BALDWIN (JAMES) VS. DOE (JOHN), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000721-MR
JAMES BALDWIN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00035
JOHN DOE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: James Baldwin appeals the Grant Circuit Court’s order of
March 19, 2009, granting the motion for summary judgment by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company. On appeal, Baldwin argues that the trial court
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Senior Judge William Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
erroneously granted the motion for summary judgment. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse the order of March 19, 2009, and remand for further
proceedings.
The facts that give rise to this appeal are not in dispute. On January
24, 2006, Baldwin was driving his truck on the interstate in Grant County.
Baldwin alleges that an unknown driver in a flatbed truck was traveling
immediately in front of him when a large tarp flew from the flatbed truck onto
Baldwin’s vehicle. Baldwin continued traveling to the next truck stop in order to
remove the tarp from his vehicle. As he was dismounting from his truck, Baldwin
alleges that he slipped and fell, thereby injuring his back. Baldwin then sought
uninsured motorist insurance coverage (UM) through State Farm, alleging his
injuries were the result of a hit-and-run from an unknown driver. State Farm
denied coverage and Baldwin initiated suit.
State Farm moved the court for summary judgment arguing that the
tarp coming from an unknown vehicle onto Baldwin’s vehicle was not a “strike,”
i.e., physical contact, as required by State Farm’s policy of UM coverage.2 The
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in its order of March 19,
2009. In granting summary judgment, the court relied upon Masler v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 894 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Ky. 1995), in which the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the “striking” requirement “means actual, direct, physical
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State Farm’s policy defined uninsured motor vehicle as a “hit and run” land motor vehicle
whose owner or driver remains unknown and which strikes: a. the insured, or b. the vehicle the
insured is occupying and causes bodily injury to the insured.
(Internal emphasis omitted).
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contact between the hit-and-run vehicle, itself, and the insured's vehicle.” The trial
court further noted that while Masler involved a rock thrown up by an unknown
vehicle and the facts sub judice involve a tarp that came directly from an
unidentified vehicle, the reasoning in Masler dictated the grant of summary
judgment. It is from this order that Baldwin appeals.
On appeal, Baldwin presents one argument: that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment as the contact between Baldwin and the
unidentified vehicle was sufficient physical contact (i.e., satisfied the striking
requirement) to provide UM coverage. State Farm argues that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment as the facts in the case sub judice do not meet
either requirement of UM coverage under the policy, namely, that there must be
direct vehicle-to-vehicle impact and that this impact causes bodily injury to the
insured.
At the outset, we note the applicable standard of review on appeal of a
grant of summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781
(Ky.App. 1996). Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. The trial court must view the
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record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Thus, summary judgment is proper only “where the movant shows
that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances.” Id. However, “a
party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that
motion without presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.” Hubble v. Johnson, 841
S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992), citing Steelvest, supra. See also O'Bryan v. Cave,
202 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Ky. 2006); Hallahan v. The Courier Journal, 138 S.W.3d
699, 705 (Ky.App. 2004). Since summary judgment involves only legal questions
and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need
not defer to the trial court's decision and will review the issue de novo. Lewis v. B
& R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001).
In a determining whether uninsured motorist coverage exists, the
courts turn to the contract provision between the parties and to our Kentucky
statutes. KRS 304.20-020 recognizes “that individual insurers may, by contractual
definitions, provide coverages and terms and conditions in addition to those
required by the statute.” Burton v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 116 S.W.3d 475, 478
(Ky. 2003). As the determination of UM coverage involves only the construction
of Kentucky statutes and a written insurance contract, our review is de novo and
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we have no obligation of deference to the lower courts. Dowell v. Safe Auto Ins.
Co., 208 S.W.3d 872 (Ky. 2006).
As noted by State Farm, Kentucky courts have consistently held that
contact in the hit-and-run context means direct physical contact in order to prevent
fraud. As held in Masler, supra:
The accepted and recognized rationale for the “striking”
requirement of a policy when the identity of a hit and run
motorist is unknown is to foreclose fraudulent and
collusive claims. Jett v. Doe, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 221
(1977), recognizes the purpose of the standard form
provision which is contained in State Farm's policy of
insurance. The requirement means actual, direct,
physical contact between the hit and run vehicle, itself,
and the insured's vehicle. See State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, Ky., 553 S.W.2d
691 (1977). This Court has chosen not to expand the
actual, direct, physical contact requirement to indirect
physical contact.
