HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION II, ET AL. VS. KING (LEVAN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001472-MR
HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORPORATION II AND
AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAUMEL T. WRIGHT, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00420
LEVAN AND MICHELLE KING
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Household Finance Corporation II and
American Security Insurance Company (“Appellants”) appeal from an order of the
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Letcher Circuit Court denying their separate motions to compel arbitration. We
reverse and remand.
Appellees Levan and Michelle King entered into a mortgage
agreement with Household Finance Corporation II (“HFC”) under which HFC
agreed to lend them $70,199.37 to refinance a modular home located in Letcher
County. Under the provisions of the Loan Agreement, the Kings agreed to
maintain property insurance in amounts sufficient to protect HFC’s security
interest in the home. The Loan Agreement also allowed HFC to procure hazard
insurance at the Kings’ cost if the Kings did not acquire coverage themselves:
Lender’s Right to Place Hazard Insurance
You authorize us, at our option, to obtain hazard
insurance coverage on the real property in an amount not
greater than the outstanding balance of principal and
interest on your loan or, if known to be less, the
replacement value of the real property. In the event that
you fail to maintain the required hazard insurance
outlined above or fail to provide adequate proof of its
existence, You authorize us to charge you for the costs of
this insurance . . . If at any time after we have obtained
this insurance, you provide adequate proof that you have
subsequently purchased the required coverage, we will
cancel the coverage we obtained and credit any unearned
premiums to your loan.
The Kings were unable to secure insurance on the full amount of the
loan, but they were able to secure $56,100 coverage through Kentucky Farm
Bureau (“KFB”). The Kings claim that HFC subsequently informed them that it
had purchased additional insurance to cover the loan amount through American
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Security Insurance Company (“ASIC”) and that it had begun billing the Kings for
this insurance in May 2007.2
In April 2008, the Kings’ property was completely destroyed in a fire.
They filed claims with both KFB and ASIC. KFB offered a check in the full
amount of $56,100, while ASIC denied the claim stating that the damage was not
covered as there was other valid and collectible insurance. Thereafter, HFC mailed
a check for $371.52 to the Kings alleging that it was a return of the premiums paid
by them for insurance coverage.
The Kings thereafter filed suit in the Letcher Circuit Court against
HFC and ASIC seeking a declaration that they had “valid insurance protection” as
a result of their contract with HFC. They also sought a judgment from the court
that they had detrimentally relied upon HFC, and they asked for an award of
compensatory and “bad faith” damages against either or both HFC and ASIC.
The Loan Agreement also provided that the Kings agreed to abide by
the terms of an Arbitration Rider, the terms of which were incorporated into the
Loan Agreement. The Arbitration Rider stated as follows:
[A]ny claim, dispute, or controversy (whether based upon
contract; tort, intentional or otherwise; constitution;
statute; common law; or equity and whether pre-existing,
present or future) . . . arising from or relating to this
Agreement or the relationships which result from this
2
The Appellants claim that the lender-placed policy at issue in Kings’ complaint was actually
issued by Safeco, not ASIC, but because ASIC communicated the denial of coverage, the Kings
mistakenly named ASIC as a defendant. ASIC specifically reserved all defenses before the trial
court, including defenses relating to being improperly named as a defendant. For the purposes of
seeking to compel arbitration, Appellants addressed the facts alleged by the Kings in the
complaint, i.e., that ASIC allegedly issued the lender-placed coverage.
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Agreement . . . shall be resolved, upon the election of you
or us by binding arbitration[.]
The Arbitration Rider further provided that “[a]ny participatory arbitration hearing
that you attend will take place in the city nearest to your residence where a federal
district court is located or at such other location as agreed by the parties.” Finally,
the Arbitration Rider gave the Kings the right to reject the Rider within 30 days of
their signature by written notice. The Kings never objected to the Arbitration
Rider.
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in an order denying
enforcement of an arbitration agreement to determine if the findings are clearly
erroneous, but we review a trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard.
Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001).
Appellants contend that the Arbitration Rider was a valid arbitration
agreement under the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act (“KUAA”). Both the
United States Congress and the Kentucky General Assembly have enacted
legislation to govern certain types of arbitration agreements: the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) at 9 U.S.C. § 1 and the KUAA at KRS 417.045-240.3
Both acts have been found to benefit arbitration agreements, at least to the point of
ensuring that arbitration agreements are reviewed using the same criterion that is
3
The FAA and the KUAA have been construed consistently with each other by Kentucky courts.
