” More
specifically, it is believed that the use of loud colors is splashy, garish, and
suggestive of vanity, and that the use of worldly or secular symbols encroaches
upon their spiritual relationship with God and serves as an indication that the user’s
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Because Appellants concede that they failed to display the SMV emblem, and the facts
surrounding their charges are not at issue, this appeal will not address those specifics.
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trust in God has strayed to the world at large. Appellants argue that KRS 189.820
prevents them from freely exercising their religious beliefs by requiring them to
display the SMV emblem in direct violation of their Ordnung.
The district court evaluated Appellants’ constitutional claims under
strict scrutiny analysis and found that although the statute substantially burdened
Appellants’ sincerely held religious beliefs, the Commonwealth had sufficiently
shown that the statute furthered a compelling governmental interest through the
least restrictive means possible. Appellants then appealed their convictions to the
Graves Circuit Court.3 Appellants again argued the unconstitutionality of KRS
189.820, and presented two main arguments to the circuit court for consideration:
1) the statute at issue violates their rights of free speech and free exercise of their
religion; and 2) the statute has been selectively enforced against only members of
the Swartzentruber Amish. The circuit court disagreed with both arguments and
affirmed the convictions of the district court. However, instead of applying the
compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means analysis, the trial court
instead relied on its findings that the statute is generally applicable to all slow3
Although the Appellants appealed to the Graves Circuit Court in two separate actions, the
issues are essentially the same. Therefore, this Court will not differentiate between the two
underlying circuit court actions, but will instead address the arguments as if they had been
presented to the trial court in one consolidated action by all Appellants. We recognize that the
trial court’s former order (entered July 10, 2008; affirming the judgments of the district court)
failed to address the argument of selective enforcement, since that argument had not been
presented to the court. Nonetheless, were we to hold that Appellants were successful in
establishing a prima facie showing of selective enforcement, such a holding would rightfully
affect the parties of both appeals. We further recognize that the trial court’s later order (dated
May 14, 2009; affirming the judgments of the district court) incorporated by reference its former
order.
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moving vehicles, the statute is not aimed at particular religious practices, and the
statute does not contain a system of particularized exemptions. These appeals
followed.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part,
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. This right to freely
practice one’s religion, also known as the Free Exercise Clause, is extended to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Kentucky Constitution
lists “the right of worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of [one’s]
conscience[]” as an inherent and inalienable right. Ky. Const. § 1. Furthermore,
section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution states:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
sect, society or denomination; nor to any particular creed,
mode of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity; nor
shall any person be compelled to attend any place of
worship, to contribute to the erection or maintenance of
any such place, or to the salary or support of any minister
of religion; nor shall any man be compelled to send his
child to any school to which he may be conscientiously
opposed; and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of
no person shall be taken away, or in anywise diminished
or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any
religious tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority
shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience.
Ky. Const. § 5
The Free Exercise Clause boasts a lengthy history of interpretation and
application. The U.S. Supreme Court first determined “whether religious belief
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can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the
land” in 1879. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878).
The Mormon party in Reynolds argued that a law against polygamy
unconstitutionally stifled his right to freely exercise his sincerely held religious
belief that failure to practice polygamy would result in eternal damnation. Id. at
161-162. The Court held that a neutral law which inadvertently impacted certain
religious practices was constitutional. Id.
In the 1960s, the neutral applicability view of Reynolds evolved into a
broader view of the Free Exercise Clause by application of strict scrutiny analysis,
also known as the “compelling state interest” standard. See, e.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (U.S.S.C. 1963) (holding
that the statute disqualifying unemployment compensation claimant from benefits,
absent a compelling state interest, because of her religiously based refusal to work
on Saturdays, imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her
religion). The application of strict scrutiny analysis continued for some time,
reaching its zenith in the landmark case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.
Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972). The Court in Yoder held that the legitimate
social concerns of Wisconsin’s compulsory education law, namely the welfare of
children and society, were not upset by creating an exception with respect to the
Amish. Id.
