B. (B. A.) VS. N. (C. K.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001331-ME
B.A.B.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-AD-00003
C.K.N.; B.W.N.; AND T.P.B.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: B.A.B. appeals from an order and judgment entered by
the McCreary Circuit Court in an adoption proceeding which terminated his
parental rights. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
1
Retired Judge John W. Graves concurred in this opinion prior to the completion of his senior
judge service.
B.A.B. (the father) and S.A.B. (the mother) married in September
2004, one day before the father began serving a prison term relating to Tennessee
felony convictions. Their child, the subject of this proceeding, was born in January
2005.
When the child was several months old, the mother and child began
residing in McCreary County with the mother’s sister and brother-in-law, who are
the petitioners in the underlying proceeding and the appellees herein. After the
mother was arrested on a bench warrant in August 2005, the McCreary District
Court awarded temporary custody of the child to the petitioners. The child has
remained in the petitioners’ physical care and custody since that time.
In July 2006, after he was paroled from prison, the father filed a pro
se motion seeking custody of the child. The district court denied the motion for
custody but eventually ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $60
per month.
Meanwhile, soon after he was paroled, the father met the child for the
first time and visited with her at least twice at his mother’s home in Pulaski
County. He testified that he also traveled to the petitioners’ home to visit the child
at least eight times in 2006, and about thirteen to fifteen times in 2007. The
petitioners, by contrast, testified that the father visited the child perhaps six or
seven times in 2007. Nevertheless, the parties agreed that petitioners allowed the
father to freely visit the child, and that each visit lasted about two or three hours.
After the father moved to McCreary County in November 2007, he saw the child
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on December 25, 2007, and on January 23, 2008. On February 7, 2008, the
petitioners filed the underlying petition seeking to adopt the child. They requested
the voluntary termination of the mother’s parental rights, and the involuntary
termination of the father’s parental rights. Although the father testified the
petitioners advised him he no longer could visit the child, the petitioners indicated
they only told him that he could not visit without his parole officer’s permission,
and that they would not discuss the pending proceeding.
The father, who was represented by counsel, opposed the petitioners’
proceeding. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) evidently
conducted an investigation and filed a report pursuant to KRS 199.510, although a
copy of the report is not included in the record on appeal. See KRS 199.470(4)(a)
(report may be ordered at the trial court’s discretion). The record does contain the
report of a guardian ad litem, who recommended approval of the adoption as being
in the child’s best interest. After a hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment of
adoption in favor of the petitioners, and terminated the mother’s and the father’s
parental rights. The father appealed.
Frequently, a petition for the involuntary termination of parental rights
is filed by the Cabinet, and is preceded by the child’s placement in foster care
under the Cabinet’s supervision. Such a termination proceeding falls within the
scope of KRS Chapter 625, and a final order involuntarily terminating parental
rights frees the child for adoption. See KRS 199.500(1)(b) and KRS 625.060.
Less often, parental rights are involuntarily terminated as a result of an award of
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adoption to a child’s aunt, uncle, or other close relative who, as here, has had the
child in his or her home for more than ninety continuous days immediately
preceding the filing of the petition. KRS 199.470(4))(a). See Moore v. Asente, 110
S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003). As in a case seeking the termination of parental rights, a
party seeking a nonconsensual adoption must plead and prove, by clear and
convincing evidence “as a part of the adoption proceedings[,]”
(1) that the child is abused or neglected as defined in
KRS 600.020(1); (2) that termination is in the child’s
best interests; and (3) the existence of one or more of ten
specific grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2).
M.B. v. D.W. 236 S.W.3d 31, 34 (Ky.App. 2007). See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (proof in a parental
rights termination case must satisfy at least the clear and convincing evidence
standard). Appellate review of an involuntary termination or nonconsensual
adoption proceeding
is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR 52.01
based upon clear and convincing evidence, and the
findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless
there exists no substantial evidence in the record to
support its findings. V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for
Human Resources, Ky.App., 706 S.W.2d 420, 424
(1986).
“Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily
mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is
proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the
weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily
prudent-minded people.” Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718,
726, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
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M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Ky.App. 1998).
See also M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d at 34-35.
