CROSS (BERNEDETTE) NOW HOWARD VS. CROSS (GEOFFREY)
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000936-MR
BERNEDETTE CROSS (NOW HOWARD)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DONNA L. DELAHANTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-03530
GEOFFREY CROSS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Bernedette Cross appeals the October 23, 2008, order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court finding that the parties’ separation agreement does
not entitle Bernedette to survivorship benefits under her ex-husband, Geoffrey
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Cross’s, pension plan. Because we hold that the trial court’s interpretation of the
parties’ separation agreement was correct, we affirm.
The parties were married in the United Kingdom in 1970. For a
period of six years during the marriage, Geoffrey was employed by ICL, a British
company, domiciled in the United Kingdom. The parties were divorced by the trial
court via a decree of dissolution entered on December 30, 1993. At the time the
parties divorced, Geoffrey was vested in the ICL pension plan, and it was in pay
status. The parties had entered into a property settlement agreement which was
incorporated by reference into the decree. One provision of that agreement
provided that Bernedette would receive one-third of Geoffrey’s remaining ICL
pension and further states: “[i]n the event that there are any spousal death benefits,
residual beneficiary benefits or other benefits existing under the terms of said
pension, then in such event Mr. Cross shall name Mrs. Cross as the sole
irrevocable beneficiary of all such benefits.” The agreement required that the
pension division be accomplished by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO). No QDRO was ever prepared in regard to the ICL pension. However,
Geoffrey has been receiving the full pension amount and paying Bernedette’s onethird share directly to her.
In February of 2008, Bernedette filed a motion and affidavit, asserting
that she had recently been informed that the ICL pension plan would not allow her
to be a surviving spouse entitled to survivorship benefits. Instead, the plan
provided that Geoffrey’s current wife would be entitled to any spousal death
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benefits. Bernedette requested that Geoffrey be required to purchase and maintain
a life insurance policy or to fund an annuity naming her as the beneficiary and also
requested that he be held in contempt for not already doing so. Geoffrey filed a
motion to deny relief. The trial court, determining that the issues were purely
legal, requested that the parties submit written briefs. On October 23, 2008, an
order was entered in which the trial court found that the plain language of the
agreement established that Bernedette would only receive benefits for which she
was eligible under the plan, that the ICL pension did not provide any surviving
spouse benefits for Bernedette, and therefore Bernedette was not entitled to the
value of any benefits.
Bernedette filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s
order, and Geoffrey filed a response. The trial court heard arguments from the
parties, regarding the motion to alter, amend, or vacate, and subsequently issued an
order denying said motion. This appeal followed.
Separation agreements, pursuant to a divorce or legal separation, are
governed by KRS 403.180. At issue in this case is the trial court’s interpretation of
the parties’ settlement agreement, specifically the provision which relates to
Geoffrey’s ICL pension. Inquiries as to the construction, operation, and effect of a
spousal separation agreement are typically governed by the same rules and
provisions applicable to the construction of other contracts. Richey v. Richey, 389
S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1965). The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law which
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this court will review de novo. Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656 (Ky. App.
2003); Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1998).
On appeal, Bernedette argues that the trial court improperly
interpreted the separation agreement as applying only to death benefits for a former
spouse or alternate payee. Bernedette argues that the proper interpretation of the
agreement is that she is guaranteed any spousal death benefits, regardless of
whether they relate to a past or current spouse.
The primary object when interpreting a settlement agreement is to
effectuate the intentions of the parties. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152, 153
(Ky. 1966); Withers v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., 656 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Ky. App.
1983). “Any contract or agreement must be construed as a whole, giving effect to
all parts and every word in it if possible.” City of Louisa v. Newland, 705 S.W.2d
916, 919 (Ky. 1986).
When a contract is ambiguous or silent on an essential issue, the
interpreting court may consider parole and extrinsic evidence as it relates to the
circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution, the objective of the contract,
or even the conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Dennis v. Watson, 264 S.W.2d 858,
860 (Ky. 1954); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Barker, 256 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Ky. 1953);
L.K. Comstock & Co., Inc. v. Becon Constr. Co., 932 F.Supp. 948, 965 (E.D.Ky.
1994). Absent any ambiguities, the parties’ intentions must be discerned from the
four corners of the document without resort to extrinsic evidence. Hoheimer v.
Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000); L.K. Comstock, 932 F.Supp. at 964.
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The provision at issue reads in full:
(a) ICL Pension. The parties agree that the balance of
Mr. Cross’ ICL Pension shall be divided between them
by Mr. Cross receiving two-thirds of same and Mrs.
Cross receiving one-third. It is further agreed that said
division shall be by the entry of a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order. In the event that there are any spousal
death benefits, residual beneficiary benefits or other
benefits existing under the terms of said pension, then in
such event Mr. Cross shall name Mrs. Cross as the sole
irrevocable beneficiary of all such benefits.
Bernedette argues that the trial court improperly focused on the terms
of the pension plan, as opposed to the terms of the agreement. She argues that the
rules of the pension plan are irrelevant and instead desires a broad interpretation of
the agreement provision, which would grant her rights to any benefits which arise
from the pension. We do not agree. We have reviewed the trial court’s order, and
we agree with its assessment of the parties’ separation agreement. That portion of
the order reads as follows:
All United States Courts must consider [the] parties’
rights and obligations in regard to pensions pursuant to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
ERISA is a federal act which preempts state laws relating
to pensions. ERISA defines and regulates pension plans
and sets forth requirements relating to division of pension
assets between spouses and other qualifying individuals.
There is, however, an exemption to ERISA for employee
benefit plans that are maintained outside of the United
States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially
all of whom are nonresident aliens. (29 U.S.C.A. Section
1003(b)(4)).
ERISA requires that any division of employee benefit
plans be accomplished by a QDRO. In the case at hand,
the PSA required that the division of respondent’s
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pension and any surviving spouse benefit, be
accomplished by the entry of a QDRO. Even prior to the
entry of the PSA both parties being represented by
counsel, knew or should have known ICL Pension Plan
was a pension plan maintained outside the United States,
and administered under the laws of the United Kingdom.
A QDRO would have absolutely no effect in regard to
obtaining any benefit from the ICL Plan even if such
benefit was available. The Court believes that a QDRO
was not prepared or entered in regard to the ICL Plan as
the QDRO would have no import.
The PSA requires Respondent to name Petitioner as the
sole irrevocable beneficiary in the event that certain
benefits exist under the pension plan. Fourteen years
later, these benefits do not exist under the ICL Pension
Plan. If the ICL Plan, in the future, should provide
benefits to an alternate payee or former spouse, then
Respondent would be required to take the necessary steps
for Petitioner to receive such benefits. This Court has no
control over the ICL Plan or the law of the United
Kingdom under which the Plan operates. The plain
language of the PSA establishes that the parties agreed
that Petitioner would receive any spousal benefits for
which she was eligible under the plan, not the value of
benefits for which she does not qualify. This Court shall
not order that Respondent pay to the Petitioner the value
of spousal death benefits under the ICL Plan as Petitioner
is not entitled to receive such.
To interpret the agreement provision in the manner that Bernedette
suggests would imply that Bernedette would be entitled to any benefits that existed
under the pension plan, irrelevant of their original intent. Such an interpretation
would grant Bernedette entitlement to all benefits as they arise, including group
insurance offerings or surviving dependant benefits. This broad interpretation does
not appear to be the intention of the parties at the time they entered into the
agreement. Furthermore, the relief which Bernedette seeks would require Geoffrey
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to expend his own money in order to provide her with a benefit which the parties
did not previously negotiate, in the form of an annuity or life insurance payout.
This does not appear to have been the intention of the parties’ either. Instead, the
agreement mandates that Geoffrey name Bernedette as the beneficiary of any
available benefits, an act, which in this case, is a legal impossibility. Unlike the
portion of the agreement provision that pertains to the balance of Geoffrey’s ICL
pension, the portion that pertains to available spousal death benefits contains the
limiting language “in the event there are any spousal benefits.” As the trial court
has already noted, no benefits currently exist which are available to Bernedette. As
the agreement does not require any further action from Geoffrey in the event that
such benefits are not available, it would be inappropriate for us to do so now.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melanie Straw-Boone
Pregliasco∙Straw-Boone
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark W. Dobbins
Sandra F. Keene
Tilford Dobbins Alexander Buckway
& Black PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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