GADDIS (DAVID) VS. COMP LONE STAR TRANSPORTATION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001173-WC
DAVID GADDIS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-08-00523
LONE STAR TRANSPORTATION;
HON. CHRIS DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: David Gaddis appeals from an opinion of the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) denying his claim by finding that Kentucky did not
have extraterritorial jurisdiction over his claim under KRS 342.670. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm.
In December 2007, Gaddis, a Kentucky resident, was hired as a truck
driver by Lone Star, a company based in Texas. According to the record, Gaddis,
from Kentucky, and Lone Star, from Texas, engaged in at least two telephone
conversations regarding Gaddis’s potential employment. During the administrative
stage, Gaddis testified that Lone Star informed him that he was absolutely hired by
telephone. He testified that Lone Star’s demand that he travel to Texas for a
physical, drug test, and driving test were merely formalities to his hiring, which he
contends occurred in Kentucky.
According to Lone Star’s Vice President of Safety Jeff Cooney, all
Lone Star applicants were subjected to telephone and background screenings
before being invited for “orientation” in Texas. Cooney further testified that those
applicants receiving orientation invitations were then required to pass a physical
examination, a drug test, and a driving test before they were offered employment.
Thus, Lone Star contends that Gaddis was not hired until he completed their entire
hiring orientation process in Texas.
After beginning his employment, Gaddis specialized in transporting
oversized cargo and received his work assignments from a dispatcher in Texas. On
December 14, 2007, Gaddis was transporting cargo when he encountered an ice
storm near Pullman, Texas. Gaddis testified that his dispatcher instructed him to
re-tarp his truck even after Gaddis notified the dispatcher that a foot of ice had
collected on his trailer. When Gaddis climbed on his trailer to re-tarp, he slipped,
fell backwards, and hit his head on heavy cargo. According to Gaddis, after
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regaining consciousness, he notified his dispatcher about his injuries and
completed his delivery to Lowell, Michigan.
Gaddis, who had not been employed the requisite ninety-day period to
obtain company-sponsored health insurance, testified that he requested and was
promised medical coverage from his manager multiple times but never received
such coverage.1 From his fall to the termination of his employment with Lone
Star, Gaddis stated that his lone treatment was at an immediate care center. Gaddis
ended his employment with Lone Star in February 2008.
Shortly thereafter, Gaddis arrived in Missouri to begin his new
employment when he began suffering from what he believed was a stroke. After
treating Gaddis for a week, the medical care personnel diagnosed him with Bell’s
palsy. Gaddis then contacted Lone Star and informed it that he wanted to get
medical treatment for his injuries by obtaining workers’ compensation benefits.
Lone Star replied by informing Gaddis that his request was denied.
Subsequently, Gaddis applied for workers’ compensation benefits in
Kentucky, alleging permanent head, back, and shoulder injuries from his fall. On
August 7, 2008, Lone Star filed a notice of claim denial contending, inter alia, that
Kentucky did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Gaddis’s claim. After an
evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge found that Kentucky did not have
extraterritorial jurisdiction over Gaddis’s claim because employment was
principally localized in Texas. The Board affirmed, and this appeal followed.
1
Apparently, according to Gaddis’s testimony, he was offered workers’ compensation benefits
after his injury but rejected the offer for fear of losing his job.
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Gaddis contends that the Board should have found that his
employment was “principally localized” in Kentucky and, thus, was covered under
KRS 342.670(1)(a). We disagree.
Our duty is to correct the Board only where it has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing
the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice. Max & Erma's v. Lane, 290
S.W.3d 695, 696 (Ky.App. 2009). Moreover, “[w]hen the party with the burden of
proof fails to convince the ALJ, the party's burden on appeal is to show that
overwhelming favorable evidence compelled a favorable finding, in other words,
that no reasonable person could fail to be persuaded by the evidence.” Clark
County Bd. of Educ. v. Jacobs, 278 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Ky. 2009).
KRS 342.670(1) provides, in relevant part, the following:
(1) If an employee, while working outside the territorial
limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of which
he, or in the event of his death, his dependents, would
have been entitled to the benefits provided by this chapter
had that injury occurred within this state, that employee,
or in the event of his death resulting from that injury, his
dependents, shall be entitled to the benefits provided by
this chapter, if at the time of the injury:
(a) His employment is principally localized in this state,
or
(b) He is working under a contract of hire made in this
state in employment not principally localized in any state,
...
KRS 342.670(5)(d) provides the following:
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A person's employment is principally localized in this or
another state when:
1. His employer has a place of business in this or the
other state and he regularly works at or from that place of
business, or
2. If subparagraph 1. foregoing is not applicable, he is
domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working
time in the service of his employer in this or the other
state.
Accordingly, under our statutory scheme, Kentucky has
extraterritorial workers’ compensation jurisdiction when, at the time of injury, a
person’s employment is “principally localized” in Kentucky or his employment
contract was made in Kentucky in employment not principally localized in any
state. KRS 342.670(1)(a) and (b). Under KRS 342.670(4)(d), when deciding if
employment is “principally localized” within a state, an ALJ must determine
whether a person’s employer has a place of business in a state and if the employee
works at or from that place. Haney v. Butler, 990 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Ky. 1999). If
both conditions are answered affirmatively, the employee’s employment is deemed
“principally located” in the subject state and the analysis ends. Id.
When the employee’s workplace and the employer’s place of business
are not identical, an ALJ must then determine whether the employee is domiciled
in a state and, if so, whether he spends a substantial part of his working time for the
employer in that state. Id. If both conditions are answered in the affirmative, the
employee’s employment is deemed “principally located” in the subject state. Id. If
an employee is domiciled in a state but does not spend a substantial part of his
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working time for his employer in that state, a person’s employment cannot be
deemed to be principally localized in the domicile state. Id. In this case, the ALJ
determined that Gaddis’s employment was principally localized in Texas and that
his contract for hire was made in Texas, so the question on appeal is whether there
is substantial evidence to support these findings. Id.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s finding that
Gaddis’s employment was principally localized in Texas was not clearly
erroneous. The evidence reveals that all of Lone Star’s drivers are dispatched from
Fort Worth, Texas, where drivers are assigned a driver-manager to assist them
during the trip. In Eck Miller Transp. Corp. v. Wagers, 833 S.W.2d 854 (Ky.App.
1992), this Court concluded that a trucker, who is assigned substantially all of his
work “from” his employer’s place of business, will be deemed to have employment
“principally localized” in the state of his employer’s place of business pursuant to
KRS 342.670(4)(d)(1). Id. at 858. Here, Gaddis received all of his work
assignments from his employer’s place of business in Fort Worth Texas, and, thus,
cannot reasonably argue that his employment was not principally localized in
Texas.
Further, we note that Gaddis makes two additional arguments: (1) that
Kentucky, pursuant to KRS 342.670(1)(a) as defined by (4)(d)(2), has extraterritorial coverage over his claim because he was domiciled in Kentucky and
spent a substantial part of his working time in Kentucky; and (2) that Kentucky,
pursuant to KRS 342.670(1)(b), has extraterritorial coverage over his claim
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because his employment contract was made in Kentucky and his employment was
not principally localized in any state. However, as stated in Eck Miller Transp.
Corp., 833 S.W.2d 854, these arguments are irrelevant because they would “only
come into play if the ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, or
were incorrect as a matter of law, neither of which is the case.” Id. at 858.
Therefore, we cannot address Gaddis’s two remaining arguments. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers' Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stuart E. Alexander, III
Kathleen M.W. Schoen
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephanie D. Ross
James R. Wagoner
Louisville, Kentucky
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