HOOKER (BILLY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002065-MR
BILLY HOOKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN KNOX MILLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00052
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Billy Hooker appeals from the judgment and sentence
entered by the Knox Circuit Court following his conviction by a jury of fleeing or
evading police in the first degree and disregarding a stop sign. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
During the early morning hours of April 18, 2009, Officers Winston
Tye and Jake Knuckles were sitting in their cruisers at an intersection in Knox
County when they heard and saw a motorbike driving toward them. The
motorbike came to a stop in the middle of the road, approximately 75 to 100 feet
away from the officers, and the driver attempted to turn the motorbike around in
the opposite direction. The officers grew suspicious and Officer Tye approached
the motorbike in his cruiser to investigate.
As Officer Tye pulled up beside the motorbike, he recognized Hooker as the
driver. Officer Tye had his window down and ordered Hooker to stop. Officer
Tye started to put his cruiser in park to get out; when he did, Hooker took off and
drove around him toward Officer Knuckles. As the motorbike sped past Officer
Knuckles’ cruiser, about four feet away from it, Officer Knuckles noticed that the
driver was not wearing a helmet and recognized Hooker as the driver. Officer
Knuckles then activated his lights and siren and both officers pursued Hooker
through town.
During the pursuit, the officers observed Hooker drive onto a sidewalk,
almost wrecking, and disregard a stop sign without slowing down. Hooker turned
into a driveway between a church and his mother’s house, at which point Hooker’s
brother ran off the front porch of the house in front of Officer Knuckles’ cruiser,
yelling and cursing at him. Hooker’s brother then chased Officer Tye’s cruiser
down the street, yelling at him. The officers were unable to locate Hooker to
effectuate an arrest that morning; however, Hooker was eventually apprehended.
The morning of trial, Hooker moved to suppress any evidence stemming
from the officers’ attempt to stop him, on the basis that the officers lacked
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reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop. The trial court conducted a
hearing on the motion and Officer Tye testified that he became suspicious after
Hooker attempted to turn the motorbike around upon seeing the officers. The trial
court denied Hooker’s motion to suppress.
The case proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Hooker of fleeing or
evading police in the first degree and disregarding a stop sign. Upon conclusion of
the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the Commonwealth and Hooker reached a
plea agreement on the sentencing phase, which the trial court accepted. The court
then sentenced Hooker to five years’ imprisonment on the charge of first-degree
fleeing or evading police, which was enhanced to fifteen years by virtue of
Hooker’s status as first-degree PFO.1 As part of the plea agreement, Hooker
reserved his right to appeal the first-degree fleeing or evading police conviction.
This appeal followed.
First, Hooker argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence as the fruit of an illegal stop since the police officers lacked reasonable
and articulable suspicion to stop the motorbike. Since we find that no actual stop
occurred, any evidence of illegal conduct on behalf of Hooker during the chase
should not have been suppressed.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress first to determine
whether the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous and then de novo to
determine whether the trial court’s decision is correct as a matter of law. Henry v.
Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194, 197 (Ky. 2008).
1
Hooker was also fined $100, to be paid within six months of his release from incarceration.
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In this case, the trial court found that the officers had reasonable and
articulable suspicion for stopping Hooker. However, as the Commonwealth
emphasizes on appeal, whether the officers had reasonable and articulable
suspicion is irrelevant since no actual stop of Hooker occurred. As noted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court:
A seizure occurs when an officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen. A seizure does not
occur, however, if in response to a show of authority, the
subject does not yield. In that event, the seizure occurs
only when the police physically subdue the subject.
Here, it is undisputed that when the officer turned
on his lights, [the defendant] failed to yield to his
authority. Instead, he led police on a high-speed chase,
which included driving in the wrong lane of traffic. [The
defendant’s] seizure only occurred when the police
physically apprehended him following the chase. Thus,
the police officer’s justification for initially attempting to
stop [the defendant] is immaterial[.]
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 216, 219-20 (Ky. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
The same rationale applies here. Officer Tye’s justification for attempting to
stop Hooker is immaterial since no stop actually occurred.2 Indeed, the record
reflects that the chase did not result in Hooker’s immediate apprehension and
Hooker concedes on appeal that the “stop” was actually an “attempt to stop.”
Thus, any evidence against Hooker emanating from the attempted stop and
2
The fact that the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was based upon different
reasoning does not alter our result since well-settled is the rule that an appellate court may affirm
a lower court for any reason supported by the record. See McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286
S.W.3d 780, 786 n.19 (Ky. 2009).
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subsequent chase, including Officer Tye’s testimony, was not the fruit of an
unreasonable seizure. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Hooker’s
motion to suppress such evidence.
Next, Hooker contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the charge of first-degree fleeing or evading police.
Specifically, he claims that insufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that he
created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person or
property as a result of his flight from police. We disagree.
