STEEN (JARED R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000070-MR
JARED R. STEEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-002915
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Jared R. Steen, seeks reversal of the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s decision denying his motion for a directed verdict. He was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for the offense of manslaughter, and eight
days for driving under the influence. Steen contends there was insufficient
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
evidence for a reasonable juror to find him guilty. We disagree, and affirm the
convictions.
On May 4, 2007, the appellant, Jared R. Steen agreed to give Robert
Lyle a ride home from work at United Parcel Service. That ride ended abruptly
and tragically, leaving Robert Lyle dead and Jared Steen severely injured. Robert
Lyle died at the scene and Steen was rushed to the University of Louisville
Hospital.
While at the hospital, two separate tests were conducted to determine
Steen’s blood alcohol content. The first test was based on a blood sample taken by
the University of Louisville Hospital about an hour and twenty-five minutes after
the wreck. The result of the first test was a blood alcohol content level between
0.083 and 0.0899. The second test, conducted by the Kentucky State Police, was
based on a sample taken about two hours and ten minutes after the wreck occurred.
This test resulted in a blood alcohol content of 0.07.
Using the results of the two tests, the medical examiner, Dr. BurrowsBeckham, attempted to extrapolate what Steen’s blood alcohol content would have
been at the time of the incident. In her analysis, she used three conversion
numbers, because each person has a different metabolic rate of absorption, making
it impossible to come up with an exact number of what the blood alcohol content
would be. Using the results of the first test and two different formulas, Dr.
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Burrows-Beckham calculated a potential blood alcohol range between 0.1055 and
0.1199. Applying the conversion formula to the second test, Dr. BurrowsBeckham calculated Steen’s blood alcohol content to be between 0.1 and 0.11.
Both of these calculations assume the alcohol in Steen’s body was fully absorbed
by his body at the time of the wreck. These numbers do not reflect the possibility
Jared Steen ingested the alcohol just prior to the collision actually occurring and
his body actually absorbing the alcohol after the crash.
Dr. Burrows-Beckham was not able to say with a “reasonable degree
of medical certainty” that Steen was within the range she predicted based on her
calculations. She was not able to commit to such a range because there are several
variables that could impact the actual number, such as the amount and type of food
in the stomach. However, Dr. Burrows-Beckham stated that this was the best test
that could be used, since they did not have a sample taken immediately following
the collision.
The appellant’s requests for directed verdicts were denied and the
Jefferson Circuit Court jury convicted Steen of manslaughter in the second degree
and driving under the influence. Jared Steen was sentenced to five years’
imprisonment for the offense of manslaughter, a $1,000 fine, and eight days for
driving under the influence. The five-year sentence and fine were both probated.
Following the trial, the appellant properly preserved and brought an appeal on the
issue of the denial of his directed verdict.
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The decision to deny a motion for directed verdict is reviewed based
on the standard outlined in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1991), which followed both Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983),
and Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1977). The standard is as
follows:
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant
is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
Applying this standard we conclude that directed verdict was not
warranted in this case. A reasonable juror could find the elements of manslaughter
in the second degree as outlined in KRS 507.040 had been proven by the
prosecution.
There is ample evidence in the record that could lead a reasonable
juror to find guilt. The test results showing Steen had a blood alcohol level
between 0.083 and 0.0899 an hour and twenty-five minutes and a level of 0.07 two
hours and ten minutes after the crash coupled with the testimony of Dr. BurrowsBeckham provide an avenue for a juror to reach a guilty verdict. A reasonable
juror could find Jared Steen’s alcohol content was as high as 0.119 because of the
calculations done by Dr. Burrows-Beckham. Based on the same testimony, a juror
could further find an individual with blood alcohol content above a 0.1 level was
under the influence of alcohol.
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When the trial court considered the directed verdict motion, it was
required to include consideration of Dr. Burrows-Beckham’s testimony along with
all “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution[.]” Potts v.
Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2005), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). After hearing the
variables that could affect the blood alcohol content of an individual, a juror could
still reasonably arrive at the conclusion that Jared Steen was in the range described
by Dr. Burrows-Beckham. If a juror could find this to be true, then he or she could
also reasonably conclude Steen wantonly caused the death of Robert Lyle, based
on his level of intoxication.
Furthermore, the per se level of intoxication is not to be introduced in
any case outside a prosecution for driving under the influence. Cormney v.
Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Ky. 1996), citing Walden v.
Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1991). There is no magic number for
intoxication, the jury must determine based on the facts and circumstances of the
case if the driver was “under the influence” sufficiently to have constituted wanton
conduct. Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Ky. 1975). In this
case, the jury was permitted to infer from Dr. Burrows-Beckham’s testimony what
effect alcohol could have on a person with a blood alcohol level around 0.1 and its
conclusion was reasonable that an individual with that amount of alcohol in his
system would be under the influence.
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Therefore, because a reasonable juror could find the appellant guilty
of second-degree manslaughter as defined in KRS 507.040, the decision of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas M. Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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