PERKINS (SUE) VS. MAPEL (PATSY), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002049-ME
SUE PERKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00003
PATSY MAPEL AND
BILLY MAPEL
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, THOMPSON, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Sue Perkins appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery
Circuit Court finding that venue was proper in Montgomery County and awarding
primary custody of her grandchild to his paternal grandparents. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm.
On April 2, 2007, B.M. (child) was born to M.P., the mother, and
R.M., the father in Montgomery County, Kentucky. After the child’s birth, he and
his mother resided in Montgomery County for the majority of the time. In
September 2008, the mother and child moved to Morgan County where the
mother’s mother and stepfather resided. Subsequently, on December 10, 2008, the
mother was allegedly murdered by the father in Morgan County. According to the
record, the father has been charged with the mother’s murder.
Following mother’s death, Perkins, the maternal grandmother, filed a
juvenile dependency, neglect, and abuse petition and an emergency custody
petition in the Morgan Family Court. The documents filed by Perkins were
notarized by Morgan County Attorney Steve O’Connor. On November 13, 2008,
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 610.010, the family court issued an
emergency custody order and found that the child was in immediate danger due to
his parents’ failure to provide for his safety or needs. The family court awarded
Perkins temporary custody of the child and granted visitation rights to the paternal
grandmother.
On January 12, 2009, Patsy and Billy Mapel, the child’s paternal
grandparents, filed for custody in Montgomery Circuit Court. The next month,
Perkins moved to transfer the Montgomery County custody action to Morgan
County, arguing that Montgomery County was not the proper venue. The
Montgomery Circuit Court then issued an order to the Cabinet of Health and
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Family Services to produce all of its Morgan and Montgomery County records
regarding the child and scheduled a hearing on the venue issue.
At the venue hearing, the circuit court heard extensive testimony
regarding the child’s contact with Morgan and Montgomery County. From this
testimony, the circuit court found that the child had resided in Montgomery County
except for a few months of his life. Further, the circuit court found the following:
The only relative the child has in Morgan County is this
child’s 69 year-old maternal grandmother, Sue Perkins.
The child has numerous relatives in Montgomery
County, including a sister, grandmother, grandfather,
aunts, uncles, and cousins. The child is not yet in school;
therefore[,] the majority of the witnesses are family
members, who all reside in Montgomery County.
Additionally, the child’s guardian ad litem issued a report to the circuit court
providing that she was “of the opinion that either Montgomery County or Morgan
County would be [an] appropriate forum for this matter to be heard,” due to their
significant contact with the child.
Based on these facts, the Montgomery Circuit Court ruled that
Montgomery County was the appropriate venue. The circuit court further ruled
that Montgomery County was the home county of the child within six months
before the commencement of the proceeding. Thus, the circuit court ruled that
venue in Montgomery County was proper pursuant to KRS 403.822 (1)(a).
On August 31, 2009, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary
hearing to determine custody of the child. Based on the testimony, the circuit court
found that the paternal grandparents would be more actively involved in the young
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child’s life, including taking the child fishing, walking, and riding on the tractor.
In comparison, Perkins’s granddaughter testified that Perkins would remain inside
her residence the majority of the time while her grandchildren played outside.
The circuit court further found that R.P., Perkins’s husband, was the
subject of a substantiated claim of sexual abuse against one of the child’s siblings.
Because of this substantiation, the circuit court noted that the Morgan Family
Court precluded R.P. from being alone with the child. Finally, the circuit court
noted the extensive family network available to support the child in Montgomery
County in the event of the paternal grandparents’ inability to care for the child
compared to his lone family member in Morgan County. Based on these findings,
the circuit court awarded joint custody of the child to Perkins and the paternal
grandparents, but primary custody was awarded to the paternal grandparents.
Perkins was awarded visitation rights. This appeal followed.
Perkins contends that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred by
deciding the parties’ custody issue on the merits when venue was improper. She
contends that the Montgomery Circuit Court was precluded from hearing the
parties’ custody case because the Morgan Family Court had accepted exclusive
jurisdiction of the case by entering a temporary custody order. She further
contends that the Montgomery Circuit Court erroneously found that the child had
to reside in Morgan County for more than six months before asserting venue.
As stated in Pettit v. Raikes, 858 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ky. 1993), we note
the following:
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When the custody dispute is wholly intrastate, the issue is
not jurisdiction, it is venue. In such circumstances, any
circuit court in Kentucky possesses jurisdiction to decide
the case; the only question is which of Kentucky's 120
circuit courts is the appropriate venue.
Fundamentally, venue relates to the proper place for a claim to be heard. Dollar
General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith, 237 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Ky. 2007). In child custody
cases, looking to the “‘more convenient and most interested’ forum provides the
best approach,” for determining venue where the issue to be determined is the best
interests of a child. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 738 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky.App. 1987).
Matters of venue are left to the trial court’s discretion and must be upheld absent
abuse of discretion. Williams v. Williams, 611 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky.App. 1981).
While we acknowledge that the Morgan Family Court issued an
emergency custody order for the child, the statutory provisions authorizing the
court’s emergency custody order do not create exclusive venue and authority to
decide permanent custody and do not prejudice a permanent custody action. KRS
610.010(9); KRS 620.060(3). While Perkins had custody of the child based on an
emergency custody motion, she had not initiated permanent custody proceedings in
Morgan Family Court when the paternal grandparents filed their action for
permanent custody in Montgomery Circuit Court. Accordingly, the previous
Morgan County case did not preclude venue in Montgomery County.
Additionally, Perkins incorrectly argues that the Montgomery Circuit
Court was prohibited from factoring the six-month residency requirement of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) found in
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KRS 403.822(1) into its venue determination. While the UCCJEA governs
jurisdictional determinations between states in child custody cases and not
intrastate venue questions, trial courts can use UCCJEA’s provisions for guidance
in venue decisions. Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587, 589-91 (Ky.App. 2007).
Thus, the Montgomery Circuit Court’s use of the UCCJEA was not erroneous.
In addition to its use of the UCCJEA, the circuit court’s factual
findings make clear that it believed Montgomery County had significant
connections to the child to permit the case to be heard in the county. As stated in
Lancaster, 738 S.W.2d at 117, it is the best approach to choose the most
convenient and interested forum in child custody cases. Here, the circuit court
found that most of the child’s relatives were in Montgomery County, most of the
witnesses were from Montgomery County, and the child spent the majority of his
life in Montgomery County. Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that venue
was proper in Montgomery County was not an abuse of discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Barbara Anderson
Lexington, Kentucky
Elizabeth H. Davis
James E. Davis
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
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