COX (MICHAEL) VS. CLAY (SHANNON GOINS)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000238-MR;
NO. 2008-CA-001998-ME;
NO. 2008-CA-002410-ME;
and
NO. 2009-CA-001406-ME
MICHAEL COX
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY PHILPOT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-02061
SHANNON GOINS CLAY (f/k/a Cox)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WHITE, SENIOR JUDGE: This consolidated appeal arises out of a Fayette
Family Court dissolution of the marriage between Michael Cox and Shannon
Goins Cox Clay. Michael appeals from Fayette Family Court orders entered on
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Senior Judge White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
April 25, 2005, May 4, 2005, November 30, 2006, December 27, 2006, August 5,
2008, September 12, 2008, November 26, 2008. Michael raises numerous issues
regarding the trial court’s denial of Michael’s motions relating to: (1)
disqualification; (2) timesharing; (3) child support; and (4) the division of marital
property. We will discuss each issue in turn.
I. Factual Background
Since the trial court issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law
in the parties divorce, Michael has filed a total of five appeals. His first appeal was
rendered by our Court on September 21, 2007. While that appeal was pending,
Michael filed his second appeal. During its pendency, Michael filed his third,
fourth, and fifth appeals which have all been consolidated into this action.
Michael and Shannon were married on November 10, 2001, and
separated in February 2003. On September 15, 2003, Shannon gave birth to the
couple’s only child Andrew. The couple separated thereafter. On February 1 and
3, 2005, and March 24 and 28, 2005, the trial court held a contested final hearing
in this case. The majority of the disputed issues related to child custody and care,
marital property, maintenance, and attorneys fees. On April 26, 2005, the trial
court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law.2
In its order, the court granted Michael and Shannon joint custody of
Andrew but did not name a primary residential custody. The order also detailed
the parties’ timesharing arrangement. Each week Michael cared for Andrew three
2
The trial court entered the decree of dissolution on May 4, 2005.
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nights and one full weekend day.3 The court appointed Dr. Dianna Hartley to
serve as a parenting coordinator and to resolve disputes over Andrew’s care. The
parties were responsible for her fee.4
Michael appealed the April 26, 2005, order and contested most of the
findings and conclusions entered by the trial court.5 While the appeal was pending,
Michael moved the court to increase his timesharing and requested that the court
be disqualified. Subsequently, Michael filed various motions concerning
disqualification, the division of assets, child support, and timesharing. We will
discuss these motions as needed herein.
II. Disqualification
Michael claims that the trial court should have disqualified itself
following two ex parte communications with Dr. Hartley. Michael argues that the
trial erred by refusing to disclose the topics discussed with Dr. Hartley and by
interfering with confidential negotiations of Dr. Hartley, who acted as a mediator.
Michael also contends that if the trial court intended to communicate with Dr.
Hartley, it should have provided counsel notice and an opportunity to be present.
Michael heavily relies on a Fayette County local rule requiring
confidentiality in the mediation process, Rules of Fayette Circuit Court 29. Our
3
Michael was to care for Andrew each Monday from 3:00 PM until each Tuesday at 9:00AM,
each Wednesday at 3:00 PM until each Thursday at 9:00 AM; each Saturday from 9:00 AM until
each Sunday at 9:00 AM. According to the April 26, 2005, order, this schedule was contingent
upon Shannon’s ability to be a stay-at-home mother. Later orders do not indicate that the a
contingency remained in effect.
4
The trial court ordered Michael to pay 75% of Dr. Hartley’s coordinating fees.
5
The appeal resulted in an unpublished opinion. 2005-CA-001163-MR
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primary concern, however, is whether the trial court independently investigated a
disputed fact. KRS 26A.015 (2) clearly provides that a judge may not investigate
disputed facts. This applies to all disputed facts not only facts discussed in
mediation.
In its December 27, 2006 order, the trial court defended the
communication by relying upon Judicial Ethics Cannon 3 (7) (a). Cannon 3 (7) (a)
provides that a trial court may consult with court personnel and staff members to
carry out adjudicative responsibilities. However, this rule does not give trial courts
the authority to question anyone, including court personnel, about disputed
evidence outside the presence of the parties.
The first ex parte communication occurred following a November 20,
2006 hearing. During the hearing, both parties claimed the other was not
cooperating with Dr. Hartley. The court informed the parties that it would contact
Dr. Hartley concerning these allegations. At that time, neither party objected to the
communication or requested to be present. Michael only objected to the
communications after the court issued its order. Under the contemporaneous
objection rule, parties must preserve error prior to the court’s ruling in order to
avoid judicial mistake. R.Cr. 9.22; Delahanty v. Com. Ex rel. Maze, 295 S.W.3d
136, 143 (Ky. 2009). Therefore, we conclude that Michael failed to properly
preserve this issue.
