DUDGEON (MICHAEL F.) JR. VS. DUDGEON (LAURIE KIDD)
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000522-ME
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001013-ME
MICHAEL F. DUDGEON, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE O. REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01333
LAURIE KIDD DUDGEON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON, JUDGE; WHITE,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Michael F. Dudgeon, Jr., brings Appeal No. 2009CA-000522-ME from a January 7, 2009, Order made final by Order entered March
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Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2, 2009, and Appeal No. 2009-CA-001013-ME from a May 22, 2009, Order of the
Franklin Circuit Court, Family Court Division, (family court) denying motions to
modify child support. We vacate and remand Appeal Nos. 2009-CA-000522-ME
and 2009-CA-001013-ME.
The facts of this case invite our Court to address an increasingly
relevant and onerous dilemma – the proper standard for modification of child
support where each parent enjoys nearly equal physical time with the children,
each parent earns nearly equal income, and each parent pays nearly equal amounts
of other expenses related to the children. We hold that these three specific
circumstances are of an “extraordinary nature” rendering the child support
guidelines inapplicable under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.211(3)(g)
and, thereby, mandating application of the standard for modification of child
support found in KRS 403.213(1).
Michael and Laurie Kidd Dudgeon were married in June 1996. Two
children were born of the marriage. Subsequently, the parties’ marriage was
dissolved by a decree of dissolution entered in the family court on April 11, 2006.
The decree incorporated a settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed to share
joint custody of their children with neither party being designated “primary
custodian.” The parties agreed the children would spend “three weekday nights”
per week with Laurie, “two weekday nights” per week with Michael, and alternate
weekends between the parents. The parties further agreed that Michael would pay
Laurie child support of $950 per month.
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In 2005, the year the parties separated, Laurie earned approximately
$48,153, and Michael earned approximately $99,784.2 Based upon these figures,
Laurie’s income consisted of 32.5 percent of the parties’ combined income, while
Michael’s income consisted of 67.5 percent.
On September 2, 2008, Michael filed a motion seeking to modify
child support and to “codify” the parties’ actual time-sharing schedule with the
children. Therein, Michael asserted that Laurie’s income since the divorce had
substantially increased resulting in the current child support award being unfair and
unconscionable. Michael also specifically requested that the time-sharing
arrangement be “codified” by the court to reflect the actual time the children were
spending with each parent.
Following a hearing, the family court denied Michael’s motion to
modify his child support obligation. The court found that Laurie’s annual income
increased to $96,000 and that Michael’s annual income increased to $114,300.
However, the court denied the motion because it believed the increase in Laurie’s
annual income did not equate to a 15 percent change in the amount of child support
owed as required by KRS 403.213(2) to support a modification. As a result, the
family court specifically found that Michael failed to demonstrate a material
change in the circumstances that is both substantial and continuing per KRS
403.213(1). As to the timesharing arrangement, the court concluded that the actual
2
The income figures are based upon the 2005 joint tax returns of Michael F. Dudgeon, Jr., and
Laurie Kidd Dudgeon.
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time the children were spending with each parent only “changed slightly” from
2005. On March 2, 2009, Michael filed Appeal No. 2009-CA-000522-ME.
We observe from the record that Laurie’s annual income increased
some $47,847 from her income in 2005. Thus, in 2008, Laurie earned 45.6 percent
($96,000) of the parties’ combined annual income, and Michael earned 54.4
percent ($114,300). As to timesharing, Laurie enjoyed physical custody of the
children approximately 53.6 percent of the time in a two-week period, and Michael
enjoyed physical custody of the children about 46.4 percent of the time in a twoweek period. The difference in the amount of custodial time between the parties
was attributed to Laurie having the children one extra night in a two-week period.
Essentially, the parties’ custodial arrangement resulted in a nearly equal division of
physical time between Laurie and Michael, the actual difference constituting a
mere night every two weeks. The evidence also established that each party,
likewise, almost equally shared other expenses associated with the children.
In early May, 2009, Michael filed a Renewed Motion to Modify Child
Support on the premise that Laurie’s annual income had increased again to
$123,384. This represented an increase of $75,231 in her annual income from that
of 2005 and an increase of $27,384 from 2008. By order entered May 22, 2009,
the family court summarily denied the motion, and on May 27, 2009, Michael filed
Appeal No. 2009-CA-001013-ME. The appeals were subsequently consolidated
for review by this Court.
APPEAL NO. 2009-CA-000522-ME
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AND
APPEAL NO. 2009-CA-001013-ME
In both appeals, Michael challenges the family court’s denials of his
motions to modify child support. The material facts of this case are undisputed.
Resolution of these appeals centers upon a question of law and specifically the
proper interpretation of KRS 403.213(1) and (2), which set forth the criteria for
modification of child support orders.3 KRS 403.213 reads, in part:
(1) The Kentucky child support guidelines may be used
by the parent, custodian, or agency substantially
contributing to the support of the child as the basis for
periodic updates of child support obligations and for
modification of child support orders for health care.
