WHEELER (EVA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 24, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001591-MR
EVA WHEELER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KEN M. HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00554
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE; SHAKE,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Eva Wheeler appeals from an order of the Hardin Circuit
Court denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop and
subsequent search of a house. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court
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Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580
properly found that consent had been obtained prior to the searches and requests
we affirm the order. We find no error and affirm.
On August 21, 2008, Detective Chris Thompson of the Greater Hardin
County Narcotics Task Force received a call that a clerk from Walgreens had
reported a suspicious purchase of Sudafed, an ingredient of methamphetamine.
The name of the man who purchased the Sudafed was Andy Mann. The clerk also
provided a description of Mann. Thompson was in the vicinity and drove to the
Walgreens where he witnessed Mann exit the Walgreens and get into a vehicle
occupied by four other people. Thompson did a license plate check and
determined that the vehicle belonged to Michael Martinez, who was driving the
vehicle. The license plate check also revealed that Martinez was under
investigation for manufacturing methamphetamine. When the vehicle left the
parking lot, Thompson followed it.
Thompson observed the vehicle make an illegal u-turn against a red
light and drive back toward the Walgreens. Because Thompson was in an
unmarked police vehicle, he requested a marked vehicle perform a traffic stop due
to the u-turn. Once the traffic stop had occurred and Thompson arrived on the
scene, he requested that the occupants exit the vehicle. He then questioned Mann
about the purchase. Mann told Thompson that he made the purchase for Martinez
and Wheeler so they could use it to manufacture methamphetamine.
Thompson then questioned Martinez, during which Martinez
consented to a search of the vehicle. During the search, Thompson found the
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unopened box of Sudafed. Martinez was on probation at the time, so Thompson
called Martinez’s probation officer, Steve Whitely. When Whitely arrived, he
talked with Martinez and asked if he had anything in his house that “should not be
there.” Whitely then asked if they could go to Martinez’s house and search it.
Martinez gave his consent to search his house.
Thompson, Whitely, and Martinez proceeded to Martinez’s residence,
stopping along the way to get gas and a written consent to search form. Martinez
then signed the search form. During this time, the remaining occupants of
Martinez’s vehicle were taken to the Elizabethtown Police Department to give their
statements. Once at Martinez’s residence, Thompson and Whitely found
equipment and chemicals used for the purpose of manufacturing
methamphetamine. All occupants of the vehicle were eventually arrested.
Wheeler was indicted for complicity to commit the manufacturing of
methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Wheeler
entered a plea of not guilty. She later moved to suppress the evidence found as a
result of the traffic stop, claiming the police acted unlawfully during the course of
the stop and in searching Martinez’s vehicle and residence. Specifically, she
sought to suppress the Sudafed found in the vehicle, the statements of the other
passengers, and the evidence discovered during the search of the residence.
A suppression hearing was held. Only three witnesses testified,
Thompson, Whitely, and Officer Matt McMillan. McMillan was only at the scene
for a few seconds, so his testimony was short and unrevealing. Thompson and
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Whitely then testified to the events surrounding the stop and searches as described
above. No other witnesses were called and the hearing ended.
Prior to the court ruling on the suppression issue, Wheeler entered a
conditional guilty plea to complicity to commit manufacturing in
methamphetamine. The persistent felony offender charge was dismissed. Wheeler
reserved the right to appeal the ruling if her suppression motion was denied and to
withdraw the plea if it was granted. Following the plea, Wheeler made additional
motions to consider additional evidence on the suppression matter.
The trial court eventually entered an order denying the motion to
suppress finding that Martinez had voluntarily consented to the search of his
vehicle and residence. The court also allowed Wheeler to introduce a hand-written
note from Martinez into evidence, but denied the entry of any other evidence. This
appeal followed.
An appellate court’s standard of review of the trial
court’s decision on a motion to suppress requires that we
first determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then
they are conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we
must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
application of the law to those facts to determine whether
its decision is correct as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002). We find that the
trial court did not err in denying Wheeler’s motion to suppress.
The traffic stop itself was lawful for two reasons. First, it was brought
about by Martinez’s unlawful u-turn. Second, Detective Thompson had a
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reasonable, articulable suspicion that the people in the vehicle were, or were about
to become involved in criminal activity.2 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d
302, 305 (Ky. 1998). At the time of the stop, there had been no violation of
Wheeler’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.
However, this case revolves around the issue of consent, namely
Martinez’s consent to search his vehicle and residence. Warrantless searches are
reasonable and do not violate the Fourth Amendment if consent to search is
granted. Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992). Wheeler,
however, argues that the consent to search was not voluntary and obtained by
coercion.
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the
State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his
consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
coercion, express or implied.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2059 36 L.Ed.2d
854 (1973). “The question of voluntariness turns on a careful scrutiny of all the
surrounding circumstances in a specific case.” Id. “Whether consent is the result
of express or implied coercion is a question of fact and thus, we must defer to the
trial court’s finding if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Krause v.
Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Ky. 2006) (citations omitted). We find that
Martinez’s consent was voluntary.
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The Walgreens clerk called about a suspicious Sudafed purchase, the vehicle at issue was being
driven by Martinez who was already under investigation for manufacturing methamphetamine,
and the vehicle made an illegal u-turn to travel back toward Walgreens.
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During the suppression hearing, the only witnesses were those called
on by the Commonwealth. Thompson and Whitely both testified that Martinez
voluntarily consented to the searches. No evidence indicated that the officers used
coercive tactics. Little evidence was introduced regarding the length of the traffic
stop, how much time passed before consent was given, or even a detailed
explanation as to what was said during the stop (other than why the Sudafed was
purchased and that the officers were granted consent to search the vehicle and
residence). A hand-written note from Martinez was allowed into evidence after the
suppression hearing stating that he did not consent to the searches; however, the
note was not subject to cross-examination. The trial court evidently found the
testimony of the two officers more credible than Martinez’s note. Finally, nine
days after the hearing, the defense tried to introduce a police dashboard video
recording of the stop. While the video could have produced more details as to
what took place during the stop, the trial court, exercising its discretion, declined to
reopen the evidence and allow this video to be entered.
Based on the testimony at the hearing, there was substantial evidence
that the verbal and written consents to search were voluntarily given to Thompson
and Whitely. Because the consents to search were found to be voluntary, there was
no Fourth Amendment violation and no reason to suppress the evidence.
Finally, Wheeler argues that any evidence gained from the
questioning of the other occupants of the vehicle should be suppressed. We
disagree. As stated above, Detective Thompson had a reasonable suspicion that
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criminal activity was afoot. Because of this, he was justified in asking the
occupants of the vehicle some questions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Based on the above, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the
motion to suppress.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ronald E. Hines
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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