An involuntary termination or nonconsensual adoption proceeding
often involves a claim that a child has been abused or neglected. See KRS
199.500(4) and KRS 625.090(1). KRS 600.020(1) defines an abused or neglected
child as including a child “whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with
harm” when a parent or other person entrusted with the child’s custody or
supervision engages in any one of a number of specified conducts, including:
(c) Engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the
parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing
needs of the child including, but not limited to, parental
incapacity due to alcohol and other drug abuse as defined
in KRS 222.005;
(d) Continuously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide
essential parental care and protection for the child,
considering the age of the child; [or]
....
(h) Does not provide the child with adequate care,
supervision, food, clothing, shelter, and education or
medical care necessary for the child's well-being.
However, even if the evidence shows that a child is abused or neglected, a court
may order a nonconsensual adoption only “if it is pleaded and proved as a part of
the adoption proceedings that any of the provisions of KRS 625.090 exist with
respect to the child.” KRS 199.500(4). KRS 625.090(2) in turn sets out ten
conditions as alternative grounds to support the termination of parental rights. The
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first nine of those conditions2 are identical to the nine conditions listed in KRS
199.502 as alternative grounds for a nonconsensual adoption. Thus, parental rights
may be terminated or a nonconsensual adoption may be awarded upon clear and
convincing evidence of the existence of one or more of the nine conditions, as
described in either statute. Those conditions include:
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child, and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child; [or]
....
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone,
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is
incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, or education reasonably necessary and
available for the child's well-being and that there is no
reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the
parent's conduct in the immediately foreseeable future,
considering the age of the child[.]
KRS 199.502(1) and KRS 625.090(2).
Here, the father first contends on appeal that the trial court erred by
failing to find the petitioners lacked standing to file their claim. We disagree.
The child continuously resided in the petitioners’ home for some two
and one-half years immediately preceding the filing of the petition, thereby
satisfying the ninety-day filing requirement of KRS 199.470(3). Certainly,
2
The tenth condition, as set out in KRS 625.090(2)(j), is irrelevant to KRS Chapter 199
nonconsensual adoptions since it pertains to a situation in which a child has spent at least fifteen
of the preceding twenty-two months in foster care under the Cabinet’s responsibility.
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petitioners lacked standing to seek the termination of the father’s parental rights
pursuant to KRS Chapter 625. However, because they are the child’s aunt and
uncle, petitioners were authorized by KRS 199.470(4)(a) to plead and prove the
existence of conditions in support of their claim for adoption, the award of which
would necessarily result in the termination of the father’s parental rights. See
Smith v. Wilson, 269 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1954). The father’s argument that
petitioners lacked standing to proceed below is without merit.3
Next, the father alleges that his due process rights were violated when
the district court entered the August 2005 emergency order placing the child in the
petitioners’ custody after the mother was arrested on a bench warrant. The district
court’s order was not timely appealed, and the matter is not properly before this
court for review.
Next, the father contends that the trial court’s findings and
conclusions do not conform to the allegations raised in the pleadings. More
specifically, he notes that although petitioners’ pleadings raised only the grounds
set out in KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g), the court’s order cited KRS 625.090(2)(a),
(c), (e) and (g), thereby indicating a reliance on a different statute and two
additional grounds.
3
The father relies on an unpublished opinion of this court, K.N. v. R.P., WL 275106 (No. 2007CA-000181, Feb. 1, 2008), when arguing that petitioners lacked standing to initiate termination
proceedings. However, K.N. is distinguishable on its face, as in pertinent part it turned on the
fact that parental rights were terminated through a separate termination proceeding prior to the
adoption hearing, despite the fact that KRS 625.050 authorizes the initiation of such termination
proceedings only by “the cabinet, any county or Commonwealth’s attorney or parent.” Here, by
contrast, the termination of the father’s parental rights was an authorized result of a judgment of
adoption pursuant to KRS 199.500(4).
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As noted above, KRS 199.500(4) specifically directs that when
considering a request for a nonconsensual judgment of adoption, a trial court
should rely on the termination of parental rights provisions set out in KRS 625.090.
