C. (G.) LAUREL VS. N. (G.), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001190-ME
G.C., FATHER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DURENDA LUNDY LAWSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-AD-00018
G.N.; R.N.; AND
S.J.C., A CHILD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: G.C. appeals from an order and judgment entered by the
Laurel Circuit Court, Family Division which terminated his parental rights in an
adoption proceeding. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In March 2008, the child (S.J.C.) was placed in the home of her
maternal great-grandmother and step-great-grandfather, following the arraignment
of her father (G.C.) and her mother (P.C.) on charges of manufacturing
methamphetamine.1 In April 2008, temporary custody of the child was given to the
great-grandparents, and the child has resided with them ever since.
On July 20, 2008, the father was arrested on charges of burglary and
unlawful imprisonment. He has been incarcerated since then, and is currently
serving a nine-year prison sentence for conviction of those charges. On July 29,
2008, the great-grandparents filed the underlying petition seeking to adopt the
child, pursuant to KRS2 199.470. Since the mother consented to the adoption, the
petition requested the voluntary termination of her parental rights and the
involuntary termination of the father’s parental rights.
The father, who was represented by counsel, opposed the petition.
The trial court conducted a hearing, during which the great-grandmother, both
parents, and a social worker testified.3 Subsequently, the court entered an order
and judgment of adoption which terminated the mother’s and the father’s parental
rights. The father appealed.
1
Although the drug charges ultimately were dismissed, evidently both parents admitted to the
allegations during arraignment.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
The record reflects that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) conducted an
investigation and filed a report pursuant to KRS 199.510, recommending that the petition be
granted. The record also contains the report of a guardian ad litem, who recommended the
adoption as being in the child’s best interest.
-2-
On appeal, the father claims that the court erred by finding that the
elements of KRS 625.090(2) were satisfied so as to justify the involuntary
termination of his parental rights. We disagree.
Appellate review of an involuntary termination or nonconsensual
adoption proceeding
is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR[4]
52.01 based upon clear and convincing evidence, and the
findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless
there exists no substantial evidence in the record to
support its findings. V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for
Human Resources, Ky.App., 706 S.W.2d 420, 424
(1986).
“Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily
mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is
proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the
weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily
prudent-minded people.” Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718,
726, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Ky.App. 1998).
See also M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 34-35 (Ky.App. 2007).
KRS 625.090 provides, in pertinent part:
(2) No termination of parental rights shall be ordered
unless the Circuit Court also finds by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of one (1) or more of
the following grounds:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a
period of not less than ninety (90) days; [or]
....
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six
(6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3-
refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child[.]
First, the father argues that although the court’s final written order
reflects a finding of abandonment pursuant to KRS 625.090(2)(a), the order
contradicts the court’s oral findings during the hearing, when the court stated that it
could not find that the father had abandoned the child. However, well-settled is the
notion that “a written judgment takes precedence over any arguably contrary oral
statements made by the court.” Terry v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 466, 477
(Ky. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Taber, 941 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Ky. 1997)
(“When there is an inconsistency between oral statements of a court and an order
reduced to writing, the latter must prevail”)). The reasoning for this rule has been
articulated by the Kentucky Supreme Court as follows:
[W]here there is an inconsistency between the oral
statements of a court and that which is reduced to writing
as the court’s final judgment, the latter shall prevail and
the former shall be disregarded. Such construction is
essential to the operation of the Court of Justice for
judges often voice views and opinions which may be
inconsistent with their final judgments. If this Court
should announce a rule whereby the comments of a trial
judge could be used to impeach the effect of a court’s
final judgment, the result would be the destruction of any
certainty as to the effect of judgments and a state of
chaos in judicial proceedings.
-4-
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 869 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1994). Thus, in this case, the
court’s final written order finding that the father had abandoned the child prevails
over any oral findings.
Next, the father argues that the court erred by finding that, pursuant to
KRS 625.090(2)(a), he had abandoned the child, since incarceration “for an
isolated criminal offense may not constitute abandonment justifying termination of
parental rights.” Cabinet for Human Resources v. Rogeski, 909 S.W.2d 660, 661
(Ky. 1995).5 However, even without considering the period of time in which the
father has been incarcerated, our review of the record reveals that clear and
convincing evidence was produced to show that prior to his incarceration, from
March until his arrest in July 2008 (a period of more than 90 days), the father
failed to financially support the child, failed to exercise his supervised visitation
rights, and generally had no contact with the child other than to say “hi” in passing.
We find it helpful to note the following discussion on the element of
abandonment:
In adoption proceedings parental rights are not severed
merely because a child would have a better home
elsewhere or because the natural parent may provide less
parental care than the adopting parent. Nor are they
severed because a parent has temporarily abdicated his
parental responsibility in favor of a kindred, as appears to
have been the situation in the case at hand. Rather, there
must be proof that the natural parent has abandoned or
neglected the infant as prescribed by the statute.
Generally, abandonment is demonstrated by facts or
5
The Court in Rogeski actually held: “Although incarceration for an isolated criminal offense
may not constitute abandonment justifying termination of parental rights, incarceration is a factor
to be considered[.]” 909 S.W.2d at 661.
-5-
circumstances that evince a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child. Non-support does not itself constitute
abandonment, especially where the child is supported by
a volunteer, but it may be an element of abandonment.
O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky.App. 1983) (internal citations omitted).
In the present case, although evidence was presented to show that
prior to March 2008, the father did in fact support the child and that since his
incarceration, he has telephoned the child regularly, nonetheless, his lack of
support for, and contact with, the child from March until July 2008 sufficiently
evinces an intent to forego his parental duties for a period of more than 90 days.
Therefore, the court’s finding of abandonment is not clearly erroneous.
Next, the father contends that the court erred by finding that, pursuant
to KRS 625.090(2)(e), he had not financially supported the child for a period of
more than six months. However, a finding that the father had not financially
supported the child for a period of more than six months is not necessary to justify
the termination of his parental rights, since the court found that the father had
abandoned the child under KRS 625.090(2)(a). Thus, we decline to address the
merits of this claim of error.
The order and judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court, Family Division,
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James D. Hodge
London, Kentucky
Larry W. Gilliam
London, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.