HARRIS (JACK PATRICK) VS. HARSTON (PAMELA K.)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000912-ME
JACK PATRICK HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CATHERINE R. HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-D-00127
PAMELA K. HARSTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DIXON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, JUDGE: Jack Harris appeals from the Domestic Violence Order (DVO)
issued against him by the Warren Family Court. After carefully reviewing the
record and the law, we vacate the DVO and remand.
Jack moved to Bowling Green to live with his brother and sister-in-law in
May 2009. He had been an attorney in Louisiana, but he retired due to disability
and is no longer licensed to practice law. He is proceeding in this case pro se.
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Pam Harston, a physician, is a neighbor of Jack’s brother. In July 2009,
Jack moved in with Pam. She had recently been evicted from a medical practice
and was commencing her solo practice while engaged in litigation with her former
partners. Jack worked in her office assisting in administrative matters and working
on her lawsuit. He also spent time on research for a prospective book.
The record indicates that Jack and Pam had no serious difficulties in their
relationship until March 2010. At that point, the facts are somewhat disputed.
Jack suffers from bipolar disorder, and Pam alleges he experienced a manic
delusional episode in March of 2010. Pam was going to a wedding in Florida and
invited both Jack and another man to accompany her. Jack alleges that the other
man was a drug addict and that Pam provided him with marijuana during the trip.
The record shows that Jack felt slighted by Pam during the trip.
Upon returning to Bowling Green, Jack went back to his brother’s house.
The record contains numerous email and text messages exchanged between Pam
and Jack during this time. Jack was clearly very upset about the events that had
occurred during the Florida trip. He accused Pam of unethical practices and
behavior relating to her duties as a physician. In fact, Jack went as far as to mail a
letter to opposing counsel in Pam’s litigation reporting that Pam had improperly
shredded mail, including a check for twenty thousand dollars. Jack sent copies of
the letter to a circuit judge, a U.S. Attorney, and others.
The prolific emails and text messages between Pam and Jack continued.
The record indicates that they spent the night together on more than one occasion.
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On April 16, when Pam declined to undergo psychiatric treatment that Jack had
determined she needed, he told her that their romantic relationship was finished.
Nonetheless, the communications did not end. Jack continued to send emails to
Pam pointing out how she had been at fault in the last days of their relationship.
He accused her of unethical practices.
On April 17, 2010, Jack sent a memorandum to the Department of Drug
Enforcement (DEA), detailing allegations of how Pam had behaved unethically.
That same evening, Jack sent Pam a barrage of text messages telling her that she
would be arrested and would be unable to practice medicine. He called her names
and indicated that he knew that she was out in her daughter’s car while her
daughter was at home. In his final message, he stated, “you [are] history as a
physician; and your suit is over.”
That night, Pam obtained an Emergency Protection Order (EPO) against
Jack. On the petition, Pam complained that Jack: had entered her home uninvited;
had expressed violent thoughts about her; had a history of mental illness; texted
excessively; and indicated that he would like to “blow my head off.” Because the
EPO ordered Jack to stay 1000 feet away from Pam, he was forced to move out of
his brother’s home. Between the issuance of the EPO and the hearing on the DVO,
Jack reported Pam to the Cabinet of Health and Family Services, alleging that she
had abused the KASPER2 system. He filed a grievance against her with the
Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure.
2
Kentucky All Systems Electronic Reporting, a system designed to trace prescription drugs from
pharmacy to pharmacy.
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On May 3, 2010, the Warren Family Court held a hearing on Pam’s petition
for a DVO. After hearing the testimony of Jack, of Pam and her psychiatrist, and
of Jack’s sister-in-law, the court issued a DVO against Jack that prevented him
from contacting or coming within one thousand feet of Pam. This appeal follows.
Our standard of review is governed by Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
(CR) 52.01. Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. 1980). (CR 52.01 applies to
domestic cases). When reviewing an action taken by a court without a jury, we
may not reverse its findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous. Clear error
only occurs when there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s findings. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116
(Ky. App. 1998). Substantial evidence is that which is “proof sufficient to induce
conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Rearden v. Rearden, 296 S.W.3d
438 (Ky. App. 2009). (citation omitted).
Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 403.750 authorizes a family court to
issue a domestic violence order “if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence
that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may again
occur[.]” The definition of domestic violence and abuse is “physical injury,
serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent
physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family
members[.]” KRS 403.720(1). KRS 503.010(3) provides as follows: “’Imminent’
means impending danger, and, in the context of domestic violence and abuse as
defined by KRS 403.720, belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a
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past pattern of repeated serious abuse.” See Fraley v. Rice-Fraley, 313 S.W.3d
635, 640 (Ky. App. 2010).