However, the grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(i) are identical to those listed
in KRS 199.502(1)(a)-(i) and the petitioners’ pleadings. Thus, any error in the
citation of the relevant statute had no effect on the provision of adequate notice to
the parties, or on the court’s determination of whether clear and convincing
evidence supported the judgment of nonconsensual adoption. Moreover, since the
court’s award required the court to find the existence of only one of the statutory
conditions, its finding that four grounds supported the adoption judgment, rather
than only the two grounds alleged by the petitioners, was cumulative and any error
was harmless. CR4 61.01.
Finally, the father contends that the trial court’s judgment of adoption
was not supported by the evidence. We disagree.
As noted above, petitioners were required to plead and prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the child was neglected, that at least one of the
grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2) existed, and that the termination of parental
rights would be in the child’s best interest. M.B. v. D.W. 236 S.W.3d at 34. On
review, this court must determine whether the trial court’s findings were clearly
erroneous as being unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 34-35.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Here, clear and convincing evidence was produced to show that the
father was incarcerated and did not meet the child until she was eighteen months
old, that the father subsequently saw the child for no more than an average of two
or three hours per month through January 2008, and that he did not visit the child
after January 2008. Further, the father admitted during the hearing that in 2007, he
traveled to McCreary County with the intention of killing his wife and brother. He
changed his mind but nevertheless fired a gun toward their residence. The father
testified that he has a seventh grade education, that he has been convicted of
perhaps eight felonies, that he used and sold drugs in the past, and that he and his
wife used cocaine while she was pregnant with the child. His income consists of
disability payments, which evidently were awarded as a result of physical injuries.
This situation is distinguishable from that described in D.S. v. F.A.H.,
684 S.W.2d 320 (Ky.App. 1985), which involved a mother who voluntarily placed
her child with the paternal grandparents while seeking psychiatric treatment for
mental health issues. The mother admitted she currently was unable to care for her
child, but she remained in contact and hoped someday to be reunited with the
child. Thus, she opposed the grandparents’ nonconsensual adoption proceeding.
This court vacated the trial court’s judgment of adoption, noting that the mother
had remained in touch with the child while seeking medical treatment, and that her
inability to work or to care for the child was not self-imposed or deliberate. The
court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the mother had abandoned or neglected the child.
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Here, by contrast, although the father attested to his ability and
willingness to care for the child, he produced no evidence that he ever had
provided essential care and treatment for the child. Clear and convincing evidence
showed that, although the petitioners did not limit the frequency of visitation, and
the father may have misunderstood whether he could continue to visit the child
after January 2008, he has had only minimal contact with the child since her birth.
Moreover, he has failed to fulfill his court-ordered child support obligation, and he
has accumulated a substantial record of drug-related criminal conduct which, by its
very nature, calls into question his ability to provide essential care and protection
for the child. Further, the father produced no probative evidence to show the
existence of any “reasonable expectation” of an improved ability or willingness to
provide suitable care for the child, other than his claims that adequate financial
support would be provided through his fiancé’s employment income, and that
governmental assistance would be available to the child if she was in his custody.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by finding that
clear and convincing evidence proved that the child was neglected as defined in
KRS 600.020(1), and proved that one or more of the conditions described in KRS
625.090(2)(e) and (g), and KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g), existed.
Hence, as the third part of its analysis, the trial court was required to
determine whether a nonconsensual adoption, resulting in the termination of the
father’s parental rights, would be in the child’s best interest. The evidence is
undisputed that the child has been in the petitioners’ exclusive custody since she
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was a few months old, and that she is thriving in their care. From all indications,
the petitioners are healthy, they are financially and personally stable, and they have
a mutually affectionate and supportive relationship with the child.
The father, by contrast, spent no time with the child before she was
eighteen months old, and he subsequently has spent no more than an average of a
few hours each month with her. His income is limited to disability benefits
supplemented by financial support from his fiancé, and he admitted that he has
accumulated a substantial child support arrearage. The father testified that he has a
seventh grade education, that he has perhaps eight felony convictions, that he and
the child’s mother used cocaine once while she was pregnant with the child, and
that he demonstrated or threatened several acts of violence toward the mother and
other family members. The father provided no evidence to support a “reasonable
expectation” that his level of care, protection or conduct will show a marked level
of improvement in the future.
Having carefully reviewed the substantial evidence adduced below,
we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that the adoption and the
termination of her father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, and by
entering a judgment to that effect.
The order and judgment entered by the McCreary Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Ralph D. Gibson
Somerset, Kentucky
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
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