FREEMAN (TONIA T.) VS. BECKER LAW OFFICE, PLC, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000676-MR
TONIA T. FREEMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE IRV MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-010400
BECKER LAW OFFICE, PLC;
KEVIN RENFRO; BUBALO,
HIESTAND & ROTMAN, PLC,
N/K/A BUBALO & HIESTAND, PLC;
AND DIANNE E. SONNE, A/K/A
DIANNE E. BLUHM
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Tonia T. Freeman brings this appeal from a December 10,
2008, summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Becker Law Office,
PLC, Kevin Renfro, Bubalo, Hiestand & Rotman, PLC, n/k/a Bubalo & Hiestand,
PLC, and Dianne E. Sonne, a/k/a Dianne E. Bluhm, (collectively referred to as
appellees). We reverse and remand.
The circuit court succinctly set forth the underlying facts of this case
as follows:
Plaintiff Tonia T. Freeman was the local
Chairperson for the charitable organization Marine Toys
for Tots. Freeman had volunteered with Toys for Tots
for nine years prior to her injury. As Chairperson,
Plaintiff was responsible for examining shipments,
collecting and the distribution of toys to other counties.
The toys were stored in a building located at Fort Knox
for purposes of receipt, storage and distribution of toys.
The location of the storage granted by Fort Knox
changed from year to year. (Footnote omitted.)
On or about October 15, 2004[,] Plaintiff Freeman
was notified of a shipment of toys and she went to the
building to carry out her responsibility of examining the
new shipment of toys. After completing her job,
Freeman injured her left foot as she exited the building
using the wooden stairs leading up to the door located
outside of the building. Freeman had difficulty stepping
down from the second step as she could not move her
foot and asked the military volunteer for his assistance.
Freeman had stepped on a wooden spike from the stairs
but was unable to feel the spike in her foot because of the
nercrotic [sic] place on the bottom of her foot due to her
diabetic condition. Afterwards, Freeman then drove to
the beauty salon.
While sitting in the beauty salon, Freeman crossed
her legs, at which time her daughter said, “Mom, you
have a rock in your shoe.” After closer inspect, Freeman
realized that the wooden spike had penetrated her left
foot. Freeman took off her left shoe and saw the spike
protruding from the bottom of her left foot. The military
volunteer was called and a Military Medic came to
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Freeman’s assistance. The Medic removed the
splinter/spike, administered a tetanus shot, and advised
Freeman to see her physician.
According to [Freeman], she called her physician
and was given the first available appointment for October
21, 2004. Freeman’s physician cleaned out her injury
and removed the remaining slivers of wood from her
foot. Freeman developed an infection in her injured foot
the weekend following her doctor’s visit. She returned to
her physician that following Monday, October 25,
2004[,] and was sent to Suburban Hospital where she was
immediately sent to surgery for partial amputation of her
left foot. Due to the infection, several amputation
procedures have been made to Freeman’s foot since the
initial procedure resulting in the amputation of Freeman’s
[leg] above the knee.
While recuperating in the hospital, Freeman
contacted the Becker Law Offices about her injury, after
viewing a Becker Law Office advertisement on
television. Freeman signed a contract with Becker Law
Office on December 17, 2004[,] and received
correspondence that Kevin Renfro was her attorney.
Communications were exchanged between the parties up
until the time of the filing of this suit. Plaintiff
[Freeman] had her contacts with a paralegal that was
assisting the Becker Law Offices.
In January 2005 an attorney for the United States
Government advis[ed] Becker that the Federal Torts
Claim Act may not be applicable to their client’s claim
because Toys for Tots is a private non-profit charitable
organization. [Freeman] alleges that despite the
information received from the attorney for the U.S.
Government, Becker Law Offices continued to pursue
her claim under the FTCA. Becker Law Offices
transferred Freeman’s case to Bubalo, Hiestand &
Rotman, PLC (BH&R) which [Freeman] alleges was
made without notice or her consent. Freeman’s claim,
filed by BH&R, was denied by Toys for Tots’ insurance
company.
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On August 31, 2005, a claims attorney for the Military submitted a
detailed response to Becker explaining why Freeman’s claim was not covered
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Becker subsequently pursued the claim against
Toys for Tots’ insurance carrier. On November 28, 2006, a representative of the
insurance carrier denied the claim. The insurance company denied Freeman’s
personal injury claim based upon expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.140. On May 18, 2007, Freeman received a
letter from BH&R stating they were no longer interested in representing her on this
claim.
After consulting with new counsel, Freeman discovered that appellees
permitted the one-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.140 to expire and that her
claim against Toys for Tots was time-barred. Consequently, on October 18, 2007,
Freeman then filed a complaint against appellees alleging legal malpractice,
violation of the Consumer Protection Act, and breach of fiduciary duty. Appellees
answered and later filed a motion for summary judgment. By summary judgment
entered December 10, 2008, the circuit court dismissed all claims set forth in the
complaint against appellees. This appeal follows.
