MILLS (PETER SHELLEY) VS. MILLS (CHERIE ANN)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000965-ME
PETER SHELLEY MILLS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TAMRA GORMLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00251
CHERIE ANN MILLS
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Peter Shelley Mills appeals the April 24, 2009,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order of the Scott Family Court.
That order gave sole custody of Peter’s three minor children to their mother and his
ex-wife, Cherie Ann Mills, and continued to prohibit all contact between Peter and
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
the children until several conditions had been fulfilled. Because we hold that the
trial court improperly entered an order modifying custody of the parties sua sponte
and also entered findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence, we reverse
and remand.
The parties were divorced on January 24, 2001. A final decree was
entered which granted joint custody of the parties’ children, designated Cherie as
the primary residential custodian, and created a timesharing schedule for Peter. On
February 15, 2007, Peter filed a motion to enforce the timesharing agreement,
alleging that Cherie had ceased visitation without explanation. At that time, the
children’s ages were seven, nine, and ten. On February 16, 2007, Cherie filed a
motion to terminate visitation and alleged that Peter had neglected and abused the
children. In sum, Cherie alleged that Peter had left the children alone without
supervision, had physically abused all three of the children, and had sexually
abused the nine-year-old daughter.
After multiple delays, the matter was heard on July 30, 2008. During
the interim, Peter had not been allowed any contact with the children. The Cabinet
for Health and Family Services (CHFS) had completed a report finding that the
allegations of abuse were unsubstantiated and the Scott County Grand Jury failed
to indict Peter for any of the criminal charges stemming from the allegations. The
CHFS report stated:
The finding of neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse
in regards to [the children] is UNSUBSTANTIATED,
and no case will be opened. The finding is based on
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interviews with the children, as well as inconsistencies
with their statements, and not being able to give details.
It is also based on interviews with Peter Mills, him
passing a lie detector test, the CAC unsubstantiating the
sexual abuse, and the grand jury handing the indictment
back as a no true bill.
(Emphasis in original).
In the meantime, Cherie had begun taking the children to Dr. Cheryl
Pearson for treatment of physical and sexual abuse. Dr. Pearson was deposed and
testified that her treatment of the children was based entirely upon Cherie’s
allegations of abuse and not upon Dr. Pearson’s own conclusions that abuse had
taken place. Dr. Pearson also testified that she was biased against Peter, that she
could not make an impartial recommendation as to custody or visitation, and that
to do so would be acting outside her role as a therapist. She testified that she had
no idea what was required in order to make a determination of sexual abuse in a
custody case and that Dr. Feinberg was the “go-to” person for making such
determinations.
By the time of the hearing, Cherie, Peter, and the children had all been
evaluated by Dr. David L. Feinberg, at the request of the court. Dr. Feinberg
submitted a report to the court, which concluded:
The results of this evaluation did not yield clear evidence
that [daughter] had been sexually abused or that the
children have suffered from physical abuse. The children
related substantially different versions of their father’s
behavior. A clear pattern of questionable parental
behavior on his part was indicated but not at the level of
physical or sexual abuse.
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Dr. Feinberg made the following recommendations:
It is strongly recommended that Cherie return to longterm individual counseling . . . . It is strongly
recommended that Peter participate in long-term
individual counseling . . . . It is recommended that Peter
and Cherie share permanent joint custody of the children.
Because there has been a long period of no contact
between Peter and the children, reestablishing the parentchild relationship should occur gradually and under the
supervision and guidance of a mental health professional.
Therefore, it is recommended that Peter and the children
participate in reconciliation therapy with a licensed
therapist experienced in relational or family therapy.
Once reconciliation therapy has been ongoing for a
period of three months, additional unsupervised
timesharing could begin to take place.
To ease any anxiety the children may experience as
visitation resumes in a more normalized fashion, daytime
only, unsupervised visitation should take place for three
months. At the end of the six-month transition period, if
the reconciliation therapist deems appropriate, it is
recommended that Peter resume having regular,
unsupervised timesharing with the children according to
the previously established timesharing plan.
It was further recommended that a Guardian ad litem be appointed for the children
and that Peter and Cherie both enlist parenting coaches to assist with parenting
instruction and address specific parenting issues.
After some time passed with no ruling from the trial court, Peter filed
a motion for a ruling September 12, 2008. The motion was heard on October 1,
2008, and continued. Again, several months passed with no ruling, and on January
9, 2009, Peter filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court. On April 14,
2009, that petition was granted and the trial court was ordered to issue a ruling on
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the pending visitation order within ten days.2 On April 24, 2009, the trial court
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and final order. In that order,
the trial court modified the joint custody arrangement of the parties and awarded
sole custody to Cherie. It was also ordered that all contact between Peter and the
children should cease until certain conditions set by the court were met. It is from
this order that Peter appeals.
We begin our analysis by first noting that the trial court entered an
order modifying custody of the parties sua sponte. It is clearly established that
custody may not be modified unless a party has filed both a motion to do so and a
supporting affidavit. KRS 403.350. A court may not modify custody without both
of these. Petrey v. Cain, 987 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1999). In the present action, Cherie
filed a motion to modify timesharing, not custody. Accordingly, the trial court’s
order is reversed and remanded with instructions to hold a hearing on the issue of
timesharing alone and not custody.
