BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS VS. JOSEPH (WILLIAM R.)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001241-MR
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00985
WILLIAM R. JOSEPH
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Kentucky Retirement Systems (“KRS”),
appeals the Franklin Circuit Court’s reversal of a KRS Hearing Officer’s decision
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and the Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
denying disability benefits to the Appellee, William R. Joseph, a former inspector
with the Cabinet for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. On appeal,
KRS argues that the circuit court’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and
the applicable law, we reverse.
Joseph accepted employment with the Mine Reclamation and
Enforcement division of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection in 1985 and continued working there until his last date of paid
employment on April 14, 2006.2 Throughout his career, Joseph’s duties included
visits to mine reclamation sites in Eastern Kentucky to ensure compliance with the
Environmental Reclamation Statutes and Regulations. KRS asserts that Joseph’s
job duties fell into the classification of light work, while Joseph argues that
testimony at the hearing established that his duties were strenuous and included
walking up and down treacherous, uneven, and rocky hillsides,3 as well as driving
a truck over rough back country roads approximately one thousand miles per
month.4 KRS states that Joseph worked in a seated position approximately four
2
The last day Joseph performed actual work duties was January 13, 2006.
3
In support of this assertion, Joseph directs this Court’s attention to the testimony of Jeff O’Dell,
an internal policy analyst with the department, who stated that the position held by Joseph could
be treacherous. He also cites the testimony of co-worker Omar Reed, who stated that the terrain
they were forced to work on was steep, non-level ground which was often loose and rocky, and
that the conditions would be difficult even for a person with a healthy back. Finally, Joseph
states that his supervisor, Gary Perkins, also testified in confirmation of the treacherous working
conditions.
4
KRS acknowledges that Joseph’s job duties consisted of conducting mine inspections which
sometimes involved driving long distances, walking uneven terrain, and working in mild to
adverse weather conditions.
2
and one-half hours per day and stood approximately three hours per day. Joseph
had to lift items weighing up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds
occasionally.
In 1993, Joseph began experiencing back problems, for which he
received medical treatment, resulting in a spinal fusion performed in 2001. This
apparently reduced Joseph’s pain for approximately two years, after which time the
pain worsened and became more consistent. According to the record, Joseph
stepped into a hole while working in July of 2002, and further aggravated his back.
As the pain in his back increased, Joseph began experiencing feelings of numbness
in his legs and feet, which caused him difficulty in walking to and around the mine
sites, as well as when driving over the back roads leading to and from the work
areas. On October 15, 2005, Joseph filed an application for disability benefits,
alleging permanent disability under KRS 61.600 due to back problems which had
begun in 1993, and had worsened to the extent that he was unable to perform his
job duties as a mine inspector.
Joseph’s last day of work was January 13, 2006, at which time he was
informed by the Cabinet that his request for reasonable accommodations for his
position as an Environmental Inspector III could not be met. Apparently, on
February 21, 2006, Joseph’s counsel also contacted the Cabinet and requested
assistance in reassigning Joseph to the position of bond release officer in the same
department, in order that he would be able to continue working until he could reach
regular retirement age.
3
On March 7, 2006, counsel for the Cabinet responded that the agency
would be unable to grant Joseph’s request because the medical opinions, including
those of his treating family practitioner, Dr. James Frederick, were clear that he
could not perform any core functions of the classification of Environmental
Inspector III or the duties of a bond release officer. As of the last date of his paid
employment on April 14, 2006, Joseph had 248 months of retirement membership.
Joseph stated that if he had been able to finish his term of service, he would have
continued working until he could retire with full benefits.
The KRS medical review board initially denied Joseph’s request for
benefits, and he filed a second request. The second request was denied by two of
the reviewing physicians, while the third, Dr. William Keller, found that Joseph
had met his burden to substantiate his disability and recommended benefits. In so
doing, Dr. Keller stated that he had reviewed letters from Dr. James Frederick, Dr.
James Bean, and Dr. Angela Clifford, and concluded that there was a strong
consensus of opinion that Joseph was legitimately disabled and that he would be
unlikely to be able to resume his job in the near future.
As noted, the three primary physicians relied upon by Joseph in
seeking disability benefits were Drs. Bean, Frederick, and Clifford. Dr. Bean was
a neurosurgeon who treated Joseph conservatively for several years prior to
performing the lumbar fusion in 2001, and who continues to treat him presently.
