MISSINNE (JUNE) VS. CITY OF GLASGOW
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RENDERED: MAY 28, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001125-MR
JUNE MISSINNE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHIL PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00676
CITY OF GLASGOW
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a decision of the Barren Circuit Court
dismissing appellant June Missinne’s claim against the City of Glasgow, Kentucky
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
(“Glasgow”). Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the trial court
and remand this case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Missinne was visiting a friend and the two were sightseeing in
Glasgow on September 21, 2006. At around 3:00 p.m., she fell while walking on
the sidewalk. Missinne filed suit against Glasgow alleging that its failure to
properly construct and maintain the sidewalk in question was the proximate cause
of her fall and subsequent injuries.
Glasgow filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was
not responsible as it did not own the property in question. Missinne’s accident
occurred near the county courthouse. Glasgow contended that the property upon
which Missinne fell was owned by Barren County (“County”). Missinne,
however, argues that the County was not the one maintaining it, but Glasgow was.
As a result, she asserts that once Glasgow assumed the responsibility, they could
be liable for any negligence associated with the sidewalk.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Glasgow and
Missinne brought this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the granting of summary judgment by the trial court, an
appellate court must determine whether the trial court correctly found “that there
[were] no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party [was]
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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 56.03.
“[A] trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only [when] it
appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor. [While] [t]he moving party bears the
initial burden of [proving] that no genuine issue of material fact exists, . . . the
burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present ‘at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.’” Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. v. Mussetter, 242 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Ky.
App. 2007).
Since summary judgment deals only with legal questions as there are
no genuine issues of material fact, we need not defer to the trial court’s decision
and must review the issue de novo. Lewis v. B&R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432,
436 (Ky. App. 2001). With this standard in mind, we review the issue.
DISCUSSION
Missinne first asserts that once Glasgow assumed responsibility for
the construction and maintenance of the sidewalk upon which her alleged injuries
occurred, it was subject to tort liability for its failure to do so in a reasonably
prudent manner irrespective of the owner of the property.
In Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Lawrence, 313 Ky. 75, 230 S.W.2d
103, 105 (Ky. 1950), Kentucky’s highest court held that “[a] duty voluntarily
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assumed cannot be carelessly abandoned without incurring liability for injury
resulting from the abandonment.” (Citation omitted). Negligence requires proof
that:
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the
defendant breached the standard by which his or her duty
is measured; and (3) consequent injury. ‘Duty, the first
element, presents a question of law.’ (Citation omitted).
‘If no duty is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there
can be no breach thereof, and therefore no actionable
negligence.’ (Citation omitted).
Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. App. 2007).
Whether a duty has been “assumed” is determined by whether the
“tortfeasor has actually and specifically undertaken to render services allegedly
performed without reasonable care.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v.
Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Ky. 2005). Missinne argues that this case is
similar to Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 843 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky.
App. 1992) in which the court held that “a duty voluntarily assumed cannot be
carelessly undertaken without incurring liability[.]”
In the Estep case, there was a question of who was liable after the
undertaking of snow removal at a mall. While there was evidence that the mall
contracted the snow removers, the lease provided that it was the responsibility of
the store owners. While the trial court granted summary judgment, this court
reversed the decision based upon the assumption of duty by the mall.
We believe this case to be similar. While Glasgow did not own the
premises upon which the sidewalks were located, evidence set forth in depositions
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as well as the newspaper clipping indicate that the county did not maintain the
sidewalks, but rather Glasgow did. As set forth above, for a defendant to be
granted summary judgment, it must be impossible for the defendant to obtain a
judgment in his favor at trial. While Missinne will need to provide evidence of the
assumed duty of Glasgow, it would not be impossible for her to do so. Thus, we
find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Glasgow’s favor. We
therefore reverse the decision of the Barren Circuit Court and remand this case for
further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Schuette
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Greg Stivers
Andrea Anderson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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