TYLER (TERRY WAYNE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002355-MR
TERRY WAYNE TYLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-CR-00021
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Terry Tyler, is currently serving a life
sentence which he received in 1987 for burglary and robbery. Tyler appeals the
trial court’s denial of his “Motion for Modification of Sentence Pursuant to KRS
532.070.” Upon review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, we affirm.
Tyler was indicted by the Henderson County Grand Jury for two
counts of third-degree burglary, one count of first-degree robbery, and one count of
second-degree persistent felony offender. On April 8, 1987, following a jury trial,
Tyler was found guilty of one count of third-degree burglary and one count of firstdegree robbery, as well as being found to be a second-degree persistent felony
offender. Accordingly, Tyler was sentenced to ten years for the burglary and a life
sentence for the robbery.
Since that time, Tyler has filed numerous appeals. This Court
recently summarized that history as follows:
The lengthy procedural history in this case has
been set forth in prior unpublished decisions by this
Court.
In 1987, Tyler appealed his conviction directly.
On March 3, 1988, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed Tyler’s conviction in an unpublished opinion.
In August 1988, Tyler filed a pro se motion pursuant to
RCr 11.42 to vacate the circuit court’s April 27, 1987
judgment. The Henderson Circuit Court denied his RCr
11.42 motion. In an attempt to appeal this denial, Tyler
filed a motion for belated appeal with the circuit court,
who lacked jurisdiction, and filed a similar motion with
this court. On March 3, 1989, Tyler filed a pro se motion
pursuant to CR 60.02 seeking a new trial on the alleged
grounds of newly discovered evidence and perjured
testimony. On April 17, 1989, he filed another pro se
motion pursuant to CR 60.02 seeking relief from the
circuit court’s denial of his RCr 11.42 motion.
On June 22, 1989, the Henderson Circuit Court
denied Tyler’s two CR 60.02 motions, and Tyler failed to
appeal this denial. Then on September 5, 1989, this
Court denied Tyler’s motion for belated appeal regarding
the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion.
On April 26, 1990, Tyler filed his third motion
pursuant to CR 60.02, claiming ineffective assistance of
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counsel. The circuit court denied his third CR 60.02
motion on May 29, 1990, and Tyler appealed to this court
which affirmed the Henderson Circuit Court on February
8, 1991.
Next, on September 13, 1993, Tyler filed a pro se
motion pursuant to KRS 532.070 to modify his sentence,
which motion the circuit court denied on October 21,
1993. Tyler appealed the denial of his KRS 532.070
motion, and on October 11, 1994, this Court affirmed the
Henderson Circuit Court holding that Tyler’s motion was
untimely and his claims lacked merit.
On July 17, 1998, Tyler filed yet another motion
pursuant to CR 60.02, claiming that an improper jury
instruction was presented to the jury during the penalty
phase. After the Commonwealth failed to respond, Tyler
filed a motion for default judgment regarding his fourth
CR 60.02 motion. On September 17, 1998, the
Henderson Circuit Court denied both motions and
concluded that Tyler’s fourth CR 60.02 motion was
untimely, and the relief he sought was not available
pursuant to CR 60.02. Tyler appealed this denial. This
Court again affirmed the circuit court and held that
Tyler’s motion was untimely. The issues should have
been presented on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42
motion and did not warrant relief pursuant to CR 60.02.
Finally, Tyler filed yet another motion pursuant to
KRS 532.070 to modify his sentence. He claimed that an
improper jury instruction had been presented to the jury
during the penalty phase and that the Henderson Circuit
Court still had jurisdiction to modify his sentence,
although more than ten days had passed since the
judgment against Tyler was entered. As stated above, on
July 19, 2000, the circuit court denied Tyler’s second
motion to modify his sentence. On July 28, 2000, Tyler
filed a motion with the Henderson Circuit Court
requesting the circuit court issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding its denial … [O]n August 3,
2000, the circuit court denied Tyler’s motion for findings
of facts and conclusions of law. Subsequently, Tyler
appealed both denials to this court.