Michael also argues that the trial court should have provided counsel
with the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Hartley. Although the court refused to
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hold a separate hearing, we see nothing in the record that prevented Michael from
deposing Dr. Hartley. While the trial court’s phone call to Dr. Hartley was an ex
parte communication, Michael’s failure to object and to present evidence of
prejudice leaves him without recourse.
The second ex parte communication occurred in 2008. Following a
disagreement about timesharing, the trial court notified the parties that it was
attempting to contact Dr. Hartley. Once again neither party objected nor attempted
to depose Dr. Hartley concerning the allegation. Therefore, we are left to conclude
that Michael failed to properly preserve this issue. His objection following the last
ex parte communication was insufficient.
III. Timesharing
Michael claims that that the trial court erred in denying his motions for
increased timesharing on April 26, 2005, and August 5, 2008. When reviewing a
motion for increased timesharing, the trial court must question whether the
increase is in the best interest of the child. Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d
759, 965 (Ky. 2008). We must review this determination under a clearly erroneous
standard. Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous if they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Wells
v. Wells, 412 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ky. 1967).
With regard to the court’s 2005 order denying Michael’s motion for 5050 timesharing, the court found that additional time would be in Andrews’s best
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interest.6 However, the court ordered the additional time should be taken from
Andrew’s time in day care rather than the time he spent with Shannon. Michael
argues that the trial court allowed its personal disdain for day care to interfere with
its judgment. While the record undoubtedly reflects the trial courts dislike for
daycare, we are not convinced that the court’s order was arbitrary.
When Michael moved for timesharing, he was able to care for
Andrew three nights per week and one entire day each weekend. We recognize
that it may be difficult for Michael to consistently carve out time during his work
day to spend with Andrew. However, the trial court must base its determination on
the best interest of Andrew rather than the best interest of Michael. Michael failed
to present evidence that it is in Andrew’s best interest to reduce the time he spends
with Shannon in order to increase time spent with Michael. Without this showing,
we conclude that the trial court’s decision was reasonable.
With regard to the court’s 2008 denial of Michael’s timesharing motion,
Michael argues that the trial court refused to comply with the previous opinion by
our Court. Our review indicates that Michael misconstrued our Court’s previous
opinion. Whether Michael was entitled to a certain timesharing schedule was not
an issue in his previous appeal. Instead, Michael claimed that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to provide equal timesharing. Our Court simply
affirmed the trial court’s denial of Michael’s motion for equal timesharing.
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It is not lost on our Court that Andrew is no longer in day care but attends school. However,
we chose to review this claim because the record reflects that Andrew attends after school care.
Therefore, the issue is still ripe albeit on a smaller scale.
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Further, the trial court found that Michael chose to abandon the three
night schedule. The court’s order, entered on August 5, 2008, stated:
[Michael] currently has timesharing overnight twice a
week (every Tuesday overnight and every weekend
overnight, either on a Friday night or a Saturday night
alternatively). The Court’s original order granted three
nights per week to [Michael], but for reasons that are still
unclear to the Court, [Michael] chose to continue the
original timesharing agreement of two nights per week.
In this order, the trial court based its denial upon evidence that
Andrew functioned well under the arrangement that was in place. Andrew’s well
being was certainly a reasonable basis for the court’s decision. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court’s refusal to increase Michael’s timesharing was not
erroneous.
IV. Child Support
Michael also claims that the trial court order erred by denying his
request to modify his child support obligation. Kentucky law clearly places the
establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support obligations within
the sound discretion of the trial court. KRS 403.211 – KRS 403.213; Van Meter v.
Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky.App. 2000). Nonetheless, the court’s discretion is
not unlimited. Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky.App. 1992). It
must be fair, reasonable, and supported by sound legal principles. Downing v.
Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky.App. 2001).
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The parties’ child care costs decreased when Andrew began school in
2008. Based upon that change, Michael and Shannon agreed to review the child
support obligation. The trial court found that Michael, a partner in a medium-sized
Lexington law firm, earned $104, 254.56 in 2008 $63,525.00 in 2007, and
$47,754.00 in 2006. Thus, Michael’s average income for the three years prior to
the review was $71,844.19, or $5,987.01 per month. The court found that
Shannon, a paralegal, earned $56, 087.00 in 2008.
Michael argues the trial court incorrectly calculated his income. He
claims that his average income should have been computed as $70,243.35. There is
a $1,600.84 difference between the trial court’s income assessment and the amount
Michael now seeks. This difference is not substantial. However, Michael argued
before the trial court that his average income should have been $65, 752.00. Due
to Michael’s inconsistent arguments and the small amount of discrepancy, we find
no error in the trial court’s assessment.
Michael also claims that the trial court misapplied the child support
guidelines and arbitrarily applied a 20% reduction to his obligation. Following the
support order, Michael filed a motion for more specific findings as to the trial
court’s decision to reduce child support payments by 20%.