On March 17, 2006, Dr. Bean issued a letter stating that in the absence of a new
correctable finding, he believed Joseph to be disabled from work as a result of
4
progressive back pain syndrome uncorrected by the prior fusion. Dr. Frederick has
been Joseph’s treating physician since 2003. He stated that Joseph’s condition has
been unchanged and that while the pain is subjective, he believes Joseph to be
honest. He did not believe that Joseph could continue performing his duties as a
mine inspector. Finally, Dr. Clifford treated Joseph for hernia problems and
performed a hernia repair on September 30, 2005. Joseph had already previously
undergone one hernia repair. Dr. Clifford opined that Joseph’s work would
increase the pain caused by his hernia condition and would put him at risk for
another occurrence.
A formal hearing was held on September 19, 2006, before a KRS
Hearing Officer. On December 28, 2006, the Hearing Officer issued an initial
recommended order denying Joseph’s request for benefits. Due to factual errors
initially in the order, it was remanded to the Disability Appeals Committee for
further consideration, after which time the Hearing Officer reweighed the evidence
and again recommended denial of benefits.
In that order, the Hearing Officer stated:
In order to receive disability retirement benefits,
Claimant must show by objective medical evidence that
he suffers from a total and permanent incapacity to
perform his work duties. Claimant’s surgery in 2001
seems to have, according to the objective tests, including
diagnostic tests and physical exams, corrected his spinal
problems, with the resulting complaints being subjective
complaints of pain. None of the treating physicians have
presented objective evidence of a condition which
prevents him from performing his job duties.
5
The Hearing Officer also found that Joseph’s job was properly classified as light in
nature, that reasonable accommodations were requested, and that the objective
medical evidence did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Joseph
was totally and permanently incapacitated by any physical or mental health
condition from his job duties, nor that he was likely to remain so for a period of not
less than twelve months from his last date of paid employment. Accordingly, the
Hearing Officer found that Joseph was not entitled to disability retirement benefits
pursuant to KRS 61.600.
That recommendation was subsequently affirmed by a final Order of
the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Requirement Systems on May 23, 2007.
Joseph appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court, and on June 5, 2009, the circuit
court issued an opinion and order reversing the order of the Board. In so doing, the
Circuit Court found that the proof was overwhelming that Joseph’s condition later
deteriorated to the point that he could not perform his work duties. Further, the
court found that the records relied upon by KRS were so far removed from the
relevant timeframe as to be of no probative value in determining disability as of
Joseph’s last date of paid employment. The court found that there was no doubt,
based on a preponderance of the evidence, considering the strenuous demands of
Joseph’s job, and his physical condition, that he was permanently incapacitated as
of his last date of paid employment. The court further stated that this evidence
made clear that Joseph would no longer be able to perform his duties and that his
condition could not be improved by treatment.
6
In addition, the court noted that the hearing officer incorrectly cited a
March 17, 2006, MRI/CT report as showing “no new findings”, when it actually
stated that there were “no new correctable findings,”5 and found that this was a
material mischaracterization of the report. Finally, the court found that the medical
reviewers who recommended denial of benefits made obvious factual errors in
arriving at their determination,6 and accordingly, found that the review reports
were unreliable and not of probative value. Thus, the circuit court reversed,
finding that the final order of KRS was not supported by substantial evidence and
that the record compelled a finding of disability. It is from that decision that KRS
now appeals to this Court.
On appeal, KRS makes four arguments. First, it asserts that the circuit
court improperly failed to consider the entire administrative record, in violation of
KRS 13B.150(c). Secondly, it argues that the circuit court improperly substituted
its judgment for that of KRS when it found that the decision issued by KRS was
not supported by substantial evidence. Third, KRS argues that the circuit court’s
determination that the order of the agency misrepresented evidence was not
5
See A.R. at 389.
6
Specifically, the court noted that Dr. McElwain summarized Joseph’s medical records as
showing “a long history of back pain,” and noted that “in the absence of any documentation of
change in the claimant’s condition over the past several years, it is recommended that the
application be rejected for disability retirement benefits.” A.R. at 282. The court, however, was
of the belief that the record was replete with unchallenged findings of deterioration in Joseph’s
condition, which were noted both by the hearing officer and by KRS in its brief. Additionally,
the court noted that the findings of Dr. Quarles, while more lengthy, were also factually
erroneous. The court found Dr. Quarles’s statement that there was no “new convincing objective
evidence” to support a finding of disability to be erroneous, in light of the fact that he failed to
consider the physicians’ reports, which uniformly indicated disability, as objective medical
evidence. The court found that this was in violation of KRS 61.50 and 105 KAR 1:210 §6(6).
7
supported by the record itself. Finally, KRS asserts that the circuit court
improperly gave more weight to evidence from Joseph’s treating physicians. In
essence, KRS argues that a proper review of the evidence of record compels a
conclusion that there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support
the decision of KRS to deny Joseph’s application for benefits.