Preliminarily, we note that Jack has presented a number of arguments
alleging evidentiary and constitutional error. He argues that we need not examine
the sufficiency of the evidence in light of these other alleged errors that he believes
to be dispositive of his case. However, we are persuaded that sufficiency of the
evidence is the issue upon which this case turns. Our Supreme Court has explained
that:
[o]rdinarily, this Court confines itself rather closely to
deciding only those issues which the parties present. . . .
However, we are constrained by no rule of court or
constitutional provision to observe this procedure, and on
rare occasions, the facts mandate a departure from the
normal practice. When the facts reveal a fundamental
basis for decision not presented by the parties, it is our
duty to address the issue to avoid a misleading
application of the law.
Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991). (Emphasis added). We believe
this is such a case -- especially because the standard of review requires us to
examine whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
findings.
Our Supreme Court has cautioned us to be reluctant to apply its holding in
Mitchell, supra. However, it has also admonished that “[s]o long as an appellate
court confines itself to the record, no rule of court or constitutional provision
prevents it from deciding an issue not presented by the parties.” Priestly v.
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Priestly, 949 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Ky. 1997). In this case, it is the record which
reveals that no domestic violence had occurred.
At the hearing, Pam alleged four acts of domestic violence: 1) that Jack
threw a king-sized Reese’s Cup at her; 2) that Jack grabbed her arm and pushed
her away from him; 3) that Jack cornered her in her kitchen without touching her;
and 4) that Jack raised his arms while retrieving his personal belongings from her
office. She admitted to the trial court that after he cornered her in her kitchen, she
invited him to spend the night with her; he accepted the invitation.
We are not persuaded that any of those acts rises to the level of domestic
violence contemplated by KRS 403.720 or KRS 403.750. Pam testified under oath
that she was never physically injured by Jack. She also failed to prove imminent
fear of Jack by evidence of a past pattern of serious abuse. Logic dictates that if
she had been fearful of Jack, she would not have invited him to spend the night
with her. She alleged that Jack had threatened her, but the record shows that any
threats pertained solely to Pam’s medical practice and licensure status.
Additionally, Pam testified that she had not heard Jack say that he wanted to blow
her head off. She told the court that Jack’s sister-in-law had told her that Jack had
made the comment. However, Jack’s sister-in-law testified under oath that he had
never made any statement indicating violent intentions toward Pam, including the
alleged comment about blowing off Pam’s head. Assuming, arguendo, that
throwing a candy bar and pushing away someone’s arm constitute unwanted
touching, we have recently held that unwanted touching “alone does not satisfy the
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definition of domestic violence and abuse as stated in KRS 403.720(1).” Caudill
v. Caudill, 318 3W3d 112, 119 (Ky. App.2010).
Our courts do not condone the frivolous practice of obtaining DVO’s to use
the courts to leverage another party in some other proceeding; i.e., a civil lawsuit.
Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2005). The record reveals that
Pam’s true motive was to prevent Jack from reporting her to the DEA and the
Kentucky Medical Licensure Board. Immediately after the court announced that it
was granting the DVO, Pam asked that the order be less restrictive. She said that
she did not want to see him lose his home with his brother. She then asked the
court if it could prevent Jack from contacting government agencies concerning her
and her medical practice. The court properly told Pam that that sort of protection
from harassment does not come within the scope of Kentucky’s domestic violence
statutes.
We are persuaded that Pam’s efforts to obtain a DVO against Jack are
inappropriate under these circumstances. The domestic violence laws are intended
to provide swift protection to victims of violence as set forth in clear terms by the
pertinent statutes. Those statutory elements are wholly absent in this case.
Harassing communications involving business relationships do not come within the
scope of domestic violence protection.
Our court has recently emphasized that:
the impact of having an EPO or DVO entered
improperly, hastily, or without a valid basis can have a
devastating effect on the alleged perpetrator. . . From
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[his] perspective, the fairness, justice, impartiality, and
equality promised by our judicial system is destroyed. In
addition, there are severe consequences, such as the
immediate loss of one’s children, home, financial
resources, employment, and dignity. Further, one
becomes subject to immediate arrest, imprisonment, and
incarceration for up to one year for the violation of a
court order, no matter what the situation or circumstances
might be.
Wright, supra. The serious subject matter of a DVO is absent in this case.
Due to the lack of any evidence – much less substantial evidence – of
domestic violence, we vacate the order of the Warren Family Court and remand for
entry of an appropriate order dissolving the DVO.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Patrick Harris, J.D., pro se
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Pamela K. Harston, M.D., pro se
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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