Peter argues that the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous
and that its legal conclusions constitute an abuse of discretion. Typically, because
we are already reversing the trial court’s order on other grounds, it would not be
necessary for us to address this issue. However, because the trial court’s order also
ceased contact between Peter and the children, we presume that its findings of fact
may reappear after a hearing for timesharing modification. For that reason, we
believe a review of the trial court’s findings is warranted.
2
See Mills v. Gormley, 2009-CA-000061-OA (order entered 04-14-09; finality 06-04-09).
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This Court will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact unless we
hold that they are clearly erroneous. CR3 52.01.
A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial
evidence” is evidence of substance and relevant
consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the minds
of reasonable people. After a trial court makes the
required findings of fact, it must then apply the law to
those facts. The resulting custody award as determined
by the trial court will not be disturbed unless it
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion in
relation to the exercise of judicial power implies arbitrary
action or capricious disposition under the circumstances,
at least an unreasonable and unfair decision. The
exercise of discretion must be legally sound.
Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782-3 (Ky. App. 2002) (citations omitted)
(overruled on other grounds by Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky.
2008)).
Peter challenges the trial court’s findings as a whole, but points to
several specific findings. The first of these reads as follows:
Finally, Dr. Pearson recognized that [Cherie]’s opinion of
[Peter] was having an alienating effect in the children but
did not believe it was causing the children to fabricate the
abuses upon them by [Peter].
This is supported by Dr. Feinberg, the forensic
psychologist retained by the parties to provide a custodial
evaluation. Dr. Feinberg reports that “[the children] are
at-risk children.” While Dr. Feinberg did not label
[Peter]’s conduct sexual or physical abuse, he does
conclude that the children “believe that [(Peter)] has been
abusive.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(Quotations in original). After reviewing the testimony of Dr. Pearson and the
report of Dr. Feinberg, it appears that the trial court’s findings of fact are made
wholly out of context, are comprised of select portions of the doctors’ testimony
and report, and as such are clearly erroneous. Dr. Pearson specifically stated that
she could not make a determination as to whether the children had been abused.
Furthermore, nowhere in Dr. Feinberg’s report can we find a conclusion that the
children have or have not fabricated the allegations against their father, for any
reason. What Dr. Feinberg does say is:
Cherie has an extremely negative view of Peter that she
has shared with the children. Counseling should also
enable Cherie to be appropriately supportive of the
children’s relationship with their father. The children
continue to act out her distrust and dislike of Peter.
(Emphasis added). This conclusion of Dr. Feinberg is in contrast to the above
finding of the trial court, a finding which is therefore unsupported by substantial
evidence.
The next trial court finding that Peter challenges reads: “Dr. Pearson
is qualified to render opinions regarding the children’s statements of abuse and to
provide this Court with unbiased recommendations on how best to help these
children now and in the future.” Given Dr. Pearson’s statements that she was
biased against Peter, that she could not make impartial recommendations, and that
to do so exceeded her role as the children’s therapist, we find ourselves completely
perplexed as to the evidentiary basis of this finding and, thus, find that it is also
unsupported by substantial evidence.
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Lastly, Peter challenges the following specific finding of the trial
court:
More concerning to this Court is that when Dr. Feinberg
asked [the daughter] what does FATHER “do wrong,”
[she] never referred to the sexual contact. Implying she
may believe, wrongly, that this is not wrong or normal
contact between a parent and child.
(Capitalization and quotations in original). In short, the trial judge draws her own
psychological conclusions from Dr. Feinberg’s evaluation, conclusions which she
is not trained to do. Furthermore, this statement makes it clear that the trial judge
has already ascertained that the sexual abuse has taken place and that the
daughter’s failure to mention it as something “wrong” is an indication of the
daughter’s distorted frame of mind, not a lack of evidence of the actual abuse. In
short, it appears to us that the trial court has hand-selected statements of both Dr.
Pearson and Dr. Feinberg in order to reach a foregone conclusion. We are further
persuaded of this by the trial court’s conclusion that it is going to “err on the side
of caution” when continuing to prohibit all contact between the children and Peter,
a standard of proof which has absolutely no legal basis. As there is a legally, and
socially, recognized interest in children maintaining relationships with both
parents, erring on the side of caution would be supervised visitation, as
recommended by Dr. Feinberg. However, the trial court completely ignores this
interest as well as the harm that could result from the continued prevention of
contact between Peter and his children.
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For the foregoing reasons, the April 24, 2009, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and final order of the Scott Family Court is reversed and
remanded with instructions to hold a hearing on the issue of timesharing alone.
Further, due to the circumstances of this case, the trial judge is seriously
encouraged to consider whether at this point in the litigation the hearing should be
assigned to another judge on remand.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jason Rapp
Lexington, Kentucky
Fred E. Fugazzi
Lexington, Kentucky
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