In response, Joseph asserts that the circuit court properly considered
the entire administrative record and appropriately reversed the Board’s affirmation
of the hearing officer. Joseph argues that the circuit court was correct in its
determination that the findings and opinion of the hearing officer were not
supported by substantial evidence. Joseph asserts that the court was also correct in
its determination that the hearing officer mischaracterized the reports of the
treating physicians and that the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer was
irrelevant because it was not related to the point in time at which Joseph could no
longer work. Joseph agrees with the circuit court’s interpretation of the medical
evidence at issue, as well as of the nature of his job, and argues that the hearing
officer should have used the “residual functional capacity” standard of KRS
61.600(5)(B) for work activity on a regular and continuing basis, but did not.
Joseph also argues that the hearing officer, in assessing the evidence, ignored the
statutory definition of objective medical evidence set forth in KRS 61.510(33), and
that this is further reason for affirmation of the circuit court.
At the outset, we note that in reviewing an agency decision, the court
may only overturn that decision if the agency acted arbitrarily or outside the scope
8
of its authority, if the agency applied an incorrect rule of law, or if the decision
itself was not supported by substantial evidence. Kentucky State Racing Comm’n
v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 300-301 (Ky. 1972). Thus, if the record includes
substantial evidence to support the agency’s findings, the court must defer to that
finding even though there is evidence to the contrary. See Kentucky Comm’n on
Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). If the court finds the
correct rule of law was applied to the facts supported by substantial evidence, the
final order of the agency must be affirmed. Brown Hotel Company v. Edwards,
365 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1963).
In so stating, we note that, at the administrative hearing level, Joseph
was assigned the burden of proof pursuant to KRS 13B.090(7). The test of
substantial evidence where the party with the burden of proof has been denied
relief is whether the evidence in that partys’ favor is so compelling that no
reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it. McManus v. Kentucky
Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Ky.App. 2004). Ultimately, the
function of this Court in administrative matters is one of review and not of
reinterpretation. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250,
251 (Ky.App. 1983). With this in mind, we turn now to the arguments of the
parties.
As noted, KRS argues first that the circuit court failed to consider the
entire administrative record in violation of KRS 13B.150(c). That provision
provides as follows:
9
(1) Review of a final order shall be conducted by the court
without a jury and shall be confined to the record, unless
there is fraud or misconduct involving a party engaged in
administration of this chapter. The court, upon request,
may hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
(2) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions
of fact. The court may affirm the final order or it may
reverse the final order, in whole or in part, and remand
the case for further proceedings if it finds the agency's
final order is:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) Without support of substantial evidence on the whole
record;
(d) Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of
discretion;
(e) Based on an ex parte communication which
substantially prejudiced the rights of any party and likely
affected the outcome of the hearing;
(f) Prejudiced by a failure of the person conducting a
proceeding to be disqualified pursuant to KRS
13B.040(2); or
(g) Deficient as otherwise provided by law.
KRS 13B.150 (Emphasis added).
More particularly, KRS argues that the circuit court expressly excluded from its
consideration certain portions of the medical evidence, noting that the hearing
officer’s consideration of the history of Joseph’s back condition, “was in error” and
that the facts relied upon in the final order were “so far removed from the relevant
10
time period as to be of no probative value at all in determining disability as of Mr.
Joseph’s last date of paid employment.”
In response, Joseph argues that the circuit court did in fact consider
the entire record, but simply concluded that the medical evidence relied upon by
the hearing officer was irrelevant, because it was out-of- date, and not related to
the point of time during which Joseph could no longer work. He also notes that the
circuit court reviewed all of the evidence submitted, including the reports from
numerous physicians, and concluded that some of those reports were materially
mischaracterized by the hearing officer. Having reviewed the order of the circuit
court, as well as the record, we are in agreement with Joseph’s contention that the
court properly considered the entire record in rendering its decision.
While KRS is correct in its recitation of the court’s opinion as to the
nature of the evidence at issue, we disagree with its conclusion that the court failed
to consider the evidence itself, or that it “struck” the evidence from the record. To
the contrary, we believe that the court’s opinion in this regard is indicative of the
fact that it did consider the evidence and simply found it to be outdated,
immaterial, and without probative value to the issues at hand. Thus, in stating that
the final order, “stripped of this immaterial evidence, contains only reports from
Mr. Joseph’s treating physicians...,” we do not believe the court to have literally
intended the order to be “stripped,” or the evidence to have been stricken. To the
contrary, we believe it merely to have been stating that it did not consider the
11
evidence to be probative of the issues at hand. Therefore, we disagree with the
argument that the court violated KRS 13B.150 in rendering its opinion.
