PULLEN (TED) VS. CONDER (JOSEPH)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000450-MR
TED PULLEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-002426
JOSEPH CONDER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Ted Pullen (Pullen), Director of Louisville/Jefferson County
Metro Government Public Works Department (the Department), appeals the trial
court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of immunity. On
appeal, Pullen argues that his failure to ensure that repairs were made to a sidewalk
was discretionary, not ministerial, entitling him to qualified immunity. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. On May 26, 2007, Joseph Conder
(Conder) was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk along Browns Lane. Conder’s
bicycle hit an uneven place in the sidewalk and he fell, suffering physical injuries.
At the time of the accident, Pullen was director of the Department.
On March 2, 2008, Conder filed suit against Pullen and others
alleging that his accident was the result of their negligence. As to Pullen, Conder
specifically alleged that he had breached a duty to maintain the sidewalk, resulting
in Conder’s injury. Pullen timely filed a response, asserting the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity.
On July 11, 2008, Pullen filed a motion for summary judgment. In his
motion, Pullen argued that Conder violated an ordinance by riding his bicycle on
the sidewalk and that Conder’s violation of that ordinance was the proximate cause
of his injury. The court denied Pullen’s motion, finding that any negligence on
Conder’s part would not act as a bar to his claims of negligence against Pullen and
the other defendants.
On December 9, 2008, Pullen filed a motion to dismiss and/or for
summary judgment arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. In support of
his motion, Pullen offered his Affidavit. Because the contents of the affidavit are
crucial to our opinion, we set forth the pertinent parts in their entirety below.
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1. That he [Pullen] is the Director of Public Works for
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, having
become such on January 1, 2007.
2. That he did not become aware of an accident
involving plaintiff Conder until long after the occurrence
of May 26, 2007, from which said plaintiff’s present
claims arise, nor was he made aware of any condition of
the sidewalk at or near 2811 Brown’s Lane in Louisville,
Kentucky, prior to the date of said occurrence.
3. That he has caused a search to be made of the records
of the Metro Works Department, with the resulting
information being that only two (2) calls have been made
to the Metro Works Department, namely Service Request
No. 2735355, dated May 4, 2004, dealing specifically
with the sidewalk in the 4206 block of Brown’s Lane,
and Service Request No. 3150709, dated September 29,
2006, dealing with a raised sidewalk adjacent to the
Walgreen’s Drugstore located near the intersection of
Taylorsville Road, Yorkshire Blvd., and Brown’s Lane.
No requests or notices of defects in the 2800 block of
Brown’s Lane are known to exist.
4. Affiant’s duties as Director of the Metro Works
Department consist of decision and policy-making
decisions relevant to oversight of construction projects
and plans, personnel decisions, and consideration of sites
requiring maintenance, remodeling, and repair, as well as
participating, with others in Metro Government, in the
overall decision-making process relating to Metro
property. Affiant is guided by Metro ordinances having
relevance to such projects; the Metro ordinance known to
bear on plaintiff’s claims is, by copy, attached hereto.
5. The Metro Works Department responds to calls by
residents, made through 311 MetroCall, or directly to the
Works Department with respect to uneven, or otherwise
questionable sidewalk conditions; as previously stated
herein, there have been no reports of any sidewalk defect
in the immediate area of 2811 Browns [sic] Lane (please
see paragraph 3 hereof).
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We note that the ordinance referred to in paragraph four of Pullen’s affidavit is not
in the record before us.
Conder filed a response arguing that, because Pullen’s duties were
ministerial, he was not entitled to immunity. We note that Conder did not file any
affidavits with his response but did make reference to the Department’s web site.
As noted by Conder, that web site indicates that the Department is responsible for
“maintain[ing] the city’s streets and road system . . . and maintain[ing] public
streets, right of ways and alleys within Metro Louisville.” The court summarily
denied Pullen’s motion. It is from this denial that Pullen appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Pullen offered evidence outside the pleadings, his motion to
dismiss and/or for summary judgment was, in fact, a motion for summary
judgment. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02. Therefore we review
the trial court’s denial of Pullen’s motion using the summary judgment standard of
review.
