KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. VS. SLOAN (LYNNE)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001629-MR
KINDRED NURSING CENTERS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
d/b/a HARRODSBURG HEALTH
CARE CENTER;
KINDRED HEALTHCARE
OPERATING, INC.,
KINDRED HEALTHCARE, INC.;
AND KINDRED HOSPITALS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00325
LYNNE SLOAN, AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF GLADYS B. REED, DECEASED
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEE
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership d/b/a
Harrodsburg Health Care Center, Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., Kindred
Healthcare, Inc., and Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership (Kindred) appeal from
an August 13, 2009 order of the Mercer Circuit Court which denied Kindred’s
motion to compel arbitration. We vacate and remand.
Gladys Reed was a resident of Kindred’s facility, Harrodsburg Health
Care Center. Reed died on August 28, 2007. Lynne Sloan,2 her daughter, was
appointed ancillary administrator of her estate.
Sloan, in her capacity as ancillary administrator, individually, and on
behalf of other beneficiaries, filed an action against Kindred alleging negligence
and violations of statutory duties in the death of Reed. However, Kindred alleged
that Reed had signed an arbitration agreement encompassing these claims, and
Kindred filed a motion, pursuant to the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act,
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 417.045 – 417-240 (KUAA) and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (FAA), to compel arbitration and either dismiss
or stay this action. By order entered August 13, 2009, the circuit court denied
Kindred’s motion to compel arbitration. This appeal followed.
1
Senior Judge Joseph Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
2
In her brief, the appellee refers to herself as “Lynne Slone.” However, we refer to her as
“Lynne Sloan” because this is the way her name is spelled in the notice of appeal.
-2-
Kindred argues that the circuit court erred by denying its motion to
compel arbitration, maintaining that the arbitration agreement constituted a binding
and enforceable contract and that the evidence established that Reed signed the
agreement through a valid power of attorney.
Under KRS 417.060, a person may seek a judicial order to compel
arbitration upon a showing that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that the
opposing party refuses to arbitrate. If the opposing party challenges the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement, the circuit court “shall proceed summarily to the
determination of the issue so raised.” KRS 417.060(1).
Appellate review of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order
arises under KRS 417.220(1)(a). The standard of review by our Court from
appeals arising under this statute was discussed in Conseco Finance Servicing
Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001) as follows:
It may also be well to note that our review of a trial
court’s ruling in a KRS 417.060 proceeding is according
to usual appellate standards. That is, we defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, upsetting them only if clearly
erroneous or if unsupported by substantial evidence, but
we review without deference the trial court’s
identification and application of legal principles. . . .
Here, the circuit court made no factual findings nor can we determine
whether the circuit court’s ruling was based upon the application of legal principles
justifying a de novo review by this Court.3 The circuit court’s order does indicate
3
We cannot determine from review of the circuit court’s order whether the court found the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement which must be resolved first under KRS 417.050 or 9
U.S.C. § 2.
-3-
that the court “considered the record” and “heard arguments of counsel.” Under
the circumstances presented in this case, in reliance upon Conseco, we believe the
circuit court is bound by Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, which
mandates that a court set forth specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of
law in its order or judgment.
As such, the circuit court erred when it entered its August 13, 2009
order denying arbitration because, in that order, it merely stated that Kindred’s
motion to compel arbitration was denied; it did not contain any findings of fact or
conclusions of law. In the absence of such findings and conclusions, we cannot
discern the basis of the circuit court’s decision and there can be no meaningful
review of this case.4 See Brown v. Shelton, 156 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. App. 2004).
We remind the circuit court that it speaks only through written orders
entered upon the official record. See Midland Guardian Acceptance Corp. of
Cincinnati, Ohio v. Britt, 439 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1968); Com. v. Wilson, 280 Ky. 61,
132 S.W.2d 522 (1939). Thus, any findings of fact and conclusions of law made
orally by the circuit court at an evidentiary hearing cannot be considered by this
Court on appeal unless specifically incorporated into a written and properly entered
order.
Upon remand, the circuit court shall reconsider Kindred’s motion to
compel arbitration in accordance with KRS 417.050, KRS 417.060, and 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16, and shall render an order that sets forth specific findings of fact and
4
This is distinguished from a case where the circuit court makes inadequate findings of fact. In
such a case, a party is bound to make a request for more definite findings under CR 52.04 before
reversal may be predicated upon such error.
-4-
separate conclusions of law as required by CR 52.01. We view Kindred’s
remaining contentions of error to be moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Mercer Circuit Court is
vacated and this cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald P. Moloney, II
J. Peter Cassidy, III
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen M. O’Brien, III
Lexington, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.