Louisville Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Ky. 2004) (“we have interpreted the
KUAA consistent with the FAA . . .”). Therefore, citation to federal authority has been
expressly approved for interpretation of the KUAA because it is “nearly identical” to the
provisions of the FAA, and “the outcome is the same” under both state and federal arbitration
law. Id.
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applied to other contracts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct.
852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Kodak Min. Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d
917, 919 (Ky. 1984).
Moreover, because an appeal at the end of the litigation will not often
afford an adequate solution to the wrongful denial of a request to arbitrate, both the
FAA and the KUAA provide that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory
order denying an application to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16; KRS 417.220.
In this case, the Arbitration Rider comes within the broad provisions
of the KUAA. The KUAA applies to: “[a] written agreement to submit any
existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in [a] written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties[.]” KRS 417.050.
The Arbitration Rider in this case is a written pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate.
The Kings contend that the Arbitration Rider is invalid because KRS
417.050(2) prohibits arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. KRS 417.050(2)
provides that the KUAA does not apply to insurance contracts, but the statute notes
that arbitration agreements between insurers are not invalid or unenforceable. The
trial court agreed with the Kings’ reasoning that they are ultimately seeking
recovery of insurance proceeds, thus “making the issue . . . a[n] insurance
contract.”
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has clarified the limited meaning of
the term “insurance contract” as used in KRS 417.050(2);
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An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity whereby
the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for any loss
resulting from a specific event. The insurer undertakes
the obligation based on an evaluation of the market’s
wide risks and losses. An insurer expects losses, and
they are actuarially predicted. The cost of such losses are
spread through the market by means of a premium.
Buck Run Baptist Church, Inc. v. Cumberland Sur. Ins., 983 S.W.2d 501, 504-05
(Ky. 1998).
In this case, the contract containing the Arbitration Rider was the
Loan Agreement, which is not an “insurance contract” as described by the General
Assembly in KRS 417.050(2) or as defined by the Supreme Court in Buck Run.
The policy behind KRS 417.050(2) was to remove arbitration agreements included
in a policy issued to an insured from the coverage of the KUAA. That is not the
situation here. An agreement containing a provision mandating that one party
obtain insurance does not transform the agreement itself into an agreement for
insurance or mean that it provides insurance coverage. Accordingly, the
Arbitration Rider is not included within the meaning of an “insurance contract.”
Having determined that a valid arbitration agreement under the
KUAA exists, the Court must now determine if the claims asserted by the Kings
fall within the Arbitration Rider. The use of the phrases “any claim, dispute or
controversy” “arising from or relating to this Agreement or the relationships which
result from this Agreement” indicates the extensiveness of the Arbitration Rider.
Moreover, courts have interpreted the phrase “arising out of or relating to” broadly,
“interpreting it to encompass all claims, contractual or tort, which touch upon
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matters covered by the agreement.” Hagan v. Greenpoint Credit Corp., 2007 WL
2258866 (E.D.Ky. August 3, 2007) (No. 07-17-KKC) at *6 (citing Orcutt v.
Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F.Supp.2d 746, 753 (S.D.Ohio 2002)).
The Kings’ claims relate to and arise out of the provisions requiring
them to maintain insurance in the Loan Agreement, as they could not maintain
their claims without reference to the insurance provisions in the Loan Agreement.
Therefore, the language of the Arbitration Rider includes Kings’ claims.
It is less clear, however, whether ASIC has the right to require
arbitration, as ASIC was not a signatory on either the Loan Agreement or the
Arbitration Rider. In some circumstances, a non-signatory to an arbitration
agreement may both bind, or be bound by, a signatory to the agreement. Olshan
Foundation Repair and Waterproofing v. Otto, 276 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Ky. App.
2009). In Olshan, this Court recognized five ways in which a non-signatory may
enforce arbitration agreements: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3)
agency; (4) veil piercing/alter ego; (5) estoppel. Id. (citing Javitch v. First Union
Securities, Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003), Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920
F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir. 1990), and Thompson-CSF v. American Arbitration
Assoc., 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)).
In Olshan, the Court upheld an arbitration provision based on an
estoppel theory and compelled arbitration involving a non-signatory to the
underlying arbitration agreement. The Court found that one cannot receive the
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benefits of an agreement while at the same time evading the dispute resolution
procedures contained in the same agreement. Olshan, 276 S.W.3d at 831-32.
