BRYANT (STEVEN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000105-MR
STEVEN BRYANT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A.WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00038
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE, NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Steven Bryant, pro se, has appealed from the Caldwell
Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to set aside his judgment and sentence or
alternatively, to modify the judgment and sentence pursuant to CR1 60.02 and RCr2
10.26. We affirm.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Bryant and a co-defendant were indicted by a Caldwell County Grand
Jury in 2002 for robbery in the first degree3 and assault in the first degree.4 Bryant
elected to proceed to a jury trial. Upon submission, the jury indicated it was
having difficulty reaching a unanimous verdict. Bryant then decided to enter a
conditional guilty plea as to the charged offenses. Within the conditional plea,
Bryant reserved the right to appeal from the trial court’s pretrial denial of his
motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of a violation of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers. Upon entry of his plea, the Commonwealth
recommended a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment on the robbery and eleven
years’ imprisonment on the assault. The trial court sentenced Bryant in accordance
with the Commonwealth’s recommendations and ordered the sentences to be
served consecutively for a total sentence of twenty-one years.
Bryant directly appealed from his conviction to this Court based on
his conditional plea. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky which affirmed the convictions in Bryant v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d
169 (Ky. 2006).
While the direct appeal was pending, Bryant filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. The trial court denied the motion without
holding an evidentiary hearing. Bryant failed to timely file a notice of appeal from
that denial. On October 20, 2008, Bryant filed the instant CR 60.02 motion for
3
KRS 515.020, a Class B felony.
4
KRS 508.010, a Class B felony.
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relief. The trial court denied that motion on December 11, 2008. This appeal
followed.
“The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d
83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000). To amount to an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
decision must be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principals.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Absent
a “flagrant miscarriage of justice,” the trial court will be affirmed. Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983). The relief provided by CR
60.02 is only given under extraordinary circumstances, and the pursuit of such
relief is not a substitute for an appeal or other remedies, but rather is intended as an
avenue to raise issues which cannot properly be raised in other proceedings.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997). Further, CR 60.02 was
not “intended merely as an opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could
‘reasonably have been presented’ by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.” Id.
at 416. See also Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
Bryant contends his simultaneous convictions for robbery and assault,
both in the first degree, constituted a violation of the rule against double jeopardy
and the trial court erred in failing to so find when it denied his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that since the robbery and assault involved the same
victim, the two crimes merged with the assault amounting to a lesser-included
offense of the robbery and thus his conviction on both counts was erroneous. After
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a careful review of the record and the law, we conclude Bryant’s argument is
without merit.
When presented with a claim of a double jeopardy violation, courts
are required to “determine whether the act or transaction complained of constitutes
a violation of two distinct offenses and, if it does, if each statute requires proof of a
fact the other does not.” Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky.
1996) (citing Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1995)). If each
charged crime requires proof of an element not contained within the other, the
crimes do not merge and no double jeopardy violation occurs. Id. at 809.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has examined this very issue in
relation to concurrent charges of assault and robbery arising from the same course
of conduct. See Fields v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 742 (Ky. 2007); Grundy v.
Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2000); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d
805 (Ky. 1996). In Fields, the Supreme Court was presented with a similar factual
situation to the one at bar. In discussing whether a double jeopardy violation
occurs when a defendant is convicted of both robbery and assault, the Court stated
no such violation exists when, as here,
conviction of either the assault or the robbery of [the
victim] required proof of an element not required to
prove the other. The conviction of robbery required
proof of a theft, which was not required to convict of
assault. The conviction of assault required proof of a
physical injury to [the victim], whereas the conviction of
robbery required proof only that the Appellant used or
threatened the use of physical force upon [the victim]
while armed with a [firearm].
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219 S.W.2d at 746. Just as in Fields, in the instant case the two crimes charged
clearly required proof of different elements. Proof of serious physical injury was
required to sustain the assault conviction, but such injury was not required under
the robbery indictment. Further, to support a conviction for the robbery, the
Commonwealth was required to prove intent to commit a theft, which is clearly not
an element of assault. Thus, Bryant was charged with two separate and distinct
crimes, meaning the merger doctrine does not apply and no double jeopardy
violation occurred.
We note Bryant relies heavily on the holding in Sherley v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1977), in support of his argument that the
merger doctrine is applicable to this matter. However, because the holding in
Sherley on the merger doctrine was overruled in Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263
S.W.3d 583 (Ky. 2008), his reliance thereon is misplaced. There was no error.
It appears Bryant has abandoned the remaining issue raised in his CR
60.02 motion before the trial court as it is not included in his brief to this Court.
“Failure of appellant to discuss the alleged errors in its brief is the same as if no
brief had been filed in support of its charges.” R.E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Price, 528
S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky. 1975). Therefore, we will not discuss the other allegation of
error as it is not properly before us for review.
Finally, the Commonwealth contends Bryant knew or should have
known of the existence of his claim when he filed his direct appeal, his subsequent
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RCr 11.42 motion, and his federal habeas corpus petition and he should therefore
be prohibited from raising this issue at this juncture. However, because we have
resolved this appeal on the merits of the claim presented, we need not comment on
the Commonwealth’s assertion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Caldwell Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Bryant, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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