Freeman contends the circuit court erred by rendering summary
judgment dismissing her legal malpractice claim against appellees. For the reasons
hereinafter elucidated, we agree.
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no material issue of
fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky Rules of
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Civil Procedure (CR) 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all
facts are to be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Our
review shall proceed accordingly.
In a legal malpractice claim, plaintiff must prove the following
elements: (1) an employment relationship with the attorney, (2) the attorney
“neglected his duty to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably competent
attorney acting in the same or similar circumstances,” and (3) such breach was the
“proximate cause of damage to the client.” Stephens v. Denison, 64 S.W.3d 297,
298-299 (Ky. App. 2001).
In the case at hand, Freeman demonstrated that an employment
relationship existed with appellees. Furthermore, Freeman produced facts
establishing that appellees failed to file her personal injury claim against Toys for
Tots within the one-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.140. An attorney’s
failure to timely file an action before expiration of the statute of limitations
certainly can constitute a breach of an attorney’s duty to exercise ordinary care. As
such, Freeman offered facts to establish the first two elements of a legal
malpractice claim. However, the third element – the attorney’s breach of duty
constituted the proximate cause of damages to the client – presents a more
troublesome issue.
To prove an attorney’s negligence actually caused damage, plaintiff
must present facts demonstrating that “he/she would have fared better in the
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underlying claim; that is, but for the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would have
been more likely successful.” Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Ky. 2003).
Thus, to meet the third element of her legal malpractice claim, Freeman must
present facts proving that “but for” appellees’ legal negligence, Freeman would
have probably been successful in her underlying personal injury claim against Toys
for Tots. Marrs, 95 S.W.3d at 860.
As to the third element, the circuit court concluded that Freeman’s
underlying personal injury claim lacked merit, thus, that Freeman suffered no
damage caused by appellees’ alleged legal malpractice. Particularly, the circuit
court reasoned:
A licensee is a person entering the land with
permission but not for the purpose for which the property
is maintained. The landowner has the duty to warn a
licensee of known dangers on the land. Scuddy Coal
Company Inc., v. Couch, 274 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. App. [sic]
1954). Conversely, an invitee enters the land with
permission and for the purpose for which the land is
maintained. The landowner has the duty to make
reasonable inspections for dangerous conditions on the
land and warn the invitee of all dangers known or could
have been discovered by reasonable inspection. Id. The
Court has further distinguished between licensee and
invitee in that "an invitation is inferred where there is a
common or mutual advantage, while a license is inferred
where the object is the mere pleasure or benefit of the
person using it." Moody v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 39
S.W.2d 988, 989 (Ky. 1931); citing Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Snow's Adm'r, 30 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. App. 1930).
As a volunteer for Toys for Tots, Plaintiff Freeman
was responsible for examining shipments, collecting and
the distribution of toys to other counties for Toys for Tots
and not for Fort Knox. The toys were stored in a
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building located at Fort Knox for purposes of receipt,
storage and distribution of toys for Toys for Tots. The
location of the storage granted by Fort Knox changed
from year to year. [Freeman] was notified by Fort Knox
personnel when shipments arrived to the warehouse
ready for her inspection.
Defendants allege that [Freeman] was a licensee
and not an invitee as [Freeman] argues. Based on the
evidence on the record, the Court cannot find, as a matter
of law, that [Freeman] falls within the definition of an
invitee. A licensee enters the premises at his own risk
and must take the premises as he find[s] them, thus, has
no cause of action from dangers existing on the land
which was entered with permission. Bales v. Louisville
& N.R. Co., 200 S. W. 471 (Ky. 1918). The owner is
only liable for injuries resulting from acts of negligence
and to [sic] for injuries resulting from defects on the land
since licensee takes the premises as he finds them.
Louisville & N.R. Co., v. Page, 263 S.W. 20 (Ky. 1924).
This Court, as a matter of law, finds that [Freeman] was a
licensee at the time of her injury and thus was due only
the duty to warn of known dangers of the land.
The Court is persuaded that no genuine issues of
material fact exist in this matter precluding Summary
Judgment at this time. Since [Freeman] cannot prevail
on the underlying claim in any event, the Defendants are
entitled to Summary Judgment and the Complaint filed
against them should be dismissed.
Freeman argues the circuit court erroneously concluded that she was a
licensee and not an invitee of Toys for Tots at the time of her injury. Alternatively,
Freeman also contends that whether she was an invitee or licensee presented an
issue of fact to be decided by the jury.
To begin, the issue of whether an individual is classified as an invitee
or licensee generally presents a question of fact for the jury where underlying
material facts are in dispute. Shoffner v. Dilkerton, 292 Ky. 407, 166 S.W.2d 870
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(1942); see also 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 87 (1990). To survive
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon Freeman to present sufficient facts that
when viewed in a light most favorable to her created a material issue of fact
precluding entry of summary judgment. Succinctly stated, Freeman must have
presented sufficient facts demonstrating that she was an invitee of Toys for Tots at
the time of her injury.
