CARPENTER (JOSEPH) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000590-MR
JOSEPH CARPENTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRANK ALLEN FLETCHER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00067-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000608-MR
VALERIE CARPENTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRANK ALLEN FLETCHER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00067-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Joseph and Valerie Carpenter appeal from
their convictions and sentences in the Powell Circuit Court for crimes relating to
the manufacturing of methamphetamine (meth) and child endangerment. Their
convictions and sentences resulted from conditional guilty pleas that they entered
following the denial of their motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
The Carpenters are married and have two children, Randi and Joseph.
Randi was an 18-year-old female at the time, and Joseph was a 14-year-old male.
The Carpenter family lived in a double-wide trailer on Daniels Branch in Powell
County.
The testimony at the suppression hearing before the trial court
indicated that sometime around midnight on March 3, 2008, the Kentucky State
Police (KSP) Post received a telephone call from a young female reporting that her
parents were making meth at the residence and that she was scared for her little
brother. Trooper Jay Perkins of the KSP was dispatched to investigate, and he was
accompanied by Powell County Deputy Sheriff Melvin Rogers who drove a
separate vehicle.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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When the officers arrived at the trailer, the lights were out. The
officers approached the trailer, walked onto the small wooden porch at the front,
and knocked on the front door. Joseph Carpenter came to the door, and Trooper
Perkins advised him that the officers were there on a welfare check of the children
pursuant to a call to the KSP Post. When Joseph inquired as to who made the call,
Trooper Perkins refused to disclose that the call apparently had come from Randi.
Trooper Perkins asked Joseph, “Would you mind if I checked on your
children?” Joseph gave his consent, and the trooper entered the residence. Joseph
testified that he was directed by the trooper to stay on the front porch with the
deputy; but the trooper testified that he did not require Joseph to stay outside and
that he was free to enter the home. Trooper Perkins further testified that upon
entering the residence, he smelled an odor that seemed to be cat urine. He further
testified that he had learned in his training that such a smell is consistent with the
manufacturing of meth.
Trooper Perkins testified that the first room he entered was a bedroom
on the left where the door was open and there was a light on. Upon entering the
bedroom, the trooper observed a woman, later identified as Valerie, lying in bed
with the covers pulled over her. When the trooper identified himself, the woman
did not respond.
Trooper Perkins testified that he observed two closed doors in the
bedroom and proceeded to open one which was a closet. He then opened the other
door within the bedroom and found a bathroom with various items used in the
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manufacture of meth therein. Being somewhat overcome by fumes coming from
the bathroom, he withdrew and directed Valerie to get dressed and go outside.
Upon exiting the bedroom, Trooper Perkins observed the children, who had been
in bedrooms on the other side of the trailer.
After determining that the children were safe, the officers arrested
Joseph and Valerie for manufacturing meth. The Carpenters were indicted by a
grand jury and entered conditional guilty pleas to various charges following a
suppression hearing and an adverse ruling by the trial court. In its order denying
the Carpenters’ suppression motion, the trial court stated that the warrantless
search was valid due to consent to the search given by Joseph and due to the
presence of exigent circumstances.
Joseph was sentenced to ten years in prison for manufacturing meth
and child endangerment. Valerie was sentenced to eight years in prison for
facilitation to manufacturing meth and child endangerment. Their appeals
followed.2
Appellate review of a motion to suppress “is a two-step process that
first reviews the factual findings of the trial court under a clearly erroneous
standard. The second step reviews de novo the applicability of the law to the facts
found.” Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004) (citations
omitted).
2
The two appeals have been combined for our ruling in this opinion.
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“It is fundamental that all searches without a warrant are unreasonable
unless it can be shown that they come within one of the exceptions to the rule that
a search must be made pursuant to a valid warrant.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 826
S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992). “Consent is one of the exceptions to the requirement
for a warrant.” Id. “All that [is] required to establish consent [is] that the consent
was voluntarily given in view of all the circumstances.” Id.
The Carpenters argue that Joseph’s consent to enter the residence was
not voluntary “but rather was the result of implied force that was evident in
Trooper Perkins’ words and actions.” The Carpenters point to the various ways
that the trooper described his words during his suppression hearing testimony. The
Carpenters state that the trooper testified that his words to Joseph included:
“Would you mind if I checked on your children?” or “You don’t care if I go inside
and check on your children?” or “I’m here to check on your children” or “I just
need to check on your children” or “Can I check on your children?”