The provisions of any decree respecting child support
may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification
and only upon a showing of a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and continuing.
(2) Application of the Kentucky child support guidelines
to the circumstances of the parties at the time of the
filing of a motion or petition for modification of the
child support order which results in equal to or greater
than a fifteen percent (15%) change in the amount of
support due per month shall be rebuttably presumed to
be a material change in circumstances. Application
which results in less than a fifteen percent (15%)
change in the amount of support due per month shall
be rebuttably presumed not to be a material change in
circumstances. For the one (1) year period
immediately following enactment of this statute, the
presumption of material change shall be a twenty-five
3
It is well-established that interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law for the
Court. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App.
2004); Kearney v. City of Simpsonville, 209 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. App. 2006). And, the application
of uncontroverted facts to the law is reviewed de novo by the Court of Appeals. Keeney v.
Keeney, 223 S.W.3d 843 (Ky. App. 2007).
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percent (25%) change in the amount of child support
due rather than the fifteen percent (15%) stated above.
KRS 403.213(1) and (2).
Under KRS 403.213(1), a child support order may be modified “upon
a showing of material change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing.”
And, KRS 403.213(2) sets forth two separate presumptions pertaining to
modification of child support. KRS 403.213(2) initially creates a rebuttable
presumption that a material change in circumstances exists if the amount of child
support owed per month would be altered at least 15 percent as calculated under
the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212. Conversely, subsection (2) of KRS
403.213 also creates a rebuttable presumption that no material change in
circumstances exists if the amount of child support owed per month would not be
altered at least 15 percent as calculated under the child support guidelines.
In relying upon KRS 403.213(1) and (2) to deny Michael’s motions to
modify child support, the family court concluded that Michael failed to
demonstrate a 15 percent change in child support owed per month and, thus, had
not demonstrated a material change in circumstances. In so concluding, we think
the family court erroneously applied the rebuttable presumption in KRS
403.213(2). Our reasoning is as follows.
The child support guidelines are codified in KRS 403.212. The
guidelines were originally developed “based on the theory that a child should
receive as child support the same proportion of parental income that he or she
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would have received had the parties lived together as an intact, two-parent family.”
16 Louise E. Graham and James E. Keller, Kentucky Practice – Domestic
Relations Law § 24:15 (3d ed. 2008). To calculate child support under the
guidelines of KRS 403.212, the combined monthly adjusted parental gross income
is located on the child support guideline table and then the corresponding base
monthly child support obligation is, likewise, identified. 4 This base monthly child
support obligation is then allocated to each parent in proportion to that parent’s
respective percentage of the aforementioned combined monthly adjusted parental
gross income. Thereafter, the amount owing by the noncustodial parent is the
proper monthly child support obligation. The guidelines generally assume that one
parent is the custodial parent and that the other parent is the noncustodial parent.
In our case, the child support guidelines of KRS 403.212 are
inapplicable for two independent reasons. First, Michael and Laurie’s combined
monthly adjusted parental gross income in 2008 and 2009 ($17,525 and $19,807,
respectively) exceeds the uppermost level of the child support guidelines
($15,000). We believe the guidelines are inapplicable by relying upon KRS
403.211(3).
4
For purposes of determining child support, the monthly adjusted parental gross income will
ordinarily be calculated by combining the “actual gross income of each parent.” See 16 Louise E.
Graham and James E. Keller, Kentucky Practice – Domestic Relations Law § 24.19 (3rd ed.
2008).
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KRS 403.211(3) provides that the child support guidelines in KRS
403.212 shall not be utilized where it would be unjust or inappropriate and sets
forth criteria for the court to consider:
(a) A child's extraordinary medical or dental needs;
(b) A child's extraordinary educational, job training, or
special needs;
(c) Either parent's own extraordinary needs, such as
medical expenses;
(d) The independent financial resources, if any, of the
child or children;
(e) Combined monthly adjusted parental gross income in
excess of the Kentucky child support guidelines;
(f) The parents of the child, having demonstrated
knowledge of the amount of child support established
by the Kentucky child support guidelines, have agreed
to child support different from the guideline amount.
However, no such agreement shall be the basis of any
deviation if public assistance is being paid on behalf
of a child under the provisions of Part D of Title IV of
the Federal Social Security Act; and
(g) Any similar factor of an extraordinary nature
specifically identified by the court which would make
application of the guidelines inappropriate.
KRS 403.211(3) (footnote omitted). Thus, under KRS 403.211(3)(e), application
of the child support guidelines is inappropriate because Michael and Laurie’s
combined monthly adjusted parental gross income exceeds the upper level of the
guidelines.
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, are the parties’ particular
familial circumstances – nearly equal physical time with the children, nearly equal
income, and nearly equal expenditures for child-related expenses. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that these three particular circumstances are of “an
extraordinary nature” rendering application of the guidelines inappropriate and
unjust under KRS 403.211(3)(g). See Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63 (Ky.