Masler at 635.
Indeed, uninsured motorist insurance is “neither an all-risk insurance
designed to provide coverage for all injuries incurred, nor is it a no-fault motor
vehicle insurance that provides coverage without regard to whether a plaintiff is
legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured or unidentified motorist.”
Id.
However, subsequent to Masler, the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 169 S.W.3d 855 (Ky. 2005), held that an indirect
“hit” which was the result of a casual chain of connection was sufficient to provide
UM coverage. In so holding the Court stated:
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The issue now before us is whether the “hit” requirement
in Shelter's definition of a “hit-and-run motor vehicle” is
satisfied when a hit-and-run motorist hits an intermediate
vehicle causing it to hit the insured vehicle. We hold that
it is. The fact situation here is conceptually the same as
if the hit-and-run motorist had first struck a stationary
object, such as a road sign, driving the sign forward into
Arnold's vehicle, and causing the sign to interpose itself
between her vehicle and that of the tortfeasor, preventing
the sort of intimate and literal “physical contact” urged
by Shelter. Such a scenario has been held to constitute
“physical contact.” Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mastin,
4 Ohio App.3d 86, 446 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1982). In both
that scenario and the situation that occurred in this case,
there might have been no technical physical contact
between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle,
but the hit-and-run vehicle initiated the force that
ultimately struck the insured vehicle. We hold that an
indirect “hit” resulting from a chain-reaction accident
initiated by a “hit-and-run” motorist satisfies the “hit”
requirement of Shelter's definition of a “hit-and-run
motor vehicle.”
Arnold at 857.
State Farm argues that Arnold is not applicable as it involved vehicleto-vehicle impact under limited circumstances3 and that Masler with its
requirement of direct physical contact is controlling. Baldwin relies upon Arnold,
supra, to make the argument that if part of a vehicle or something it was
transporting comes off the vehicle and strikes the insured’s car, then UM coverage
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State Farm also makes the argument that assuming, arguendo, that the tarp did “impact” the
front of Baldwin’s vehicle, his claim must still fail based upon a lack of causation. State Farm
argues that the tarp coming into contact with Baldwin’s vehicle was not the direct proximate
cause of any of his claimed injuries. We decline to address this argument as we are unclear if
this argument was presented to the trial court. See Jewell v. City of Bardstown, 260 S.W.3d 348,
350-351 (Ky.App. 2008)(“the circuit court did not address any of these issues in reaching its
decision. We only review decisions of the lower courts for prejudicial error, consequently,
without a ruling of the lower court on the record regarding a matter, appellate review of that
matter is virtually impossible.”).
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should apply, as this would satisfy the physical contact requirement given the
causal connection. Baldwin distinguishes Masler because that case involved an
object of unknown origin propelled by an unknown driver; whereas, in the case
sub judice, an object transported by an unidentified vehicle struck Baldwin’s
vehicle. Baldwin further argues that the clear implication of the UM policy (i.e.,
the construction of the contract) provides for coverage if any part of an unknown
vehicle comes into contact with any part of the insured’s vehicle. After a review of
the parties’ arguments, the policy in question contained within the record, and the
applicable jurisprudence, we agree with Baldwin that any part of the vehicle,
including an object coming off a vehicle, which then impacts the insured’s vehicle,
satisfies the “strike” requirement of the UM policy.
Unlike the situation presented in Masler, where an object of unknown
origin was propelled by the unidentified vehicle, the facts sub judice involve an
object that was attached (albeit insufficiently) to a vehicle that subsequently
became dislodged from the unidentified vehicle and impacted Baldwin’s vehicle.
It defies logic to think that a vehicle could literally disintegrate into pieces while
traveling our highways and neither the owner nor operator thereof would bear
liability, but if all the pieces remained together as a whole then liability would
attach. We believe that the impact set forth by the facts sub judice was sufficient
to satisfy the physical contact required by the “strike” provision in the UM policy.
Thus, the trial court erred in its grant of summary judgment.
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter back to the trial court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Charles E. Bullard
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Robert B. Cetrulo
Edgewood, Kentucky
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