SHELTON (CHRISTOPHER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000307-MR
CHRISTOPHER SHELTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 06-CR-00089 & 06-CR-00159
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Christopher Shelton appeals from an order of the
Henderson Circuit Court revoking his three-year conditional discharge. He
contends that because he did not receive adequate notice of the allegations leading
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
to revocation, the trial court’s order must be vacated and this matter remanded for a
new revocation hearing. Upon our review, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse in
July 2006 and sentenced to serve one year in prison on each count after entering an
Alford2 plea of guilty. The victims were his stepdaughters, both of whom were
minors. Appellant was released in July 2007 and began serving a mandatory threeyear period of conditional discharge pursuant to KRS 532.043.3 Upon his release,
Appellant signed and acknowledged the standard conditions of discharge
supervision and also the supplemental conditions of supervision for sex offenders
with Probation and Parole Officer Lauren Adams.
On October 13, 2008, Officer Adams submitted an affidavit to the
circuit court requesting that the court revoke Appellant’s conditional discharge due
to violations of the terms and conditions of that discharge. The affidavit alleged
that Appellant: (1) had contact with one of his victims; (2) admitted to Officer
Adams that he had spent thirty minutes at a bar;4 and (3) had spent nights at places
other than his approved residence, which was a camper at the Willow Creek
Campground. Attached to the affidavit was a signed statement from Linda Gibbs,
2
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
3
The mandatory period of conditional discharge was subsequently increased to five years by the
General Assembly. See KRS 532.043(2); 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 182, sec. 42.
4
The trial court did not rely upon evidence concerning this allegation in revoking Appellant’s
conditional discharge; therefore, we decline to address it any further.
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the “life-partner” of Appellant’s mother, Brenda Cook, indicating that Appellant
had been seen with his stepdaughters, including one of the victims, on multiple
occasions since his release and that he had slept at his wife’s house on at least one
occasion. Appellant was arrested and a revocation hearing was held over the
course of two days.
At the hearing, Officer Adams testified that she received Gibbs’
signed statement in October 2008 and that she had received numerous reports from
Gibbs indicating that Appellant had had contact with his victims. According to
Officer Adams, Appellant denied seeing the victims when she would question him
about it, but he generally stuttered when doing so even though he did not stutter
when he answered other questions. Officer Adams further testified that she spoke
with Gibbs and Appellant’s mother on multiple occasions about these allegations
and that their stories were consistent with the assertions in Gibbs’ statement.
However, Officer Adams also acknowledged that the victims had denied having
had any contact with Appellant.
Officer Adams also testified that Appellant had stayed in places other
than his approved residence without her permission, which was a violation of the
discharge condition that Appellant maintain only one approved residence. Officer
Adams indicated that prior to taking a polygraph examination in September 2008,
Appellant told the examiner that he stayed at his wife’s home four to six nights per
month and that he had stayed with her at an inn in Henderson earlier that month.
Officer Adams testified that Appellant was allowed to stay at his wife’s house if he
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cleared it with her first and the victims were not there; however, he had not
received permission for these stays. Officer Adams also stated her belief that
Appellant had not been living in his camper because she could never find him there
when she visited, his water was not hooked up, and the camper did not have
electricity on at least one occasion when she visited. She also spoke with a woman
from the area who indicated that she had never seen anyone at the camper. Officer
Adams acknowledged, however, that she only attempted to visit Appellant once
every one to three months.
The Commonwealth also called Linda Gibbs as a witness. She
testified that she called Officer Adams whenever she saw Appellant with the
victims and specifically recounted two incidents where this had occurred. She also
testified that she overheard a phone conversation that Appellant and his mother had
had in which he told her that he had spent the night with his half-sister in
Evansville, Indiana in June or July 2008. Appellant objected to the testimony
concerning this incident on the grounds that Gibbs had not made mention of it in
her written statement, but the circuit court overruled the objection.
Appellant also testified at the revocation hearing and denied the
allegations against him. He indicated that he and Linda Gibbs had a rocky
relationship because of the way Gibbs treated his mother and stated his belief that
Gibbs was trying to get his discharge revoked out of revenge because Appellant
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and his sister5 had had Gibbs arrested for assaulting their mother in July 2008. He
denied having had any contact with the victims since his release.
As for the residence allegations, Appellant acknowledged staying at
his wife’s house on one occasion without Officer Adams’ permission and staying
at the inn with his wife without permission. However, he said that he was unable
to get in touch with Officer Adams as to the first incident and explained that he
stayed at the inn because of a power outage following a windstorm. Appellant
testified that he had had Officer Adams’ permission on all other occasions that he
had stayed away from home. Appellant also denied telling the polygraph examiner
that he stayed at his wife’s house four to six times a month; he instead indicated
that he told him that he had stayed at her house four to six times since his last
polygraph examination. Appellant further testified that he lived in the camper and
that he used water tanks and battery packs instead of a water line or electrical
hookup. Appellant also denied Gibbs’ allegation that he had spend the night with
his half-sister in Evansville and stated that he had not asked Officer Adams’
permission for such a stay.
