SALYER (RONALD KEITH) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000439-MR
RONALD KEITH SALYER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O'MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-000457
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Ronald Keith Salyer, appeals the February
19, 2009, opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, wherein the court
determined that Salyer was required to register as a sex offender for the remainder
of his lifetime pursuant to the version of KRS 17.510 in effect at the time of his
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
release. Following a review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
On February 10, 2005, Salyer was indicted by the Jefferson County
Grand Jury for twenty-nine counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual
performance by a minor, second offense, each count a Class D felony. The
indictment alleged that between July 5, 2002, and December 1, 2004, Salyer
committed these offenses when he knowingly had in his possession or control
matter visually depicting an actual sexual performance by a minor. These images,
all of which were severely disturbing, were found on Salyer’s personal computer.2
The indictment also charged a second or subsequent offense because
Salyer had previously pled guilty to the same offense,3 for which he received a
sentence of twelve months conditionally discharged for two years, and for which
he was ordered to complete a sex offender program. At the time of the indictment
in the matter sub judice, Salyer had still not completed that treatment.
During the months leading up to trial, despite the overwhelming
evidence against Salyer, his counsel was able to negotiate a plea agreement with
the Commonwealth. On April 28, 2005, two pleadings were filed with the trial
2
According to the Commonwealth, the indictment stemmed from 29 images on Salyer’s
computer, although the computer forensics and analysis report indicated that there would have
been more images recovered had there not been a deletion of a computer folder including 1,767
images from the hard drive by an Internet Washer Pro program installed specifically for the
purpose of eliminating and encrypting files. Further, additional investigation into the instant
case revealed a total of more than 226 image files depicting child pornography with victims
ranging from infants through young teenagers.
3
Jefferson Circuit Court Case No. 02-CR-000467. At the time he pled guilty to that offense, it
was considered a misdemeanor. KRS 531.335 was amended in 2006, and it is now a Class D
felony in all cases.
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court, including the Commonwealth’s Offer on Plea of Guilty, and Salyer’s Motion
to Enter Guilty Plea. Both were signed by Salyer and his counsel. In exchange for
Salyer’s plea, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss fourteen of the twenty-nine
counts, and recommended that Salyer receive a sentence of five years on each
charge, all recommended to run concurrently for a total of five years. That
recommendation stated that the Commonwealth would take no stand on probation.
On that same date, Salyer appeared before the court, withdrew his
previous plea of not guilty, and pled guilty to the charges. In accepting the plea,
the court found that Salyer understood the nature of the charges, including possible
penalties, and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights to plead
innocent and proceed to trial. Following his guilty plea, Salyer also filed a
pleading styled, “Waiver of Preparation of Presentence Report Prior to Sentencing”
at the hearing on the entry of his guilty plea. The court entered an order at the
conclusion of the hearing indicating that Salyer was already serving twelve months
from his previous conviction in district court, and that there would be five years to
serve from the current case. The court nevertheless ordered a Pre-Sentence
Investigation (PSI) to be produced at a hearing to be held on June 23, 2005,
wherein the court would hear a motion for shock probation. The court entered an
order on the guilty plea/waiver of PSI and judgment of conviction and sentence on
April 28, 2005.
Thereafter, Salyer filed a motion for shock probation on June 16,
2005. The court held a hearing on that motion on June 23, 2005. At the
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conclusion of the presentation of all evidence, the trial court denied the motion for
shock probation, and sentenced Salyer in accordance with the accepted plea
agreement. Salyer requested that the court amend his final judgment so that any
reference to the requirement to register as a sex offender was removed. The
Commonwealth responded that a review of KRS 17.510 (as it existed in 2005)
indicated that Salyer was not required to register as a sex offender. That statute
was subsequently amended in 2006. Under those amendments, the offense to
which Salyer pled guilty did qualify as a registry offense.
The final Amended Judgment on Guilty Plea, Waiver of PSI and
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was signed on July 19, 2005, sentencing
Salyer pursuant to the plea agreement for a total of five years’ imprisonment. That
order included no mention of sex offender registration or accompanying
requirements in the amended judgment.
Salyer was discharged from custody on February 12, 2008. Based on
KRS 17.510 in effect at the time of his release, the Department of Corrections
required Salyer to register as a sex offender prior to his release. Salyer questioned
whether or not he was actually required to register, and on April 16, 2008, Salyer
received a letter from the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet. Therein, the Cabinet
explained that pursuant to KRS 17.520(1), the duty to register as a sex offender is
determined at the time of release, and that the offense of which he was convicted
was included in the registration requirement at the time he was released in 2008.
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The letter also explained that Salyer was required to register for a lifetime since he
had been convicted of two qualifying offenses against victims who were minors.