After Yoder, the Court once again narrowed its view of the Free Exercise
Clause to a rational relation test and reinstated the holding that neutral laws of
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general applicability do not implicate the constitutional provision. Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 1597, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990) (upholding a state law prohibiting the use of
peyote, despite the use of the drug as part of a religious ritual within the Native
American Church, without utilizing strict scrutiny analysis). Following the
holding of Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) in 1993, as an attempt to reinstate the prior test of compelling state
interest/least restrictive means. In response, the Court held the RFRA to be an
unconstitutional reach of Congress’ powers of enforcing the Constitution,
effectively restoring the rational relation test of Smith. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997). Specifically, it was held
that the RFRA usurped the Court’s authority to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation. Id. Thereafter, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“ RLUIPA”), which imposed the strict scrutiny
test in situations where the alleged substantial burden is imposed by a federally
funded program or where the alleged substantial burden would affect certain areas
of commerce. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1; see also Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of
Corrections, 482 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, Kentucky has only applied strict
scrutiny analysis as directed by RLUIPA, under those specific circumstances. See,
e.g., Harston v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Transp. Cabinet, 2011 WL 744542
(Ky. App. 2011)(2010-CA-000615-MR)(not final).
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Appellants’ first argument to this Court is that the circuit court erred by
failing to apply strict scrutiny analysis when determining whether KRS 189.820
was constitutionally valid. In support of this argument, Appellants maintain that
the Kentucky Constitution offers broader protection for religious freedom than
does the U. S. Constitution, and therefore requires strict scrutiny analysis of
religious burdens.
Appellants point to multiple cases in which they argue the Court’s implicit
use of strict scrutiny analysis. We first note that this Court is not in the habit of
applying implicit tests, but rather explicit ones. If Kentucky Courts had intended
strict scrutiny analysis to apply in cases alleging violation of the Free Exercise
Clause, they could have plainly stated so. More notable though is that the cases to
which Appellants cite concern laws of comprehensive application, such as
compulsory education and prohibition of snake and reptile use during religious
services. In contrast, KRS 189.820 does not infringe upon Appellants’ right to
exercise their religion by restricting their religious worship rituals or enforcing
compulsory conduct to which they are conscientiously opposed. Instead, the
statute serves as a condition to utilizing a certain privilege: the use of state roads.
Just as the Kentucky Supreme Court has previously held that “driving an
automobile is not a fundamental constitutional right, but a legitimately regulated
privilege,” so also is the use of public roads. Commonwealth v. Howard, 969
S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ky. 1998). Further, the use of a vehicle and the use of public
roads are not acts of religious worship. “Full and free enjoyment of religious
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profession and worship is guarantied [sic], but acts which are not worship are not.”
Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972, 976 (1942) (citation
omitted). KRS 189.820 is a neutral law of general applicability, and therefore does
not invoke strict scrutiny analysis.
Regulations such as minimum driving age, speed restrictions, and
SMV emblems are created, and enforced, to ensure everyone’s safety. Considering
the narrow, hilly, winding state roads in Graves County and Kentucky in general,
small dark buggies being operated at low speeds present a hazard to themselves as
well as others. Because use of the SMV emblem, other than on a slow-moving
vehicle, is prohibited, the emblem is widely recognized as a cautionary indicator of
a slow-moving vehicle. See KRS 189.830. The existence of alternative methods
of alerting drivers to the presence of a slow-moving vehicle does not make
Kentucky’s requirement of the SMV emblem unconstitutional. Additionally, any
public confusion regarding the exact message of the emblem does not detract from
its effectiveness as an alert. In this instance, the Commonwealth’s objective of
ensuring public safety through the most effective means possible overshadows any
encumbrances on religious practice. Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to find
KRS 189.820 unconstitutional was appropriate.
Assuming arguendo that strict scrutiny is the appropriate analysis in
this case, KRS 189.820 would still pass constitutional muster. Clearly, the
compelling reason of the government is to promote highway safety for everyone
who uses the roads. The argument that the Commonwealth failed to show such an
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interest is unreasonable. Obviously a certain amount of common sense must be
applied in these situations. Headlights; bright reflective colors on road signs, lane
lines, and guard rails; and street lights all play a significant role in keeping our
roadways safe for everyone. The SMV emblems serve as an alert to other vehicles.
KRS 189.820 can only advance the interest of safety if it is respected and followed
by those within the Commonwealth.
Appellants argue4 that the Commonwealth has implicitly recognized
that the SMV emblem is not necessary for roadway safety because it is not
required for other vehicles, namely bicycles. Appellants also argued that bicycles,
which are specifically exempted from the SMV emblem requirement of KRS
189.820, are much less visible on a roadway, implying that they are, therefore, at a
greater risk of injury. We do not agree. Although we will concede that bicycles,
by virtue of their compact size, are likely less visible, we do not agree that bicycles
create the same amount of danger to other motorists as a large buggy or a piece of
farm machinery. We therefore reject Appellants’ argument that the bicycle
exemption creates a showing of legislative belief that the SMV emblems do not
promote roadway safety.
