COX (TOM) VS. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000566-MR
TOM COX
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN KNOX MILLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01274
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Tom Cox appeals from a judgment on the
pleadings entered in favor of Progressive Northern Insurance Company on his
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
claim that he was entitled to Pedestrian Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits
under an insurance policy. Cox argues that: (1) the trial court erred by not
accepting his factual allegations as true; (2) he is entitled to Pedestrian PIP benefits
under his insurance policy; and (3) Progressive is required to pay interest and
attorney’s fees pursuant to KRS 304.39-210(2) and KRS 304.39-220. After
reviewing the record and briefs, we affirm.
On June 25, 2008, Progressive issued a Kentucky motorcycle
insurance policy to Cox. As part of his application, Cox completed a Kentucky nofault rejection form, which expressly rejected basic PIP coverage. On September
23, 2008, Cox was operating a motorcycle and was injured in an accident.
Subsequently, Cox demanded that Progressive pay him Pedestrian PIP benefits,
which Progressive denied.
Cox filed a complaint against Progressive in the Laurel Circuit Court
alleging that he was entitled to Pedestrian PIP benefits under the insurance policy.
The trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Progressive on
March 24, 2009, concluding that Cox was not entitled to Pedestrian PIP benefits
under the policy. This appeal followed.
Cox first argues that the trial court erred by not accepting all his
factual allegations as true.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.03 states:
-2-
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on such motion, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided for in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky explained CR 12.03 as follows:
The purpose of the rule is to expedite the termination of a
controversy where the ultimate and controlling facts are
not in dispute. It is designed to provide a method of
disposing of cases where the allegations of the pleadings
are admitted and only a question of law is to be decided.
The procedure is not intended to delay the trial in any
respect, but is to be determined before the trial begins.
The basis of the motion is to test the legal sufficiency of
a claim or defense in view of all the adverse pleadings.
When a party moves for a judgment on the pleadings, he
admits for the purposes of his motion not only the truth
of all his adversary’s well-pleaded allegations of fact and
fair inferences therefrom, but also the untruth of all his
own allegations which have been denied by his
adversary. The judgment should be granted if it appears
beyond doubt that the nonmoving party cannot prove any
set of facts that would entitle him/her to relief.
City of Pioneer Village v. Bullitt County ex rel. Bullitt Fiscal Court, 104 S.W.3d
757, 759 (Ky. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Cox asserts that the trial court erred by failing to accept his factual
allegations as true because it found that he was not entitled to Pedestrian PIP
benefits when he alleged in his complaint that Progressive agreed to provide him
Pedestrian PIP benefits under the policy. We disagree. The entitlement to
reparation benefits under the policy is a legal conclusion drawn from the
-3-
interpretation of a contract, which is purely a matter of law to be decided by the
court. See Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 810 (Ky.
App. 2000).
Next, Cox argues that he is entitled to Pedestrian PIP benefits under
the express language of the policy. The provision at issue states as follows:
If you pay the premium for Basic Personal Injury
Protection, Passenger Personal Injury Protection,
Additional Personal Injury Protection, or Pedestrian
Personal Injury Protection, we will pay for reasonable
and necessary covered expenses incurred because of
bodily injury sustained by an insured person in an
accident arising out the operation, maintenance, or use
of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
If the covered motorcycle is a two or three wheeled
motorcycle designed for operation principally upon
public roads, Pedestrian Personal Injury Protection will
be shown upon the declarations page and will apply
even if you or a relative rejected the limitation upon tort
rights under the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations
Act and did not purchase Basic Personal Injury
Protection, Additional Personal Injury Protection, or
Passenger Personal Injury Protection.
(Emphasis in original).
In the absence of ambiguity, the terms of an insurance policy are to be
enforced as written. Goodman v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 100 S.W.3d 769, 772
(Ky. App. 2003).
We conclude that the policy is unambiguous. The absence of a
definition for Pedestrian Personal Injury Protection does not create an ambiguity
because “terms should be interpreted in light of the usage and understanding of the
-4-
average person.” Stone, 34 S.W.3d at 811. Further, “we must give also give the
policy a reasonable interpretation, and there is no requirement that every doubt be
resolved against the insurer.” Id.
Cox expressly rejected basic PIP benefits by completing the no-fault
rejection form as part of his application for the policy. It is also undisputed that
Cox did not pay any premiums for basic PIP benefits. Cox did purchase Pedestrian
PIP and asserts that this entitles him to reparation benefits. We disagree. The
policy plainly states that Pedestrian PIP will apply even if the insured rejected
basic PIP. “Pedestrian” is defined in KRS 304-39.050(1) as “any person who is
not making ‘use of a motor vehicle’ at the time his injury occurs.” There is no
allegation that Cox struck a pedestrian or was himself a pedestrian at the time of
the accident. It is patently unreasonable to interpret the policy so that the purchase
of Pedestrian Personal Injury Protection entitles Cox to reparation benefits when he
expressly rejected basic PIP and the accident did not involve a pedestrian. As there
were no disputed issues of fact and the only issue was the interpretation of the
policy provision, the trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Progressive.
Finally, Cox argues that he is entitled to interest and attorney’s fees
pursuant to KRS 304.39-210(2) and KRS 304.39-220.
KRS 304.39-210(2) states that “[o]verdue payments bear interest at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, except that if delay was without
-5-
reasonable foundation the rate of interest shall be eighteen percent (18%) per
annum.” KRS 304.39-220(1) states:
If overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the
reparation obligor or paid by the reparation obligor after
receipt of notice of the attorney’s representation, a
reasonable attorney’s fee for advising and representing a
claimant on a claim or in an action for basic or added
reparation benefits may be awarded by the court if the
denial or delay was without reasonable foundation. No
part of the fee for representing the claimant in connection
with these benefits is a charge against benefits otherwise
due the claimant.
Cox was not entitled to basis PIP benefits or Pedestrian PIP benefits under the
policy. Therefore, he is not entitled to interest and attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Todd K. Childers
Corbin, Kentucky
Robert L. Steinmetz
Louisville, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.