GIST (ALVIN C.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000423-MR
ALVIN C. GIST
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-001140
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL, MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Following entry of a conditional guilty plea under RCr1 8.09,
Alvin C. Gist appeals from a judgment sentencing him to serve a total term of
imprisonment of twelve years for the crimes of robbery in the first degree2 and
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020, a Class B felony.
tampering with physical evidence.3 Gist argues the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in
denying a motion to suppress a show-up identification procedure that was unduly
suggestive and unreliable. Upon review of the record, the briefs and the law, we
affirm.
On April 1, 2008, the First American Cash Advance on New Cut
Road in Louisville, Kentucky, was robbed by a black man wielding a butcher knife
and wearing jeans, a black sweatshirt, a black knit cap and a black panty-hose
mask that partially obscured his face. Even though the robbery lasted just a couple
of minutes, the clerk, Katrina Marshall, recognized the robber as Alvin Gist, a
recent customer whom she had chatted with several times on the parking lot in the
previous ten to twelve days. Each day, Gist was wearing the same clothes.
Despite the partial mask, Marshall clearly saw the robber’s nose and mouth, and
the robber’s voice sounded distinctive to her and identical to that of Gist. Once
Gist had fled the scene of the robbery, Marshall located a receipt bearing his name
and identifying information and gave it to police.
While one team of officers was at the scene of the robbery, another
team of officers began canvassing the neighborhood for leads. Without the benefit
of Gist’s name and address, Officer Manning was told by a maintenance man that a
person matching the description of the robbery suspect had entered a particular
apartment within the complex. Officer Manning went to that apartment, Gist
opened the door, allowed Officer Manning to enter, and produced identification.
3
KRS 524.100, a Class D. felony.
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Upon verifying Gist’s role in the crime, officers escorted Gist, in
custody at that time but not in handcuffs, outside the apartment complex so
Marshall could view him. Marshall, sitting in a truck some twenty to thirty feet
away from Gist, immediately and positively identified him as the robber, even
noting that Gist had changed clothes since committing the crime.
Gist was taken to the police station where he was given, and waived,
his Miranda rights before giving a statement to police admitting he committed the
robbery and saying he had hidden a portion of the proceeds under a mat in front of
the toilet in the apartment where he was found. The apartment in which Gist was
found was leased by his wife.
Although eligible to be charged as a persistent felon, in April of 2008,
Gist was indicted only for robbery in the first degree and tampering with physical
evidence. In August of 2008, he moved to suppress three items—the statement he
gave to police, items seized during the search of the apartment, and Marshall’s
eyewitness identification. In November of 2008, the trial court held a suppression
hearing after which it denied Gist’s motion to suppress on all three grounds.
In February of 2009, Gist entered a conditional guilty plea to both
charges, reserving for appeal the issues argued during the suppression hearing.
This appeal followed challenging only the trial court’s ruling that the show-up
identification procedure was not unduly suggestive since Marshall had already
provided Gist’s name and address to officers and had identified him as a prior
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customer with whom she had chatted several times before positively identifying
him as the robber during the show-up procedure.
“When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we
utilize a clear error standard of review for factual findings and a de novo standard
of review for conclusions of law.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300,
305 (Ky. 2006) (citing Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky.
2004)). The trial court’s statement of the facts is borne out by the record and
therefore supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Canler v. Commonwealth,
870 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Ky. 1994). Discerning no error, and therefore no clear error,
the facts, as stated by the trial court, are deemed conclusive.
We owe no deference to a trial court’s application of the law to the
facts. Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Ky. 2006). We apply a
two-step process in analyzing whether identification testimony violates a
defendant’s due process rights. Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377,
383 (Ky. 1999). “First, the court examines the pre-identification encounters to
determine whether they were unduly suggestive.” Id. If they were not, the
analysis ends and the identification testimony is admitted. If the pretrial
identification procedure is suggestive, “the identification may still be admissible if
‘under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even though
the [identification] procedure was suggestive.’” Id. (quoting Stewart v.
Duckworth, 93 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)). Determining whether, under the
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totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable requires consideration
of five factors enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Biggers. Those
factors are: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior
description of the suspect; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and confrontation. The Supreme
Court of Kentucky adopted these factors in Savage v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d
512 (Ky. 1995).
A one-person show-up identification procedure, like the one used in
this case, has been deemed inherently suggestive. Merriweather v.
Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Ky. 2003). Therefore, the court must assess
the totality of the circumstances and the Biggers factors surrounding the
identification to consider the likelihood of an “irreparable misidentification” by the
witness. Id. Applying these factors to the case at bar, we conclude that Marshall’s
identification of Gist was sufficiently reliable.
Marshall had adequate opportunity to see Gist during the robbery.
While the crime happened “very quick,” Marshall had seen Gist repeatedly during
the ten to twelve days preceding the robbery and had spoken with him on several
of these occasions. Each time Marshall was wearing the same clothing. Clearly,
Marshall had developed a familiarity with Gist over a period of nearly two weeks
before the robbery which occurred at knifepoint. As a result, she recognized his
voice, facial features and clothing to the extent that she was able to quickly locate
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his customer file and provide identifying information to police. The actual showup procedure followed quickly on the heels of the robbery and immediately upon
seeing Gist, Marshall positively identified him as the robber even though he had
changed clothes since committing the crime. All five Biggers factors demonstrate
the reliability of Marshall’s positive identification of Gist. Therefore, we hold the
trial court did not err in denying Gist’s motion to suppress Marshall’s identification
of him as the robber.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the order denying the
motion to suppress and the judgment of guilty entered by the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Annie O’Connell
Assistant Public Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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