Nevertheless, we are in agreement with KRS that the circuit court
erred in its assessment of the older evidence as being “irrelevant” and without
probative value. Without question, the history of the condition upon which Joseph
is alleging disability is relevant, insofar as it helps to provide a clear picture of the
condition upon which a worker is alleging disability and as it provides a basis upon
which to assess the progression of his condition over time. Having reviewed the
opinion of the hearing officer, this Court is of the opinion that it provided a
thorough recitation and summarization of the evidence at issue. The hearing
officer was of the opinion that when considered cumulatively, the objective
medical evidence established that Joseph’s condition has not changed since the
time of the 2001 surgery. This Court is compelled to agree.
Having so found, we are in agreement with KRS concerning its
second argument, namely that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment
for that of the fact-finder when it found that the KRS decision was not supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
KRS 61.510(33) defines “objective medical evidence” as:
[R]eports of examinations or treatments; medical signs
which are anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities that can be observed; psychiatric signs
which are medically demonstrable phenomena indicating
specific abnormalities of behavior, affect, thought,
memory, orientation, or contact with reality; or
laboratory findings which are anatomical, physiological,
12
or psychological phenomena that can be shown by
medically acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques,
including but not limited to chemical tests,
electrocardiograms, electroencephalograms, X-rays, and
psychological tests ....
We note that the definition provided in the statutory provision above does not
provide for the patient’s subjective complaints of pain. It was the opinion of the
hearing officer, after a consideration of the evidence, that the opinions of Joseph’s
treating physicians concerning his disability relied substantially upon his subjective
complaints of pain and were not supported by the objective medical evidence,
including radiological reports and various imaging studies which established that
his condition had not objectively changed since the time of his surgery, at which
time he was able to work without difficulty.
Having reviewed the record, this Court is of the opinion that the
circuit court went beyond its permitted scope of review in substituting its judgment
for that of the hearing officer on a question of fact, namely, which medical reports
were more credible. The record reveals that Dr. McElwain summarized Joseph’s
medical records as showing “a long history of back pain,” as well as “the absence
of any documentation of change in claimant’s condition over the past several
years....” The circuit court, in reviewing the evidence, came to its own conclusion,
in opposition to that of the hearing officer, that the record was “replete” with
unchallenged findings of deterioration in Joseph’s condition. In so finding, the
court goes on to describe Dr. McElwain’s report as “blatantly erroneous” and “of
no probative value whatsoever”. Likewise, the court disagrees with Dr. Quarles’s
13
conclusion that there was no “new convincing objective evidence” to support a
finding of disability, and states instead that the physicians’ reports “uniformly
indicated disability.” We simply cannot agree with the circuit court’s assessment
in this regard. While the record may be replete with Joseph’s subjective
complaints of pain, such is not the appropriate basis for an award of benefits.
Simply stated, it was for the hearing officer to weigh the evidence of
record and make a determination. After reviewing the evidence, the hearing
officer concluded that the objective tests conducted on Joseph, including x-rays,
MRI, and CT studies, failed to reveal an objective change in his condition since the
time of his surgery in 2001.7 Accordingly, the hearing officer determined that this
evidence tends to disprove Joseph’s subjective complaints of increased pain, as
well as the opinions of the treating physicians, who relied substantially upon his
subjective reports. While the circuit court may have disagreed with the hearing
officer’s interpretation of the evidence in this regard, such is not a sufficient basis
for reversal.
7
This evidence consists of, among other records, the March 17, 2006 note of Dr. Bean, which
stated that Joseph’s objective tests from 2002 to 2004 have failed to reveal any abnormalities and
signify a satisfactory fusion of L5/S1, based upon a review of negative 2003 x-rays, a 2003 MRI
showing no abnormalities and a solid fusion, a 2004 MRI without new findings of disc change,
and a 2004 CT, also showing a solid fusion. Finally, KRS notes that Joseph underwent updated
CT and MRI examinations, which revealed a stable CT exam with no nerve root compression or
canal compromise, and an MRI with surgical changes, but no disc disease at L3/4, L2/3 or above,
and no nerve root compression or new stenosis.
Further, the evidence reviewed by the hearing officer includes records from Joseph’s pain
management physician documenting that he received pain relief at a level of 60-70% from
lumbar facet joint injects received in May of 2006. KRS notes, and correctly, that this record,
along with a discharge note from September, was the only medical evidence submitted by Joseph
in documentation of his condition for the twelve-month period prior to discharge, thereby giving
the finder of fact little to no information upon which to base a finding of a permanently disabling
condition, particularly as the May 2006 note documented improvement in same.