Summary judgment is only proper when "it would be impossible for
the respondent to produce any evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his
favor." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to
construe the record "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
. . . and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Id. at 480. A party opposing a
summary judgment motion cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will
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disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 481. Whether or not a defendant is protected by official immunity is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d
469, 475 (Ky. 2006); Estate of Clark ex rel. Mitchell v. Daviess County, 105
S.W.3d 841, 844 (Ky. App. 2003).
ANALYSIS
At the outset we note that, unless this Court holds otherwise, an
appellant is limited to arguing only those issues raised in his prehearing statement.
CR 76.03(8). The only issue Pullen identified in his prehearing statement is
whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. However, in his brief, Pullen also
appears to argue that he cannot be deemed negligent because he had no knowledge,
either actual or imputed, of the defective sidewalk. In support of this argument,
Pullen cites to one Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case and two state court cases:
Collins v. U.S., 621 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1980); City of Dayton v. Thompson, 372
S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1963); and Bowlin v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 445 S.W.2d
693 (Ky. 1969). Those cases do address the requirement for an actor to have
knowledge of a defect. However, they do so in the context of determining the
actor’s negligence, not in the context of determining entitlement to immunity. In
fact, none of the cases even contains the word immunity. Furthermore, Pullen does
not state in his brief how knowledge of a defect or the cited cases relate to the issue
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of immunity. Therefore, his argument regarding lack of knowledge is without
merit.
Next, we address whether the trial court properly denied summary
judgment on the issue of immunity. Although there are various types of immunity,
we agree with the parties that the only type of immunity at issue herein is what is
generally referred to as “qualified official immunity” (qualified immunity).
Therefore, we limit our analysis to that type of immunity.
While performing discretionary acts or functions, public officers or
employees are shielded from liability for negligence by the doctrine of qualified
immunity. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001). Discretionary acts
involve the exercise of judgment by an official acting within the scope of his
office. Qualified immunity does not extend to negligent performance of
ministerial duties which consist of routine acts or functions. Id., see also Collins v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, 10 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Ky. 1999).
We believe Yanero to be most instructive herein. In Yanero, a high
school baseball player was injured when struck by a baseball during batting
practice. At the time, the player was not wearing a helmet, which was mandated
by school rule. The player sued, among others, his coaches and the school’s
athletic director. Testimony indicated that the athletic director’s job entailed
promulgating rules and that the coaches either did or did not uniformly enforce the
batting helmet rule. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the school’s athletic
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director had qualified immunity because determining what rules to adopt is
discretionary, not ministerial. However, the Court determined that the coaches,
who were responsible for enforcing the rules, were not entitled to qualified
immunity, because enforcing rules is ministerial, not discretionary. Yanero, 65
S.W.3d at 528-29.
In his complaint, Conder alleged that Pullen had a duty to maintain
the sidewalk. In his answer, Pullen denied any such duty. Therefore, at this stage
of the litigation, the question before the court was: did Pullen have a duty to repair
defective sidewalks? In his affidavit, Pullen stated that he makes decisions
regarding a number of things, including what “sites requir[e] maintenance,
remodeling, and repair.” Furthermore, Pullen stated that his Department responds
to citizen complaints about sidewalk defects. Pullen did not state that he or the
Department can choose not to repair a sidewalk. Therefore, Pullen admitted that
the Department has responsibility for repairing sidewalks, an admission confirmed
by the Department’s website. Because repairing sidewalks is mandatory, doing so
is a ministerial function of Pullen’s office. How to make repairs and, possibly,
when to make those repairs, would be discretionary functions of Pullen’s office,
but, on the record as it currently exists, making repairs is ministerial. Just as the
coaches in Yanero were required to enforce the rule regarding the use of batting
helmets, the Department and Pullen, as its head, are required to maintain
sidewalks. Because that function is not discretionary but ministerial, the trial court
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correctly denied Pullen’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity.
The parties and the trial court should note that we are not foreclosing
the possibility that Pullen may be able to establish at a later date that he is entitled
to qualified immunity. We are simply holding that he has not done so to date.
Furthermore, we make no determination about what liability, if any, Pullen may
have for negligence.
CONCLUSION
Because Pullen has failed to establish that the duty of maintaining
sidewalks is discretionary rather than ministerial, we affirm the trial court’s denial
of Pullen’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
I. G. Spencer, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Candace Curtis Kenyon
Louisville, Kentucky
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