Appellants propose the use of reflective tape as a less restrictive
alternative to the SMV emblem. However, the reflective tape can only be seen
when it is engaged by headlights. Accordingly, the reflective tape would offer no
protection to buggy operators or other motorists during dawn, dusk, and the
4
This argument was made by counsel for Appellants at the oral arguments held on March 24,
2011.
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daylight hours. Statistics were presented to the Court that a greater number of
buggy-related accidents take place at dusk, a time when most motorists have not
yet engaged their headlights. Certainly, the low level of visibility is a major
contributing factor to this high number of accidents. Nonetheless, Appellants
argue for a buggy marker that will provide them with even less visibility. The trial
court was not convinced that a small black and white rectangle strip of tape is an
equally effective alert on a small dark buggy as a large orange and red triangle.
Accordingly, we see no way in which the Commonwealth’s goal of road safety,
with respect to slow-moving vehicles, can be achieved through less restrictive
means.
This Court is not in the business of tenaciously restricting religious
practices. Indeed, the freedom to express and exercise one’s religious beliefs is
held in high esteem. However, such practices cannot infringe on the rights and
safety of the public at large. If we were to grant an exception to the Amish, we
would be placing a greater importance on their ability to freely exercise their
religion over the significant safety interests of both the Amish and the public at
large. To do so would completely frustrate the legislature’s intent when it enacted
KRS 189.820. The trial court was correct in refusing to find KRS 189.820 to be
unconstitutional.
Appellants also argue that the trial court erred by not imposing upon
the Commonwealth a burden of production to rebut Appellants’ claims of selective
enforcement. We not agree. In order to succeed on a claim of selective
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enforcement, a claimant must show that: 1) they were singled out by a government
official as a person of an identifiable group; 2) that the official’s motivation was
primarily or partially discriminatory in purpose or intent; and 3) that the action had
a discriminatory effect. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S.
Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996). “Discriminatory purpose” implies that
the official acted because of the adverse effects his or her action would have upon
an identifiable group. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298, 107 S. Ct. 1756,
1770, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987). “Discriminatory effect” is established by a
showing that the law was enforced against the claimant, but not similarly situated
individuals outside of the identifiable group. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.
Ct. at 1487. Once a claimant has successfully shown discriminatory effect and
discriminatory purpose, the government then bears the burden of producing
evidence which rebuts the inferences. See United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343,
356 (6th Cir. 1997). However, the claimant retains the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. Id.
Kentucky appellate courts have long recognized that the trial court is
in a “superior position to judge [witnesses'] credibility and the weight to be given
their testimony.” See, e.g., Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky.
1978). In support of their claim of selective enforcement, Appellants presented
civilian testimony that non-Amish slow-moving vehicles had been observed on
Graves County roadways without the SMV emblem. The Graves Circuit Court
discounted the credibility of this witness. Additional testimony was presented that
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a non-Amish civilian had been stopped, while operating a slow-moving vehicle
without the SMV emblem, and had not received a citation. The trial court noted
that the slow-moving vehicle was large in size, was painted with bright colors, and
was being followed by a pickup truck engaging its emergency flashers. The court
also discounted the safety risk of the uncharged operator’s vehicle, compared to “a
small dark buggy, being operated at low speeds.” Lastly, Appellants presented
evidence that only two prosecutions under KRS 189.820 had occurred outside of
Graves County in 2006. In response to this, the court noted that it had not been
informed of the distribution of Old Order Swartzentruber Amish communities
across the Commonwealth.
Given the evidence presented to the trial court, and the weight given
by the trial court, the Appellants were not successful in establishing a prima facie
showing of discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, the
trial court’s dismissal of that claim was proper.
For the foregoing reasons, the July 10, 2008, and May 14, 2009,
judgments of the Graves Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS JACOB
GINGERICH, EMANUEL YODER,
AND LEVI ZOOK :
David A. Friedman
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
William E. Sharp
Louisville, Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Patricia C. LeMeur
Louisville, Kentucky
REPLY BRIEFS FOR ALL
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS MENNO
ZOOK, DAVID ZOOK, ELI ZOOK,
MOSE YODER, LEVI HOSTETLER,
JACOB GINGERICH, AND DANNY
BYLER:
William E. Sharp
Louisville, Kentucky
William E. Sharp
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLEE:
Patricia C. LeMeur
Louisville, Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Patricia C. Le Meur
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE:
Donna M. Doblick
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
David J. Bird
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLANTS:
William E. Sharp
Louisville, Kentucky
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