App. 1993).
The child support guidelines found in KRS 403.212 “do not
contemplate . . . a shared custody arrangement” between parents. Plattner v.
Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Ky. 2007). Rather, the child support guidelines
were designed so that child support would be paid by the noncustodial parent to the
custodial parent.5 It must be recognized that the guidelines were intended to apply
to a traditional post-dissolution familial model where one parent (usually the
mother) was the primary custodial parent and earned substantially less income than
the noncustodial parent (usually the father). By contrast, the modern complexities
of family life have resulted in myriad and unique familial circumstances. Strict
application of the child support guidelines contained in KRS 403.212 to these
myriad and unique familial circumstances often leads to unjust results. To avoid
such, our courts must be fully cognizant of and give credence to these myriad and
unique familial circumstances when considering child support. KRS 403.211(3)
provides our Courts with such a mechanism.
5
A narrow exception has been recently promulgated into the child support guidelines and is
limited to “split custody” arrangements. KRS 403.212(6).
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Under the unique familial circumstances of this case, Michael and
Laurie earn nearly equal incomes and, concomitantly, exercise nearly equal
physical custody of the children. Also, they share almost equally other expenses
associated with the children. These three particular circumstances are of an
extraordinary nature under KRS 403.211(3)(g). Indeed, it is manifestly unjust and
inequitable to require Michael to pay Laurie $950 per month in child support when
each earns nearly equal income, exercises nearly equal physical custody of the
children, and shares nearly equal expenses associated with the children. It is
beyond cavil that such inequitable result was ever intended by the General
Assembly. While a determination of extraordinary circumstances is generally
within the discretion of the circuit court, the circumstances of this case mandate
such a result and serve as an apotheosis of extraordinary circumstances as
contemplated under KRS 403.211(3)(g). See KRS 403.211(4). Thus, in this case,
we conclude that application of the child support guidelines would be unjust per
KRS 403.211(3)(g).
As the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 are inapplicable, it
was error for the family court to deny Michael’s motions to modify child support
based upon the rebuttable presumption of KRS 403.213(2). As hereinbefore
stated, KRS 403.213(2) creates two separate rebuttable presumptions pertaining to
modification of child support. If the amount of child support would increase or
decrease at least 15 percent upon application of the child support guidelines, KRS
403.213(2) establishes a rebuttable presumption that a material change in
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circumstances exists, thus supporting modification of support. If there is less than
a 15 percent increase or decrease per application of the child support guidelines,
KRS 403.213(2) establishes a rebuttable presumption of no material change in
circumstances. Under either rebuttable presumption, KRS 403.213(2) requires that
the increase or decrease of 15 percent in the amount of child support owed is to be
calculated per the child support guidelines.6 Where application of the child
support guidelines is unjust or inappropriate by operation of KRS 403.211(3), it is
axiomatic that the rebuttable presumptions contained in KRS 403.213(2) are,
likewise, inapplicable. Additionally, without application of the child support
guidelines, the calculation of a 15 percent increase or decrease would lack precise
quantification.
Accordingly, we interpret the rebuttable presumptions found in KRS
403.213(2) as inapplicable in modification of child support cases where application
of the child support guidelines have been determined unjust or inappropriate under
KRS 403.211(3). In these cases, the proper standard for modification of child
support is found in KRS 403.213(1) and simply requires a “showing of a material
change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing.”
In sum, we conclude that the child support guidelines are inapplicable
for two independent reasons – (1) Michael and Laurie’s combined monthly gross
income exceeds the uppermost level of the child support guidelines rendering
application of the guidelines inappropriate, and (2) the familial circumstances
6
KRS 403.213(2) reads that “[a]pplication of the Kentucky child support guidelines . . . which
results in . . . a fifteen percent (15%) change . . . .”
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herein are of an extraordinary nature rendering application of the child support
guidelines unjust. See KRS 403.211(3)(e) and (g). As the child support guidelines
are inapplicable, the rebuttable presumption found in KRS 403.213(2) concerning
modification of child support is, likewise, inapplicable. Hence, the proper standard
for modification of child support is found in KRS 403.213(1) and is simply
whether there exists a material change in circumstances that is substantial and
continuing. We, thus, believe the family court erred by relying upon the rebuttable
presumption found in KRS 403.213(2) as a basis for denying Michael’s motions to
modify child support. Consequently, we vacate the family court’s January 7, 2009,
and May 22, 2009, orders denying Michael’s motions to modify child support.
Upon remand, the family court shall reconsider Michael’s motions to modify child
support in accordance with KRS 403.213(1).
We view Michael’s remaining contentions of error either moot or
without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the Orders of the Franklin Circuit Court,
Family Court Division, are vacated and this cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Hawkins
Frankfort, Kentucky
Kevin P. Fox
Frankfort, Kentucky
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