Following the hearing, the circuit court revoked Appellant’s
conditional discharge based on the testimony from Officer Adams and Gibbs. The
circuit court specifically found that Appellant had failed to maintain a residence at
the address given to his probation officer. The circuit court noted that Officer
Adams had visited Appellant’s camper on several occasions and had never found
5
Appellant’s sister also testified at the revocation hearing and reiterated Appellant’s testimony
about his troubled relationship with Gibbs.
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Appellant there and that Appellant did not connect the trailer for power or water.
The circuit court further noted that Gibbs’ testimony regarding the alleged night
that Appellant spent in Evansville bolstered the Commonwealth’s argument that
Appellant had changed his residence without approval. The circuit court also
found that Appellant had violated the terms of his conditional discharge by having
contact with his victims. This appeal timely followed.
Analysis
On appeal, Appellant argues that he was denied due process at his
revocation hearing because he did not receive adequate notice of all of the
allegations against him. Therefore – he asserts – a new revocation hearing is
required. He specifically contends that he should have received written notice
prior to the hearing about Gibbs’ allegation that he had spent a night in Evansville
without his probation officer’s permission.
In considering this argument, our concern is whether the revocation
proceeding herein complied with the minimal due process requirements set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct.
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct.
1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 54, 56
(Ky. App. 2002); Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky. App.
1986). A revocation proceeding “is not a part of a criminal prosecution and thus
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to
parole revocations.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600. However, a
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defendant is still entitled to written notice of the claimed violations of his
conditional discharge and disclosure of the evidence against him. Id., 408 U.S. at
489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604; Robinson, 86 S.W.3d at 56. KRS 533.050(2) similarly
provides that “[t]he court may not revoke or modify the conditions of a sentence of
probation or conditional discharge except after a hearing with defendant
represented by counsel and following a written notice of the grounds for revocation
or modification.”
In support of his position, Appellant argues that Rasdon v.
Commonwealth, supra, is directly on point. The defendant in Rasdon was charged
with sodomy and robbery of a woman identified by witnesses as a “street-wise
Louisville prostitute” while on conditional discharge. The Commonwealth
subsequently notified the defendant that it would seek to revoke the discharge
based upon his “violation of the conditions of conditional discharge, especially”
his re-arrest and the existence of probable cause for those offenses. Rasdon, 701
S.W.2d at 717. However, after hearing evidence regarding these matters, the trial
court – somewhat oddly – revoked the defendant’s conditional discharge based
solely upon its finding that the defendant had failed to “avoid persons or places of
disreputable or harmful character.” Id. at 718. While this was one of the
conditions of the defendant’s release, it was not one of the written grounds
provided by the Commonwealth in its revocation notice to the defendant.
We held that a new revocation hearing was merited under these
circumstances because the trial court “erroneously revoked [the defendant’s]
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conditional discharge for a reason other than one contained in the notice of the
hearing.” Id. at 717. We noted: “Even if we accept the fact that the avoidance of
disreputable characters was one of the conditions for Rasdon’s conditional
discharge, we can only conclude that he was not given notice that this would be
one of the grounds for violation and revocation.” Id. at 719. We further held that
despite its general reference to violations of the defendant’s discharge terms, the
written notice in question “applies only to a rearrest and probable cause to believe
that he had committed a new crime. If other specific violations existed, they
should have been stated in some manner to notify him of the charges he would be
required to defend.” Id. at 717.
The case before us is distinguishable from Rasdon, however, because
the discharge revocation in that case was based solely upon a ground that had not
been included in the notice of revocation – the defendant’s failure to “avoid
persons or places of disreputable or harmful character.” Id. at 718. The trial court
in that case did not even consider the defendant’s rearrest or the existence of
probable cause that he had committed another crime as bases for its decision even
though the evidence likely would have supported them. See id. at 719. Thus, the
offenses for which the defendant was given written notice played no role in the
trial court’s revocation decision, making a new hearing clearly necessary.
In contrast, the circuit court here revoked Appellant’s conditional
discharge on two grounds – that he had had contact with his victims and that he
had changed his residence without approval. Appellant has alleged no procedural
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irregularities with respect to the improper-contact charge, and the circuit court
could have revoked Appellant’s conditional discharge solely on this basis.6 See
Lucas v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 806, 807-08 (Ky. App. 2008) (“Generally, a
trial court’s decision revoking probation is not an abuse of discretion if there is
evidence to support at least one probation violation.”). Moreover, there was
considerable evidence presented other than the testimony relating to the Evansville
incident to support the circuit court’s finding that Appellant had failed to maintain
a residence at the appropriate address. However, even assuming that the notice
given to Appellant was inadequate as to the residence charge because of the “new”
contention that he had spent the night with his half-sister in Evansville, we believe
that any such error in this regard was harmless since he was provided with
adequate written notice of another independent ground for revocation of his
conditional discharge. Although it would have been preferable for the notice
provided by the Commonwealth to have contained this specific factual allegation,
we believe that Appellant’s minimal due process rights were satisfied here. To
hold otherwise would serve nothing more than to put form over substance.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Henderson Circuit Court
revoking Appellant’s conditional discharge is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
6
We also note that Appellant has failed to challenge the substantive validity of the trial court’s
decision. In any event, we do not believe that an abuse of discretion occurred in that respect.
See Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. App. 1986).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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