Similarly, where a borrower sued the mortgage lender and the insurer
that issued lender-placed coverage, the federal court compelled arbitration under an
estoppel theory. Hagan at *8 . The Court in Hagan noted that equitable estoppel
allows non-signatory enforcement of arbitration agreements when (1) “the
signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause ‘must rely on the
terms of the written agreement in asserting [its] claims’” such as when a
signatory’s claims “‘makes reference to’ or ‘presumes the existence of’ the written
agreement” or (2) when the signatory alleges “substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories
to the contract.” Hagan, 2007 WL 2258866, *8 (quoting MSDealer Service Corp.
v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Otherwise, ‘the arbitration
proceedings [between the two signatories] would be rendered meaningless and the
federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted.” Id. (citing MSDealer,
177 F.3d at 947).
Moreover, other courts have allowed third parties to enforce similar
arbitration provisions. See Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379,
382-83 (5th Cir. 2008). The arbitration clause in Sherer contained identical
language as the clause in this situation, stating that “[a]ll disputes, claims, or
controversies arising from or relating to this Agreement or the relationships which
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result from this Agreement. . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration.” Id. at 380.
The Court allowed a non-signatory to compel arbitration:
According to the broad terms of the Loan Agreement,
Sherer has agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from
‘the relationships which result from th[e] [a]greement.’
A loan servicer, such as Green Tree, is just such a
“relationship.” Indeed, without the Loan Agreement,
there would be no loan for Green Tree to service, and no
party argues to the contrary. Sherer’s . . . claims arise
from Green Tree’s conduct as Sherer’s loan servicer and,
therefore, fall within the terms of the Loan Agreement’s
arbitration clause. Based on the Loan Agreement’s
language, Sherer has validly agreed to arbitrate with a
nonsignatory, such as the loan servicer Green Tree, and
the language is sufficiently broad to permit Green Tree to
compel arbitration.
Id. at 382.
In this case, the Court’s ruling in Olshan permits ASIC to enforce the
Arbitration Rider under an estoppel theory. Just as in Olshan, the Kings are
attempting to enforce the Loan Agreement so that HFC will provide hazard
insurance coverage, but they also wish to avoid the Arbitration Rider in the same
Loan Agreement.
Moreover, the equitable estoppel test set forth in Hagan has been met
in this situation. Kings’ claims arise from and are related to the provisions for
lender-placed insurance in the Loan Agreement. Additionally, the Kings have
alleged “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the
nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” Hagan, 2007 WL
2258866, *8 (quoting MSDealer, 177 F.3d at 947). For example,
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The Kings alleged that they made a claim with HFC “by and through” ASIC, that
HFC “and/or” ASIC “is liable for the indebtedness owed on the policy, and that
“[t]he acts of the Defendants are in violation of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and
the Kentucky laws promulgated and are an act of bad faith by their refusing and
continuing to refuse to pay the Plaintiffs.”
The Kings further argue that the Arbitration Rider was
unconscionable. However, this argument was not made to the trial court. Rather,
in their response to Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration, the Kings simply
argued that “[t]he key issue in this matter is an insurance policy.” The foundation
of appellate review is based on the principle that the lower court has first had a
chance to deliberate and decide upon the issues. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd.
Partnership, 207 S.W.3d 593, 607 (Ky. App. 2006). As stated by this Court:
The Court of Appeals is one of review and is not to be
approached as a second opportunity to be heard as a trial
court. An issue not timely raised before the circuit court
cannot be considered as a new argument before this
Court.
Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1980).
Even if we could review this issue, we do not find the Arbitration
Rider to be unconscionable. An unconscionable agreement is one which “no
[person], not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and
honest [person] on the other hand would accept, on the other.” Wilder, 47 S.W.3d
at 342. The doctrine of unconscionability is only used to avoid its terms when the
terms are “one sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts.” Id. at 341.
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There is nothing oppressive or unfairly surprising about requiring
arbitration in this matter. The Arbitration Rider was clearly-worded and stated in
bold face and all caps: “THE PARTIES HEREBY KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THEIR RIGHTS TO LITIGATE SUCH CLAIMS
IN A COURT BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY UPON ELECTION OF
ARBITRATION BY EITHER PARTY.” The Rider also stated that the Kings
could opt out of the arbitration agreement within 30 days after it was signed, which
they failed to do. The Kings cannot claim that the Arbitration Rider was unfairly
surprising or unconscionable.
The order of the Letcher Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian F. Haara
Louisville, Kentucky
Johnnie L. Turner
Harlan, Kentucky
Brian M. Johnson
Matthew A. Stinnett
Lexington, Kentucky
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