CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. VS. COLLINS (JIMMY)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001470-MR
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM ENGLE III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00522
JIMMY COLLINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a circuit court jury verdict. The
appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”), argues that several rulings by the
trial court were in error and that, consequently, it should have been granted either
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
its motion for directed verdict or its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (“JNOV”), or, in the alternative, should now be granted a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Appellee Jimmy Collins (“Collins”) brought an action against CSX
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) in Perry Circuit Court in
September of 2003. Collins asserted in his complaint that he had developed
bilateral osteoarthritis as a result of CSX’s failure to provide a reasonably safe
work place.
In June of 2009, the trial court entered a final judgment based upon
the jury’s finding that CSX was liable for Collins’s injuries. CSX now appeals that
decision alleging several errors in the rulings of the trial court.
DISCUSSION
CSX first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied CSX’s
motion for a directed verdict and JNOV, or, in the alternative, motion for a new
trial. In reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict or for JNOV, an
appellate court must reverse if it is shown that the verdict was either flagrantly or
palpably contradictory to the evidence since such would indicate the jury reached
the verdict through passion or prejudice. Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Min. Co., 798
S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1990) (citing NCAA v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Ky.
1988)). Evidence in support of the prevailing party must be considered to be true.
The reviewing court may not make determinations regarding credibility nor the
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weight of the evidence, as such is within the purview of the jury. Kentucky &
Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Cantrell, 298 Ky. 743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1944), and
Cochran v. Downing, 247 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1952).
In support of its argument, CSX contends that Dr. John F. Gilbert,
Jr.’s testimony regarding medical causation was insufficient to submit to the jury.
It argues that, under FELA, a claimant must prove the common law elements of
negligence, including causation. Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539
(6th Cir. 1990).
In Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S. Ct. 443,
448, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957), the Supreme Court held that, under FELA “the test of
a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that
employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death for which damages are sought.” CSX contends that expert testimony is
necessary in cases such as this where the development of bilateral osteoarthritis
may not be within the purview of a lay person.
Dr. Gilbert is Collins’s primary care physician. He treated him for
osteoarthritis in his knees, the ailment which was the issue at trial. At trial, Dr.
Gilbert testified that he diagnosed Collins with the disease and that his job duties at
CSX were a possible contributing factor in his ailment.
Collins was a brakeman for CSX in Hazard, Kentucky. As part of his
job, he worked on coal runs. This job required him to mount and dismount a
moving train in order to line the switches for the train and to apply and release
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hand brakes on the rail cars. Collins testified that the train was usually moving
from four to five miles per hour, but that it could be moving as fast as twenty-two
miles per hour. Collins retired from CSX on February 19, 1999.
In Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2nd Cir. 2004), the
Court found that:
[w]here . . . the nexus between the injury and the alleged
cause would not be obvious to the lay juror, “[e]xpert
evidence is often required to establish the causal
connection between the accident and some item of
physical or mental injury.” Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R.
Co., 833 F. 2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1987).
Dr. Gilbert referred Collins to Dr. Mukut Sharma, an orthopedic
surgeon. Dr. Sharma diagnosed severe osteoarthritis in both knees and
recommended knee replacement surgery. CSX asserts that the causation of
bilateral osteoarthritis can only be shown through expert testimony. We believe
the testimony of Dr. Gilbert is such expert testimony. In addition to Dr. Gilbert’s
testimony, Dr. Sharma’s and Collins’s testimony as to the normal working
conditions of his job was sufficient to establish FELA’s causation requirement.
CSX cites the following in support of its argument that the medical testimony
supplied by Drs. Gilbert and Sharma was not sufficient to establish causation:
Perhaps nothing is absolutely certain in the field of
medicine, but the intent of the law is that if a physician
cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to
make a medical judgment, neither can a jury use that
information to reach a decision.
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Combs v. Stortz, 276 S.W.3d 282, 296 (Ky. App. 2009) (citing McMahon v Young,
442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534, 535 (Pa. 1971)). We believe, however, that Dr.
Gilbert’s testimony was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of causation. As set
forth above, there was also testimony from Dr. Sharma and Collins regarding
Collins’s job and his osteoarthritic condition. This was clearly enough to establish
causation under the FELA standard. Thus, we find the trial court did not err in
denying CSX’s motions for direct verdict and JNOV or, in the alternative, a new
trial.
Next, CSX contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct
the jury on proximate cause. Specifically, CSX argues that FELA was drafted to
be consistent with the common law concept of negligence. See Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163, 182, 69 S.Ct 1018, 1030, 93 L.Ed.1282 (1949). In Southern Ry. Co.
v. Gray, 241 U.S. 333, 339, 36 S. Ct. 558, 560, 60 L. Ed.1030 (1916), the Court
held that the rights and obligations under FELA required negligence on the part of
a railroad for recovery.
CSX asserts that the omission of a proximate cause instruction is
inconsistent with the traditional common law negligence and causation analysis
required by FELA. The trial court in this case instructed the jury as follows:
Did CSX Transportation’s failure to provide a reasonably
safe place to work, as identified in your response above,
cause, in whole or in part, the injuries of which plaintiff
complains?
Verdict Form 1(b).
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In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07, 77 S.Ct.
443, 449, 1 L.Ed. 2d 493 (1957), the U.S. Supreme Court held the following
regarding proximate cause and FELA cases:
Under [FELA] the test of a jury case is simply
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that
employer negligence played any part, even the slightest,
in producing the injury or death for which damages are
sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the
jury may also with reason, on grounds of probability,
attribute the result to other causes, including the
employee’s contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal
of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is
presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry
whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the
injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to
make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to
find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not
the evidence allows the jury a choice of other
probabilities. The statute expressly imposes liability
upon the employer to pay damages for injury or death
due “in whole or in part” to its negligence. (Footnote
citations omitted).
Later, in Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 349 F.2d 820, 827
(5th Cir. 1965), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
We ought to avoid those practices which “distract the
jury’s attention from the simple issues of whether the
carrier was negligent and whether that negligence was
the cause, in whole or in part, of the plaintiff’s injury.”
(citation omitted). . . . When done in this fashion, with
suitable accompanying general instruction which F.R.
Civ. P. 49(a) calls for, there is no need any longer for
putting this in the labored terms of “proximate cause” or
“sole proximate cause” or “contributory negligence.”
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Congress has “deliberately adopted a negligence standard different
from that of the common law.” Hausrath v. NewYork Cent. R. Co., 401 F.2d 634
(6th Cir. 1968); accord, Hamilton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Ky.
App. 2006). Based upon the relaxed standard of FELA, we find that Instruction
No. 2 was adequate. Thus, we find the trial court did not err in failing to submit a
“proximate cause” instruction.
Based upon the above, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kara M. Stewart
Lexington, Kentucky
Alva A. Hollon
John O. Hollon
Jacksonville, Florida
Thomas I. Eckert
Hazard, Kentucky
Russell Serafin
Houston, Texas
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