Thereafter, on June 19, 2008, Salyer wrote a letter to the Jefferson
Circuit Court requesting that the court “comply” with the judgment previously
entered in his case and order the state police to “comply” with the statutes in effect
at the time of his offense, and remove him from the sex offender registry. A letter
was thereafter sent from the court to the Department of Corrections (DOC) on July
21, 2008, forwarding a copy of the amended judgment4 and requesting that Salyer
be removed from the registry. The court sent another letter on August 13, 2008,
giving the DOC ten days to show why it had not complied with the court’s request.
Subsequently, on September 30, 2008, after hearing from the DOC
that it was not in control of the registry, the court entered a show cause order for
the Commonwealth to show why there had been no compliance with its previous
orders. The Commonwealth responded by submitting a memorandum of law
regarding Salyer’s sex offender status and explaining that the application of the
registration statutes, including the fact that the duty to register is determined at the
time of release from incarceration and not at the time of judgment. Salyer’s
counsel responded to that memorandum by arguing that the court should “honor”
the 2005 judgment, and that statutory construction should lead to a finding that the
amendments to the registration requirements were punitive and ex post facto
violations.
4
The letter did not indicate that it was to be forwarded to the registration department.
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On February 19, 2009, the trial court entered an opinion and order
sustaining the Commonwealth’s response to the show cause order, and finding that
Salyer was subject to the registration statutes applicable at the time of his release.
Further, the court held that the judgment did not in any way state that Salyer would
never be subject to registration. Salyer now appeals to this Court. In addressing
the issues raised on appeal, we remind the parties that statutory construction is a
matter of law, which we review de novo. Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v.
Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998).
As his first basis for appeal, Salyer argues that the trial court erred in
ruling that he was subject to the sex offender registration law set forth in KRS
17.520(1). Salyer asserts that sex offender registration is, in effect, an additional
punishment for specified offenses and that, accordingly, it cannot be applied
retroactively. In making this argument, Salyer draws this Court’s attention to the
fact that the 2006 amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) was
titled “An act relating to sex offenses and the punishment thereof.”
Salyer asserts that pursuant to Section 51 of the Kentucky
Constitution,5 every section of a legislative act must relate to the subject announced
in the title of the act. He thus argues that it is no longer proper to classify sex
offender registration as a civil regulatory scheme. Instead, Salyer asserts that sex
5
Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that: “No law enacted by the General
Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, and no
law shall be revised, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its
title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended or conferred, shall be reenacted
and published at length.”
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offender registration must be characterized as a criminal punishment. He argues
that as a criminal punishment, the 2006 amendment could not be imposed upon
him without violating state and federal constitutional guarantees against ex post
facto laws and double jeopardy.
In making this argument, Salyer acknowledges the holding of our
Kentucky Supreme Court in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. 2002),
wherein the Court found that Kentucky sex offender registration statutes are
remedial, non-punitive statutes, which it found to be constitutional as applied to
persons convicted prior to the enactment of the registration requirements. Salyer
nevertheless asserts that Hyatt construed the law as it existed in 2002, and that it
was no longer applicable at the time the legislature amended the SORA in 2006.
Alternatively, Salyer argues that even if this Court finds the 2006 amendments to
be a continuation of the civil regulatory scheme, we must declare them void as
violations of Section 51 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Salyer argues that that long-standing interpretation of Section 516 by
our courts requires close correlation between the title of an act and its substantive
content. In the matter sub judice, Salyer asserts that the title of the act is
unambiguous in its reference to punishment and that, accordingly, there is no
reason to engage in further construction or interpretation thereof. He thus asserts
that we are compelled to either declare the act to be criminal in nature, or to find it
void as a violation of Section 51.
6
See, e.g., Phillips v. Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co., 59 Ky. 219 (Ky. App. 1859), and
Commonwealth v. Barney, 115 Ky. 475, 74 S.W. 181 (Ky. App. 1903).
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The Commonwealth asserts that this argument is one which places
form over substance, and that the versions of KRS 17.520 and 17.510 in place at
the time of Salyer’s release were properly applied. Having reviewed the statutory
provisions themselves, and applicable law, we are compelled to agree.
In so finding, we note that KRS 17.510(2) states clearly that a sex
offender “shall, on or before the date of his or her release by the court, the parole
board, the cabinet, or any detention facility, register with the appropriate local
probation and parole office in the county in which he or she intends to reside.”
Further, the amendments to KRS 17.500(2)(a)(4) clearly establish that any offense
involving a minor or depiction of a minor as set forth in KRS 531 is an offense
requiring registration upon release from incarceration after being convicted.
Clearly, Salyer meets the criteria set forth in both of these provisions.
As our Supreme Court held in Hyatt, “Registration and Notification
Statutes across the nation have consistently been held to be remedial measures, not
punitive, and therefore do not amount to punishment or increased punishment.”
