KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE VS. NOVATION CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000449-MR
KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS’ MUTUAL INSURANCE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROCKCASTLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00282
NOVATION CAPITAL, LLC; AND
JEFFREY K. TAYLOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) appeals
an order of the Rockcastle Circuit Court requiring KEMI to transfer workers’
compensation benefits payable to Jeffrey K. Taylor to Novation Capital, LLC.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
KEMI alleges that the Workers’ Compensation Board had exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction and that Taylor was precluded from assigning his benefits to a thirdparty under KRS 342.180, which prohibits the assignment of a claim for workers’
compensation benefits. The circuit court rejected both contentions. We affirm.
As a result of a work-related injury sustained in 2005, Taylor filed a
workers’ compensation claim and subsequently entered into a settlement
agreement with his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, KEMI.
The agreement provided for payments of $400.02 per week for seventy weeks,
commencing on September 30, 2005; one lump sum payment of $150,000; and
$486.87 for 520 weeks.
In 2007, Novation Capital filed a “Petition for Approval of Transfer of
Structured Settlement Rights” pursuant to KRS 454.430, et seq., seeking approval
of the transfer of Taylor’s structured settlement payment rights. Taylor joined in
Novation Capital’s request for the approval of the transfer of monthly payments of
$1,989.17 commencing on November 1, 2007, and terminating on April 1, 2017.
In exchange, Taylor would receive a lump sum payment of $112,952. After KEMI
objected to the petition, the circuit court heard testimony concerning Taylor’s
financial condition and issued a detailed order approving the petition. In doing so,
it found that Taylor received a Disclosure Statement prior to entering into his
written agreement with Novation Capital and that the transfer of the settlement
payments was in Taylor’s best interest to avoid financial hardship. It further found
that the transfer complied with KRS 454.430 et seq., the Structured Settlement
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Protection Act. Finally, the circuit court found that Taylor’s use of the funds to
satisfy his mortgage and automobile debt was consistent with the purpose of the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
The threshold issue is whether the circuit court had subject matter
jurisdiction to approve the petition. The Workers’ Compensation Act confers
exclusive jurisdiction of claims filed pursuant to its provisions with the Board.
KRS 342.325; KRS 342.690(1); Shamrock Coal Co. v. Maricle, 5 S.W.3d 130, 133
(Ky. 1999). Thus, Taylor’s claim for benefits and the approval of the settlement
agreement were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. However, Novation
Capital’s petition did not request that any matter relating to a workers’
compensation claim be litigated. Taylor’s workers’ compensation claim had been
settled and finalized.
Unrelated to the workers’ compensation claim, Novation Capital’s
petition was filed pursuant to the Structured Settlement Protection Act, enacted to
provide a statutory procedure for the exchange of structured settlement payments
for a lump sum cash payment. In addition to providing a detailed procedure for the
transfer, the Act establishes jurisdiction in the circuit court in which the original
action was or could have been filed, or the county where the applicant resides.
KRS 454.435(1). Thus, the Rockcastle Circuit Court had subject matter
jurisdiction to approve the petition.
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KEMI’s final argument is that the transfer of Taylor’s structured
settlement payment rights to Novation Capital violates the anti-assignment
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act which states:
“[n]o claim for compensation under this chapter shall be
assignable, except court or administratively ordered child
support pursuant to KRS 403.212. All compensation and
claims therefor, except child support obligations, shall be
exempt from all claims of creditors.”
KRS 342.180. Novation Capital responds that the Act precludes assignment of a
“claim for compensation” rather than the right to payments pursuant to a settlement
of a workers’ compensation claim.
The purpose of KRS 342.180 and its prohibition against assignment of
workers’ compensation claims is “to protect the injured worker and to promote the
purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act by insuring that compensation benefits
are available to meet the present and future requirements for food, clothing, and
shelter of the worker and his dependents . . . .” Newberg v. Sarcione, 865 S.W.2d
317, 319 (Ky. 1993). However, an assignment of benefits paid is not inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute or its language.
Courts are required to construe words and phrases according to their
usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning. Heleringer v. Brown, 104 S.W.3d 397,
401 (Ky. 2003). According to its unambiguous language, KRS 342.180 prohibits
the assignment of claims. Significantly, the second sentence of the statute
distinguishes claims and compensation. As pointed out by the circuit court in its
thoughtful analysis, had the General Assembly intended to prohibit the assignment
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of an award or settlement, it could have simply included language expressing such
intent. Based on similar facts, the Kentucky Supreme Court reached the same
result.
In Newberg, the injured employee and his employer entered into a
settlement agreement that provided for reimbursement by the Special Fund for
amounts determined to be the responsibility of the Fund but paid by the employer
pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that the
reimbursement provision did not violate KRS 342.180. It explained its reasoning
as follows:
We believe that, in the instant case, the
reimbursement provision, which operated as an
assignment of a portion of the benefits received pursuant
to the worker's subsequent compensation award against
the Special Fund, does not violate either the purpose or
the language of KRS 342.180 and is in accord with the
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. KRS
342.180 prohibits the assignment of a workers'
compensation claim. The agreement herein did not
contemplate an assignment of the worker's claim against
the Special Fund to the employer, but rather an
assignment of whatever portion of the worker's recovery
had been paid by the employer but was determined by the
ALJ to be the responsibility of the Special Fund. The
reimbursement to the employer relates to compensation
benefits for the present injury and not to satisfaction of a
debt which predated the injury.
Newberg, 865 S.W.2d at 320.
As in Newberg, the agreement between Taylor and Novation Capital
is not an assignment of a claim but is a transfer of the compensation received under
the compensation agreement. Moreover, the purpose of KRS 342.180 is not
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frustrated by approval of the petition. To the contrary, pursuant to the terms of the
Structured Settlement Protection Act, the transfer of the structured settlement
agreement was subject to judicial approval and the finding that it was in Taylor’s
best interest to satisfy his delinquent housing and automobile debts.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Rockcastle Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Barry Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
C. Thomas Ezzell
Lexington, Kentucky
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