When viewing the facts most favorable to Freeman, it appears that
Toys for Tots obtained a lease to use Building 48 for the storage of toys.1 Freeman
was a volunteer for Toys for Tots. She went to Building 48 to inspect and process
the toys stored there. Building 48 was dilapidated and in a state of disrepair. Upon
exiting the building, Freeman was required to negotiate an exterior staircase. The
staircase was also in need of repair. Some steps were missing and others were
simply in a deteriorated condition. While descending the stairs, a wooden stake
emanating from the steps pierced through Freeman’s shoe and lodged into
Freeman’s foot. As a consequence, Freeman eventually suffered an amputation of
her leg above the knee.
In this Commonwealth, the law is well-settled that an invitee is an
individual who:
(1) . . . enters by invitation, express or implied, (2)
[the] entry is connected with the owner's business or with
an activity the owner [or possessor] conducts or permits
to be conducted on his land and (3) there is mutuality of
benefit or benefit to the owner” [or possessor]. Johnson
v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Kentucky, Inc., 997
1
In her deposition, Tonia T. Freeman stated Toys for Tots held a lease upon Building 48.
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S.W.2d 490, 491-492 (Ky. App. 1999) (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary, 827 (6th ed. 1990)). . . .
West v. KKI, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 184, 190-191 (Ky. App. 2008). Also, where the
premises is subject to a lease, the general rule is that the lessee is liable to an
invitee or licensee for injury caused by a defect in the premises:
At common law, subject to certain exceptions, the
occupier or tenant, and not the landlord, is liable for
injuries to a third person on or off the premises caused by
the condition or use of the demised premises. It is the
well-settled general rule that the duties and liabilities of a
landlord to persons on the leased premises by the consent
of the tenant are the same as those owed to the tenant
himself. For this purpose they stand in his shoes. This
rule applies to the tenant's wife or child. Where the
tenant has no redress against the landlord, those on the
premises in the tenant's right are likewise barred.
Visitors, customers, servants, employees and licensees in
general of the tenant are on the premises as guests, etc.,
of the tenant, and not of the landlord. Whatever rights
such invitation or license from the lessee may confer, as
against such lessee, as against the lessor it can give no
greater rights than the lessee himself has. Accordingly, it
is a general rule that the landlord is not liable to persons
on the premises in the right of the tenant for injuries from
defects in the condition of the demised premises. This
rule applies to the tenant's wife or child or to other
members of his family. It also applies to the tenant's
employees, even though the property is leased for a
business purpose such as a mill or factory, or for a
business purpose such as a store, a lease of which
contemplates an invitation to the public to enter for the
transaction of business.
The rule that the landlord is not liable to persons in
the right of the tenant for injuries from defects in the
condition of the demised premises applies also to
structural defects.
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Clary v. Hayes, 300 Ky. 853, 190 S.W.2d 657, 659-660 (1945); see also 13 David
J. Leibson, Kentucky Practice – Tort Law § 10.76 (2009).
In our case, Freeman testified that Building 48 was leased to Toys for
Tots. Additionally, Freeman presented facts demonstrating that: (1) Toys for Tots
expressly invited her to enter Building 48, (2) her entry into Building 48 was
directly related to Toys for Tots’ charitable activity, and (3) Toys for Tots was
benefited by her entry into Building 48. Thus, Freemen provided sufficient facts
that her status on the premises at the time of injury could be determined as that of
an invitee whereupon Toys for Tots would have been liable for her injury as lessee
of Building 48. See West, 300 S.W.3d 184; and Clary, 190 S.W.2d 657.
It matters not that Freeman was an unpaid volunteer at the time of her
entry into Building 48 and subsequent injury. We are convinced that an unpaid
volunteer may be either an invitee or a licensee depending upon the particular facts
of each case. Cozine v. Shuff, 378 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1964) (citing Cain v. Friend,
171 Cal. App. 2d 806; 341 P. 2d 753 (1959)).
Upon the foregoing, we are of the opinion that material issues of fact
exist upon whether Freeman was an invitee or a licensee at the time of her injury.
As such, there also exist material issues of fact upon whether appellees alleged
legal malpractice caused damage, thus precluding entry of summary judgment
dismissing such claim. Particularly, Freeman has raised issues of fact upon
whether “but for” appellees’ negligence she probably would have been successful
in her personal injury claim against Toys for Tots. Marrs, 95 S.W.3d at 860.
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In sum, we hold that the circuit court erroneously rendered summary
judgment dismissing Freeman’s legal malpractice claim against appellees.2
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Donald M. Heavrin
Chris C. Hodge
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Allan Cobb
Gary M. Weiss
Louisville, Kentucky
2
We note that the summary judgment dismissed all claims against appellees. However, Freeman
only challenges the dismissal of the legal malpractice claim in this appeal.
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