14
The law of this Commonwealth is clear that as long as the record
contains substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision, the Court must
defer to the agency, even if there is conflicting evidence. Kentucky Comm’n on
Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). It is the role of the
court to review the administrative decision, and not to reinterpret or reconsider the
merits of the claim. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d
250, 251 (Ky.App. 1983). In the matter sub judice, the circuit court improperly
deemed as “irrelevant” evidence properly relied upon by the finder of fact and then
reweighed the evidence at issue to reach a different conclusion. We believe this
was in error.
It is for the administrative agency to consider all of the evidence
presented and to choose the evidence that it believes. See Bowling v. Natural
Resources, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky.App. 1995). In the matter sub judice, the
report of the hearing officer reveals that the evidence reviewed included the
opinions of both treating and evaluating physicians, radiological test results, and
testimonial evidence. After reviewing same, the hearing officer concluded that
Joseph had failed in his burden of proving that he was permanently incapacitated
from his former job or a job of like duties, as of his last day of paid employment.
While the circuit court may have interpreted the evidence differently, it was not for
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact.
15
As its third basis for appeal, KRS argues that the circuit court’s
determination that the final order of the Board misrepresented evidence is not
supported by the record. KRS refers specifically to the court’s determination that
the final order “...incorrectly cited a March 17, 2006, MRI/CT report as showing
“no new findings,” when it actually stated that there were no new correctable
findings. A.R. at 389 [sic].” KRS asserts that in fact, the administrative record
does not contain the actual MRI/CT report in question, and instead, contains only
an interpretation of that record by Dr. Bean, as set forth in his March 17, 2006,
report.8 KRS argues that when that note is read correctly, the final order accurately
recited its contents. Accordingly, KRS asserts that the circuit court’s opinion and
order should be reversed in light of its reliance upon an incorrect interpretation of
the factual evidence. In response, Joseph asserts simply that the circuit court did
not misrepresent the record, and that a review of the record reveals that it was the
hearing officer who misunderstood and misrepresented the evidence at issue.
Having reviewed the report at issue, we agree with KRS that the
hearing officer did not misrepresent the contents of Dr. Bean’s report. When read
in its entirety, Dr. Bean describes the report itself as revealing “no new findings of
disc change above the fusion level,” and later goes on to refer to “no new
8
In that report, Dr. Bean states, “Continued pain complaints resulted in another MRI scan being
done in June 2004, again showing the lumbar fusion without new findings of disc change above
the fusion level. CT scan done 2004 confirmed satisfactory position of pedicle screws and the
fusion being solid.” A.R. p. 145. Following that impression, Dr. Bean ordered another MRI and
CT scan for Joseph, and then opined that, “In the absence of any new correctable finding, I find
him at this point disabled ...” A.R. pp. 145-146.
16
correctable findings.” Accordingly, we do not believe that the hearing officer
incorrectly represented or mischaracterized the findings of the report.
As its final basis for appeal, KRS argues that the circuit court
improperly gave more weight to evidence from Joseph’s treating physicians than to
the opinions of reviewing physicians. In reliance upon the recently issued
Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Bowens, 281
S.W.3d 776 (Ky. 2009), KRS notes that the opinions of treating physicians are not
to be given more weight than those of treating physicians, and alleges several
instances in which it believes that the opinion and order of the circuit court seemed
to do so. Having determined that reversal is appropriate for the aforementioned
reasons, we need not address this argument further herein.
Finally, we find no merit in Joseph’s arguments concerning the
hearing officer’s alleged failure to use the appropriate standard of law in relying
upon a statutory lifting standard instead of the appropriate residual functional
capacity standard to determine if Joseph could continue working. KRS 61.600(3)
clearly sets forth the basis for determining an individual’s ability for physical
exertion, classifying light work as lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time,
with frequent lifting of objects weighing up to ten pounds. The hearing officer
weighed the evidence of record in this matter and determined that Joseph’s job
duties fell within this classification. While the circuit court may have described
Joseph’s work as “extremely physically demanding,” it did not explicitly reject the
determination of the hearing officer that, according to the classifications set forth
17
by the statute, Joseph’s job duties fell within the “light work” category.
Regardless, in light of our other findings herein, we are bound to affirm the hearing
officer’s finding that Joseph was capable of continuing to perform the duties
required of his job, regardless of their classification.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the June 5,
2009, decision of the Franklin Circuit Court, and affirm the administrative decision
issued by the Board on May 23, 2007.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian C. Thomas
Frankfort, Kentucky
Rex Hunt
Frankfort, Kentucky
18
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.