TORREZ (JAVIER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000410-MR
JAVIER TORREZ
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00135
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Javier Torrez appeals from a judgment and sentence
entered by the Scott Circuit Court on February 5, 2009 following his conditional
guilty plea to the charges of trafficking in marijuana over five pounds, operating a
motor vehicle under the influence, and operating a motor vehicle without an
operator’s license. Torrez’s conditional guilty plea preserved his right to appeal
the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment and sentence entered against Torrez on February 5, 2009, as
well as the February 5, 2009, order denying his motion to suppress.
On May 28, 2008, Kentucky State Trooper Darren Boyles initiated a
traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Torrez.1 Torrez indicated that he did not speak
English and did not have a license. He was arrested for speeding, operating a
motor vehicle without an operator’s license, operating a motor vehicle under the
influence, and failure to wear a seatbelt. Trooper Boyles placed Torrez in the
police cruiser and then searched the passenger compartment of Torrez’s vehicle in
an attempt to locate identification for Torrez. No such identification was found;
however, Trooper Boyles did discover a bag containing packages of marijuana.
During the criminal proceeding following his arrest, Torrez moved to
suppress the fruits of the vehicle search on the ground that such a warrantless
search was unconstitutional. Relying on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101
S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the trial court concluded that the search of
Torrez’s vehicle was lawful under the search incident to an arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Under Belton, the trial court held that
“when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864
(footnotes omitted). The trial court denied Torrez’s motion to suppress; thereafter,
Torrez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced. This appeal followed.
1
Torrez does not challenge the stop of his vehicle or his subsequent arrest.
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The record contains a stipulation of facts by the parties concerning
Torrez’s motion to suppress including: Trooper Boyles’ reasonable suspicion for
the traffic stop and probable cause for the subsequent arrest of Torrez are not
presently being challenged, the purpose of Trooper Boyles’ search of Torrez’s
vehicle was an attempt to locate identification, and Torrez was restrained in the
police cruiser during the search of his vehicle. Moreover, it appears from the
record that Torrez indicated to Trooper Boyles that he did not speak English and
Torrez received the assistance of a Spanish interpreter throughout the criminal
proceedings. Since the relevant facts are not in dispute, only questions of law
remain for our determination. See Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43 (Ky.
2010) (when factual findings of trial court are supported by substantial evidence,
we then review the ruling on the motion to suppress de novo to see whether the
decision was correct as a matter of law).
As an initial matter, all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, unless the search falls within an exception to the
warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
is a search incident to an arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Rainey v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 89 (Ky. 2006). At
the time the trial court denied Torrez’s motion to suppress, the issue at bar was
pending before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Arizona v. Gant, --U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Since the Supreme Court
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rendered an opinion in Gant during the pendency of this appeal, reevaluation of
Torrez’s motion to suppress is necessary. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
322, 107 S.Ct. 708, 713, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (“failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms
of constitutional adjudication.”).
Torrez argues the search of his vehicle was unlawful as a search
incident to an arrest, in light of the recent decision in Gant. In Gant, the Supreme
Court held:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest. When these
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle
will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant requirement
applies.
Id. at 1723-24.
Here, the record reflects that Torrez was arrested for operating a
motor vehicle without an operator’s license when he failed to produce
identification. Further, at the time of his arrest, Torrez indicated to Trooper Boyles
that he did not speak English. Under Gant, Trooper Boyles had reason to believe
the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest, i.e., identification for
Torrez, and properly searched the passenger compartment of Torrez’s vehicle for
such identification. See Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (an officer may
search the entire passenger compartment, as well as all open or closed containers,
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as a contemporary incident of any lawful arrest); Brown v. Commonwealth, 890
S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1994) (search of entire passenger compartment proper as a
contemporaneous incident of arrest); Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 744 S.W.2d 418
(Ky. 1987) (probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI and not having a valid
operator’s license justified search of automobile’s passenger compartment after
arrest); Commonwealth v. Wood, 14 S.W.3d 557 (Ky.App. 1999) (warrantless
search of vehicle’s glove compartment following arrest of driver for driving with a
suspended license was a valid search incident to arrest).
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence entered against Torrez on
February 5, 2009, as well as the February 5, 2009, order denying his motion to
suppress, are affirmed.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent from the
majority’s opinion. Whether nor not the Court agrees with the decision in Arizona
v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), we are compelled
to follow it when engaging in a Fourth Amendment analysis. While the officer
may well have acted within bounds that were accepted prior to Gant, Gant
nonetheless is now controlling authority on this point. Pursuant to Gant, the search
in this matter was unconstitutional. The Commonwealth, with proper and
admirable candor to the Court, all but concedes this point and argues instead that
the good faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct.
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3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) applies to this case. The Commonwealth puts forth a
good argument, but it is one which is not in accord with the majority opinion in
Gant. Accordingly, I would reverse.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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