Regardless of the exact words used by Trooper Perkins when he asked
Joseph if he minded for the trooper to enter to check on the children, Joseph told
him that he did not mind. “Whether consent is the result of express or implied
coercion is a question of fact, and thus, we must defer to the trial court’s finding if
it is supported by substantial evidence.” Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d
922, 924 (Ky. 2006) (citation omitted). We conclude that there was substantial
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evidence for the trial court to find that there was a voluntary consent, not one
resulting from express or implied coercion.3
The Carpenters further argue that Trooper Perkins exceeded the limits
of the search that he had been authorized to make. “Even when a search is
authorized by consent, the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its
authorization.” Farmer v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Ky. App. 2005).
“‘The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of “objective reasonableness” – what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect?’” Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801,
1804, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991)).
The Carpenters assert that Joseph gave the trooper consent only to
check on the children and that the trooper exceeded that authority by opening
closed doors in a bedroom that the officer knew was not the bedroom of either
child. In addressing this argument, the trial court held as follows:
It certainly seemed reasonable for Trooper Perkins to
examine the doors leading from the master bedroom in
the search of the home, which resulted in finding
chemicals consistent with meth manufacturing in “plain
view.” Trooper Perkins did not know the layout of the
mobile home when entering. It is doubtful that a police
officer will know what lies behind a door without
3
The Carpenters state that the trial court found only that Joseph had given consent but that it
made no finding as to whether such consent was voluntary. While it is true that the court made
no specific finding in this regard, we note that the court discussed the necessity that consents to
search must be freely and voluntarily given and that they may not be obtained through coercion.
Furthermore, the Carpenters did not move the trial court for additional findings in this regard.
See Farmer, infra.
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opening same. The door could lead to a bathroom or
adjoining bedroom. However, unless there is a window
in the door, the door must be opened to ascertain the type
of room. Mere conjecture or speculation as to what lies
behind said door will not suffice, when the safety of
minor children is in question. In searching for occupants
of said mobile home, if the officer was opening drawers,
examining purses or searching clothing pockets, these
actions would be impermissible and would exceed said
scope.
We believe this reasoning is sound, and we decline to hold that the trial court erred
in concluding that the trooper did not exceed the scope of his authorized search.
The Carpenters also contend that Joseph was physically prevented
from limiting or revoking his consent because he was not permitted to accompany
Trooper Perkins into the trailer during the search. We do not see where this issue
was raised before the trial court. At any rate, the trial court did not address it in its
order, and the Carpenters are deemed to have waived it. Farmer, 169 S.W.3d at
53.
The final argument raised by the Carpenters in connection with the
consent issue is Valerie’s argument that any consent given by Joseph was not valid
as to her. This issue was not raised before the trial court, but Valerie urges us to
address it as palpable. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1973),
however, one spouse’s voluntary consent to a search of a home makes the fruits of
the search admissible as to the other spouse except where the objecting spouse did
not have access to the particular room or container. Here, as the evidence was
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discovered in the bathroom adjoining the master bedroom where Valerie slept, the
evidence was admissible against her as well.
The Carpenters’ other argument is that the trial court erred in also
ruling that the warrantless search was valid based on exigent circumstances.
“Another exception to the warrant requirement arises when, considering the totality
of the circumstances, an officer reasonably believes that an immediate search or
seizure is necessary in order to avoid a ‘risk of danger to police or others.’” Pate
v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Ky. 2007). Further, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57
L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), as follows:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to
emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases
have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar
police officers from making warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid. [Footnotes omitted.]
See also Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 851-52 (Ky. 2002) (where
warrantless entry was justified when officer had reasonable belief that victim might
be in need of emergency assistance).
The trial court herein stated as follows:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, it would
seem reasonable that the Officer should immediately
enter the home because of the safety of the children, one
being a minor child. This was not a case wherein a third
party or anonymous caller had called on a neighbor, or
even a neighbor or third party witnessing suspicious
behavior at the mobile home. The call was by the
children inside the home, apparently whom [sic] feared
-8-
for their safety. The chemicals used to cook Meth and
the toxic components and by-products resulting from it’s
[sic] manufacture produce toxic fumes, vapors and spills;
and a child living in a Meth lab may inhale or swallow
toxic substances or inhale the second hand smoke of
adults whom [sic] are using Meth. Likewise, parents
under the influence of Meth are not in a competent
mental or physical state to oversee minor children.
Because of the young age of the children in the home, the
Officer had no viable alternative except to enter the home
under emergency circumstances.
We again conclude that the reasoning of the trial court was sound, and we agree
that there were exigent circumstances that allowed the officers to enter the
residence without a warrant to check on the safety of the children.
The judgments and order of the Powell Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT,
JOSEPH CARPENTER:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kathleen K. Schmidt
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT,
VALERIE CARPENTER:
Shelly R. Fears
Department of Pubic Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
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