Upon consideration of a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not
be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citation omitted);
accord Banks v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Ky. 2010).
Here, the jury was instructed in accordance with KRS3 520.095, which
provides, in relevant part:
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the
first degree:
(a) When, while operating a motor vehicle with
intent to elude or flee, the person knowingly or
wantonly disobeys a direction to stop his or her
motor vehicle, given by a person recognized to be
a police officer, and at least one (1) of the
following conditions exist:
....
(4) By fleeing or eluding, the person is the
cause, or creates substantial risk, of serious
physical injury or death to any person or
property[.]
Hooker contends that no people or cars were on the road or sidewalk that
morning and no property was damaged; thus, his actions did not create a
substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person or property. In
effect, he maintains that because no one was in harm’s way, no substantial risk of
harm existed. He further posits that there lurks the hypothetical risk of someone
walking in front of a vehicle and suffering serious physical injury or death any
time anyone drives a vehicle anywhere. He directs us to the case of Bell v.
Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003), for the notion that “not every
hypothetical scenario of ‘what might have happened’ represents a substantial risk.”
Id. at 497.
The Court in Bell established that a risk must be “ample” or “considerable”
in order to rise to the level of being substantial and will turn on the unique
circumstances of each case. Id. In other words, “the issue of whether a
defendant’s conduct creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury
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‘depends upon proof’ and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). In Bell, the defendant fled on foot from police
and was apprehended after a short chase, during which the defendant discarded a
handgun that had been concealed on his person. The Commonwealth argued a
substantial risk of harm was created since (1) the defendant’s handgun could have
accidentally discharged while the defendant was fleeing – either while in the
defendant’s possession, or when it fell or was discarded to the ground and (2)
either the defendant or the officer might have instigated an armed confrontation.
Id. at 498.
The Court held that “neither the evidence presented nor the
Commonwealth’s ‘scenarios,’ which the Commonwealth suggests are reasonable
inferences from the evidence, were sufficient to support a finding that [the
defendant’s] flight created a ‘substantial risk of serious physical injury or
death[.]’” Bell, 122 S.W.3d at 498. The Court noted:
the Commonwealth’s naked assertion that [the
defendant’s] possession and/or discarding of the handgun
during his flight from [the officer] created a risk that the
handgun would accidentally fire and kill or seriously
physically injure someone falls squarely in the category
of insubstantial and purely theoretical risks.
Nor did the evidence in this case permit a finding
that [the defendant’s] flight created a substantial risk of
armed confrontation. Given that [the officer] never drew
his weapon and [the defendant] never brandished his
handgun nor pointed it in [the officer’s] direction, no
“shoot-out” occurred and the Commonwealth’s proposed
“scenario” of how [the defendant] created a substantial
risk of one rests upon its assumption that either [the
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defendant] and [the officer] or both might possibly have
acted differently than they actually did.
Id.
The Kentucky Supreme Court also addressed the issue of risk of substantial
harm in Lawson v. Commonwealth, 85 S.W.3d 571 (Ky. 2002). In Lawson, the
defendant exceeded the speed of 125 mph in his vehicle while evading police,
disregarded traffic signals, sped through intersections, weaved through traffic, and
swerved to avoid a police blockade, causing his vehicle to crash into the guard rail,
become airborne and land in the median. Id. at 573. The Court held that the
defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of
fleeing or evading police in the second degree, finding “the evidence in this case
overwhelming and . . . no jury could reasonably have believed that [the defendant]
fled or evaded police but did not create a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to any person.” Id. at 576.
We find the circumstances of this case more analogous to that of Lawson
than Bell. Here, no actual injury to any person or property occurred; thus we are
only presented with the question of whether Hooker’s flight from the police
created a substantial risk of injury.4 At trial, evidence was presented to show that
Hooker operated a motor vehicle, eluded the police by taking off on his motorbike
4
While commentators of KRS 520.095 have found the language “serious physical injury or death
. . . to property” to be “curious” and “largely incoherent in light of the KRS 500.080(15)
definition of ‘serious physical injury’” (physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death,
or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ), inclusion of the term
“property” in the jury instructions in this case is not dispositive of our resolution of the issue
before us and thus we will not attempt to interpret or define this portion of the statute. See Bell,
122 S.W.3d at 494 n.6 (quoting Lawson, 85 S.W. 3d at 576 n.9).
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after being directed to stop, drove onto a sidewalk almost wrecking the motorbike,
and disregarded a stop sign while driving through town. Despite Hooker’s
argument that no people or property were present that morning so no substantial
risk of harm existed, our review of the record reveals that Hooker’s actions created
more than a “hypothetical” risk that serious physical injury to persons or property
might have occurred and that the evidence was sufficient to induce a reasonable
juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Hooker was guilty of first-degree
fleeing or evading police.
The judgment and sentence of the Knox Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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