In response to Michael’s motion, the trial court explained that the
20% reduction was an effort to compensate Michael for the expenses of shared
custody. The court provided,
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The Court finds that the 20% set off Ordered previously
is not arbitrary but is in fact the most equitable way to
compensate the Father for the amount of time that the
child spends with him above the typical guideline
visitation.
Under CR 52.02, Michael properly made a motion for more specific
findings. The trial court described a formula used to derive the 20% figure.
Instead, the court simply stated that the reduction was a fair way to compensate
Michael. Although Michael argues that the percentage should correlate with the
percent of time Andrew spends with Michael, there is no requirement that child
support must be reduced in proportion to timesharing. We conclude that this
finding was soundly within the court’s discretion and specifically justified as a
means to compensate Michael for timesharing.
Michael further claims that the trial court’s application of the child
support guidelines was unfair because the guidelines do not contemplate a shared
custody plan. Citing Plattner v. Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. App. 2007),
Michael argues that, “requiring [Michael] to pay child support according to the
guidelines was per se an abuse of discretion under circumstances similar to the
present case.” We strongly disagree.
In Plattner, our Court did not state that any child support decision was
a per se abuse of discretion. Conversely, our Court stressed the importance of
flexibility in child support determination. Id. at 579, 580. We provided,
While Kentucky’s child support guidelines do not
contemplate such a shared custody arrangement, they do
reflect the equal duty of both parents to contribute to the
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support of their children in proportion to their respective
net incomes. They also provide a measure of flexibility
that is particularly relevant to this case.
Id. at 579.
In Plattner, the Father and Mother had equal timesharing and bore
almost identical responsibility for the child’s day to day expenses. Both parents
made virtually the same income. Under these circumstances, our Court found that
a strict application of the guidelines was an abuse of discretion.
The facts of this case are drastically differ from Plattner. Despite
earning significantly less than Michael, Shannon claimed that she provided all of
Andrew’s child care costs, the majority of his clothing and shoes, and health
insurance costs. To support her claims, Shannon provided the court with her W-2
statement, health insurance documentation, after school care documentation, and
her 2008 wage statement.
The facts of this case appear to be more similar to those found in
Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App. 1993).
In Downey v. Rogers, (citations omitted), we declined to
conclude that a trial court had abused its discretion by
awarding child support where the parties shared legal
custody and shared equal or almost equal physical
custody of their children. However, our conclusion was
based, in part, upon the fact that the children’s father had
agreed to pay a portion of his child support obligation to
the children’s mother. We also noted that the children’s
father earned twice as much annually as did their mother;
thus her share of the children’s expenses was
proportionately more cumbersome.
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Plattner, at 579-580.
Due to Shannon’s greater financial responsibilities and lesser income, we find no
error in the court’s award of child support.
Similarly, we disagree with Michael’s contentions that both he and
Shannon should owe child support to one another. As previously mentioned, trial
courts must retain flexibility in applying the child support guidelines. The record
reflects ample evidence that Shannon provides many financial resources for
Andrew. In light of these expenses, we find no error in the court’s refusal to use
Shannon’s income as a factor to reduce Michael’s child support obligation.
IV. Division of Marital Assets
In Michael’s prior appeal, he claimed that the trial court abused its
discretion concerning issues of property valuation, property division, and
allocation of marital debt. During the course of Shannon and Michael’s divorce,
Shannon claimed that she could quit her job and stay home with Andrew if she
received her martial property award of $35,000. In its findings of facts and
conclusions of law, entered in April 2005, the trial court made the timesharing
arrangement contingent upon Shannon leaving her employment. Our Court
affirmed the trial court in part, but reversed the trial court’s child support
calculation and its valuation of marital property in light of Shannon’s employment
status. Regarding the latter, our Court concluded,
[t]he status of property as either marital or non-marital is
not based on the economic status of either party, but on
the nature of the property. Therefore, the family court’s
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consideration of Shannon’s employment status in
determining the extent of the marital estate is not
appropriate and we must reverse the family court on this
issue.
2005-CA-1163.
Michael now claims that the trial court did not properly apply our
ruling concerning his retirement account, year-end wage payment, marital debts,
dissipation of marital assets, and the overall property division. Our Court
did not specifically address those issues. Although we remanded the case to the
trial court for a re-evaluation of the marital property division, we did so only with
respect to the trial court’s consideration of Shannon’s employment status. Our
opinion provided:
On remand, the family court shall determine the value of
the marital property absent any consideration of
Shannon’s employment. The family court shall then
divide the marital property in two ways, one absent any
consideration of Shannon’s employment status and the
other taking into consideration Shannon’s employment
status.
In this appeal, Michael does not argue that the trial court refused to
divide marital property absent consideration of Shannon’s employment. Instead,
he simply re-litigates issues that he raised or should have raised in his previous
appeal. Therefore, we decline to review those issues for error.
Accordingly, we affirm the aforementioned Fayette Family Court
orders.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Susan B. Jones
Lexington, Kentucky
Debra Ann Doss
Lexington, Kentucky
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