Hyatt at 571. While Salyer attempts to argue that Hyatt is outdated, and that the
provisions at issue cannot be construed as a continuation of the civil regulatory
scheme without violating Section 51 of our Kentucky Constitution, we simply
cannot agree.
While we agree that the title of the act alone, if viewed in isolation
from the remainder of its provisions, might imply punishment, we note that the
essence of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
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legislature. Hale v. Combs, 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ky. 2000). Thus, this Court is
not required to act in a vacuum when determining the purpose of legislation, and
may take judicial notice of the historical settings and conditions out of which the
legislation was enacted. Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1998).
While it is clear that the legislature used the word “punishment” in the title of the
amended act, we simply cannot find that this alone should be determinative of our
construction of the statutory scheme as a whole.
This is particularly so in a situation such as the matter sub judice,
where sex offense convictions are predicates for registration, and where a failure to
comply with registration leads to a new charge, ultimately accompanied by a
“punishment.” Thus, it is clear that the term “punishment” refers not to an ex post
facto punishment for the crime of which an individual was convicted in the past,
but is instead a punishment for a choice consciously made by the offender who
decides not to comply with the registration requirements of the statute.
More importantly, however, we note that our Kentucky Supreme
Court recently addressed the very issue raised in this appeal in Buck v.
Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661 (Ky. 2010). Therein, the Court stated:
Analyzing SORA and its 2006 amendments in
light of what it requires from the registrant, we continue
to believe that SORA is a remedial measure with a
rational connection to the nonpunitive goal of protection
of public safety, and we see no reason to depart from our
holding in Hyatt. Buck has demonstrated nothing in the
2006 amendments to SORA drastic enough to render
SORA punitive.
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Buck points to the fact that the 2006 bill amending
SORA was entitled “AN ACT relating to sex offenses
and the punishment thereof.” In Baker, which dealt with
another provision of the same 2006 bill, this Court
rejected the argument that this title alone rendered the
entire bill punitive. 295 S.W.3d at 443. Buck points to
the increased length of registration (10 years increased to
20 years for non-lifetime registrants), but has not
demonstrated that this increased registration period is
being applied retroactively.
Buck also attempts to distinguish Hyatt and Doe
based on the fact that the registrants in those cases were
challenging the registration system, but had not yet been
subject to criminal liability. This only underscores our
holding in Hyatt that criminal liability for failure to
register is prospective and not a punishment for past
crimes. The fact that Buck, unlike the registrants in Hyatt
and Doe, has actually been convicted of failing to
register does not change the fact that that criminal
prosecution is the result of a new crime, separate from
the original sex offense. We find nothing in the 2006
amendments that requires us to depart from Hyatt.
Buck, 308 S.W.3d at 667-68. Clearly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has already
addressed the very issues raised by Salyer, namely whether the act, as amended, is
a violation of ex post facto, and whether the title of the act renders it punitive. We
are thus bound by those determinations, and decline to hold otherwise.
We now turn to Salyer’s second basis for appeal, namely, that if we
find he is required to register as a sex offender, he is not subject to lifetime
registration under KRS 17.520. As noted, the Commonwealth argued below that
Salyer was under a lifetime duty to register because he had been twice convicted
for crimes against a minor. Salyer asserts that this was an incorrect argument, and
notes that while he was convicted of a felony in the current case, he was only
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convicted of a misdemeanor in the previous case. Salyer notes that the current
version of KRS 17.520(2)(a)(4) prescribes lifetime registration for any person
convicted of two or more felony offenses against a victim who is a minor. Salyer
asserts that as he does not meet those qualifications, he is only required to register
as a sex offender for twenty years. He asks this Court for a declaration in that
regard. The Commonwealth does not dispute that Salyer has been convicted once
for a misdemeanor sexual offense, and once for a felony.
Having reviewed the provision at issue, we note that it provides as
follows:
(2) (a) Lifetime registration is required for:
(4) Any person who has been convicted of two (2) or
more felony criminal offenses against a victim who is a
minor;
Certainly, the statute is very clear as to who qualifies for lifetime registration. It is
equally clear from a review of the record that Salyer was charged with distribution
of child pornography in 2003, which was amended down to a misdemeanor
conviction for possession, as well as the fifteen counts of possession, a felony of
which he was convicted in 2005. Thus it is clear that Salyer does not qualify for
lifetime registration pursuant to KRS 17.520(2)(a)(4), and is instead subject to the
twenty-year registration requirement set forth in KRS 17.520(3). This Court thus
declares that his registration term be amended accordingly.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the portion of
the February 19, 2009, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court requiring Salyer to
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register as a sex offender, reverse the portion of the order requiring lifetime
registration and instead order that Salyer qualifies for twenty-year registration
pursuant to KRS 17.520(3).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. David Niehaus
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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