A panel of this Court affirmed the trial court in the
above-referenced unpublished opinion. Thereafter, in
May 2004, Tyler, pro se, filed another RCr 11.42 motion
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with the Henderson Circuit Court. The court denied the
motion as untimely, and this Court affirmed. Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 2004-CA-001666-MR (June 3, 2005).
In November 2006, Tyler filed a motion pursuant
to CR 60.01, asking the Henderson Circuit Court to
vacate his PFO conviction due to a constitutional error in
the penalty-phase jury instructions. The court denied
Tyler’s motion on December 16, 2006. The court
acknowledged that Tyler had raised this issue in previous
motions and held that CR 60.01 did not afford relief for
substantive legal errors.
…
CR 60.01 allows the court to correct clerical
mistakes, not substantive legal errors. See Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Ky. 2000). Here,
the trial court’s judgment clearly reflected the verdict of
the jury. There is no clerical error in the judgment;
rather, Tyler asserts a substantive legal argument
attacking his conviction based on the validity of the jury
instructions. As there is no clerical mistake at issue,
Tyler’s argument is not properly before us pursuant to
CR 60.01.
Even if this issue were before us on collateral
attack pursuant to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02, review would
be foreclosed because Tyler could have raised the issue
on direct appeal. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 856-57 (Ky. 1983). Likewise, Tyler has previously
raised similar arguments in other post-conviction
motions.
Tyler v. Commonwealth, 2007-CA-000103-MR
(February 22, 2008)(quoting Tyler v. Commonwealth,
2000-CA-001872-MR (Jan. 25, 2002)). Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 2009 WL 102901 (Ky. App.
2009)(alterations in original).
The aforementioned procedural history led directly to the current
matters at issue in the matter sub judice. Following the events recited above, Tyler
filed yet another “Motion for Modification of Sentence Pursuant to KRS 532.070.”
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On September 17, 2009, the trial court denied that motion in an order which stated
in relevant part:
Tyler now moves the Court to reduce his life
sentence pursuant to KRS 532.070. That statute allows
the Court to reduce the jury’s recommendation if it
believes it is unduly harsh. He cites as support the 1998
crime bill (House Bill 455), which put a fifty-year limit
on a term of years imposed for a Class A felony. KRS
532.060(2)(a).
First, it appears that the motion is untimely and
that this Court no longer has the jurisdiction to modify
Tyler’s sentence under KRS 532.070. See Sliverburg v.
Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (1979). This was
the appellate court’s ruling when it denied Tyler’s
previous motion under KRS 532.070 on October 11,
1994; and the present motion, filed on September 14,
2009, is just as untimely as that one.
Second, even if it were timely, the 1998 crime bill
does not support Tyler’s motion. While the crime bill did
put a limit on a term of years, it did not take away the
jury’s option to impose life in prison. A life sentence for
a Class A felony is valid under both the old law and the
current one. Given the seriousness of his crimes and his
previous criminal history, Tyler’s sentence is not unduly
harsh, nor is it cruel and unusual punishment. Workman
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
See September 17, 2009, Order of Henderson Circuit Court, pp. 1-2.
This Court has reviewed the record and applicable law, and we are in
agreement with the trial court that Tyler’s latest motion in the matter sub judice
was untimely filed. The judgment and sentence against Tyler were entered in
1988. The motion to modify sentence brought in the matter sub judice was brought
over twenty years after the initial sentence was entered. Further, Tyler has twice
brought this issue before the trial court and before this Court on appeal. Each time
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such motions were found to be untimely and without merit. We do not find
otherwise now, and are in agreement with the trial court that even if Tyler’s motion
were timely, which it is not, that the provisions of the crime bill which he cites
does not curtail the option of the jury to impose life in prison if it believes such is a
fitting sentence. See Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky.
1979); Commonwealth v. Gross, 936 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Ky. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Gaddie, 239 S.W.3d 59 (Ky. 2007).
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the September
17, 2009, order of the Henderson Circuit Court, overruling Tyler’s latest motion
for modification of sentence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Terry W. Tyler, Pro Se
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K. R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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