GOODEN (JAMES H.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000161-MR
JAMES H. GOODEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RUSSELL D. ALRED, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00134
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND KELLER,
JUDGES.
VANMETER, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE: James H. Gooden appeals from the
judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court sentencing him to five-years’ imprisonment.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
In 2006 Gooden was charged with first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance as a result of a “controlled buy” between Gooden and Hurlen
and Teresa Couch, confidential informants for the Kentucky State Police. The
Couches, working with Detective Keith Saylor and other law enforcement officers,
drove to Gooden’s residence on Possum Hollow Drive in Dayhoit, Kentucky, and
purchased two tablets containing the narcotic oxycodone. The transaction was
recorded and introduced into evidence at trial.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Gooden
moved for a directed verdict alleging the Commonwealth failed to establish venue.
The trial court overruled the motion and held that venue was established through
testimony by Teresa that she purchased the narcotics at Gooden’s residence in
Dayhoit, and by the audio record of the transaction in which Detective Saylor
states that the purchase is occurring in Dayhoit, Kentucky, located in Harlan
County.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and
recommended a five-year sentence, which the trial court imposed. This appeal
followed.
Gooden argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a
directed verdict because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the crime was
committed in Harlan County, Kentucky, and therefore failed to establish venue.
We disagree.
Upon consideration of a motion for a directed verdict,
-2-
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not
be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted).
KRS1 452.510 provides that “the venue of criminal prosecutions and
penal actions is in the county or city in which the offense was committed.” Thus,
venue is the “statutory prescription that the prosecution be in the county in which
the offense has been committed[.]” Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 698 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Ky. 1985). Establishing venue “requires proof by the prosecutor that the
offense did in fact occur in the county in which the case is being prosecuted.” Id.
Direct evidence that the crime occurred in the particular county is not required; the
fact may be inferred from evidence and circumstances presented to the jury. Id.
(citations omitted).
Though a “jury is not presumed to know the location of particular
homes, it is presumed to have some knowledge of local geography, such as the
location of towns[.]” Nelson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 568, 571, 24 S.W.2d 276,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
277 (1930) (citations omitted). In Nelson, the court concluded that evidence “the
robbery took place ‘in a curve in the road on Middle creek in below Buckeye,
something near a mile below Charlie Slone’s house, and about half way between
Harmonson Slone’s and Charlie Slone’s,’ was sufficient to authorize the
submission of the case to the jury.” 232 Ky. at 571, 24 S.W. at 277. Moreover, in
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 10 Ky.L.Rptr. 167, 8 S.W. 694 (Ky. 1888), evidence
that the crime was committed in a residence in Springfield was sufficient to
establish venue since the jury was “presumed to know Springfield is the county
seat of Washington county and that it is situated in that county.” Finally, in Hays
v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky.L.Rptr. 611, 14 S.W. 833 (Ky. 1890), evidence that the
crime was committed at a residence in the “Hendron district, sixteen miles from
Springfield” was sufficient proof of venue since the jury was presumed to know
that the “Hendron district” was located in Washington County. Id. at 833.
In this case, Teresa testified that she purchased the narcotics from
Gooden at his residence in Dayhoit. In the recording of the purchase, which was
played for the jury, Detective Saylor states that two cooperating witnesses were
purchasing a controlled substance from a suspect in the Dayhoit community in
Harlan County. Detective Saylor further testified that he conducted a drug
trafficking investigation in Harlan County on October 13, 2006. From this
evidence, a jury could reasonably have inferred that the crime occurred in Harlan
County. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Gooden’s motion for a
directed verdict.
-4-
The judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.