HELTON (WILLIAM) VS. TRI-COUNTY CYCLES BARBOURVILLE, LLC , ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000049-MR
WILLIAM HELTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN KNOX MILLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00014
TRI-COUNTY CYCLES BARBOURVILLE,
LLC; MYERS CHEVROLET-OLDSMOBILECADILLAC, INC.; AND GREGORY
WILCHECK
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: William Helton appeals from summary
judgments granted by the Knox Circuit Court in favor of Tri-County Cycles
Barbourville, LLC; Myers Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc.; and Gregory
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Wilcheck, dismissing the civil action Helton had filed resulting from injuries he
sustained in an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident. The circuit court had concluded
that the appellees were entitled to immunity from Helton’s claims because of the
exclusivity provisions of the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act. We affirm.
Helton was employed as a salesman for Myers Chevrolet. Wilcheck
was the majority shareholder, dealer, CEO, CFO, director, president, secretary, and
treasurer for Myers Chevrolet. Myers Chevrolet owned a 50% percent interest in
Tri-County Cycles. Tri-County Cycles would sell ATVs and motorcycles but had
not yet opened for business at the time of Helton’s injury.2
On April 28, 2006, Helton was injured while riding as a passenger on
a Yamaha Rhino ATV driven by Wilcheck and owned by Tri-County Cycles.
Helton had just finished working with a Myers Chevrolet customer concerning the
sale of a vehicle and had been directed by Wilcheck to ride as a passenger on the
ATV for a test run. Wilcheck acknowledged that he was “jacking around” and
doing donuts prior to the accident. As Wilcheck made a sharp turn to park the
vehicle on the Tri-County Cycles lot, it flipped and landed on Helton’s leg.
As a result of the accident, Helton fractured his right leg, which
required a plate and several screws to be implanted. Helton filed a workers’
compensation claim against Myers Chevrolet, and on August 15, 2008, an
administrative law judge awarded Helton lifetime benefits. The claim has now
2
Tri-County Cycles was scheduled to open for business on the Monday following the accident.
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been settled between Helton and Myers Chevrolet’s workers’ compensation
insurer.
On January 9, 2007, Helton filed a civil complaint in the Knox Circuit
Court alleging general negligence against Tri-County Cycles, Myers Chevrolet,
and Wilcheck. He also filed a products liability claim against Tri-County Cycles.
The circuit court initially denied the appellees’ motion for summary judgment and
held the case in abeyance while Helton pursued his workers’ compensation claim
against Myers Chevrolet.
On November 18, 2008, the circuit court granted summary judgment
in favor of Myers Chevrolet and Wilcheck on the basis of workers’ compensation
immunity pursuant to KRS 342.690(1), which provides in part as follows:
If an employer secures payment of compensation
as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer
under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents,
next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on
account of such injury or death.
On December 17, 2008, the court also granted summary judgment in favor of TriCounty Cycles on the basis of workers’ compensation immunity. This appeal by
Helton followed.
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
-3-
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). “The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Even though a trial
court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should
not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact.” Id. Further,
“the movant must convince the court, by the evidence of record, of the
nonexistence of an issue of material fact.” Id. at 482.
Helton first argues that the circuit court erred in awarding summary
judgment in favor of Tri-County Cycles because Tri-County Cycles was neither his
direct employer nor his statutory “up-the-ladder” employer and, therefore, was not
entitled to workers’ compensation immunity. When the facts are substantially
undisputed, the question of employment status is an issue of law. Brewer v.
Millich, 276 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Ky. 1955).
The circuit court noted that all Myers Chevrolet salespersons,
including Helton, had executed a salesperson’s license with Tri-County Cycles as
required by the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Commission. The court further noted that
Tri-County Cycles had no separate employees of its own but that it had relied on
the employees of Myers Chevrolet for the work that had been performed prior to
the opening of the business. The court then held as follows:
The court finds that if Mr. Helton was acting in the
course and scope of his employment with Myers
Chevrolet at the time of his accident on April 28, 2006,
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he must also be found to have been acting in the course
and scope of any employment or prospective
employment of Tri-County Cycles Barbourville, LLC as
Tri-County Cycles Barbourville, LLC had no separate
employees and the[y] could not independently commit an
act of negligence that is separate and apart from the
claims alleged against Greg Wilcheck and Myers
Chevrolet.
The court cited no legal authority to support its conclusion.
Helton argues that the court erred in determining that he was an
employee of Tri-County Cycles. He asserts that he worked exclusively for Myers
Chevrolet and never was on Tri-County Cycles’ payroll. He further states that he
never sold any ATV, motorcycle, or other vehicle for Tri-County Cycles. In
addition, Helton states that Tri-County Cycles, a separate corporation from Myers
Chevrolet, had not yet opened for business.
Although we have not been cited any Kentucky decision directly on
point, the appellees have cited Levine v. Lee’s Pontiac, 203 A.D.2d 259, 609
N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.A.D. 1994), which is similar to this case. Levine was
employed by both Lee’s Toyota and Lee’s Pontiac. The two businesses were
separate corporations, sharing the same building but occupying opposite sides.
The two businesses jointly operated a service department in the building. Levine
had general supervisory responsibilities in each business, including supervision of
the service department. He took his orders from Lee Feore, who was the owner,
president, and general manager of both corporations.
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While working for Lee’s Toyota, Levine was seriously injured when a
vehicle driven by a Lee’s Pontiac employee crashed through a wall and struck a
desk behind which Levine was standing. After accepting workers’ compensation
benefits from Lee’s Toyota, Levine filed an action against Lee’s Pontiac and the
other employee. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Lee’s
Pontiac and the employee based on a special employment relationship between
Levine and Lee’s Pontiac.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court determination of
a special employment relationship. Id. at 260-61. Additionally, the court stated
Furthermore, where, as here, the facts clearly
demonstrate the plaintiff’s dual employment status,
whether the relationship between two corporate entities is
that of joint venturers, parent and subsidiary, corporate
affiliates, or general and special employers, immunity
will be extended to all the plaintiff’s employers where the
plaintiff has accepted Workers’ Compensation benefits[.]
Id. at 261.
Helton was issued a motor vehicle salesperson’s license for both
Myers Chevrolet and Tri-County Cycles prior to his injury. In our view, the
issuance of Helton’s license for both businesses establishes his joint employment
status with both Myers Chevrolet and Tri-County Cycles.
We find the reasoning of the Levine court to be persuasive and hold
that Helton’s dual employment status precluded him from avoiding summary
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judgment in favor of Tri-County Cycles after he accepted workers’ compensation
benefits from Myers Chevrolet.3
Helton next argues that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment to Wilcheck because Wilcheck was not acting within the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Helton contends that
Wilcheck was engaged in “horseplay,” that such conduct was outside the course
and scope of Wilcheck’s employment, and, therefore, that Wilcheck does not have
immunity. See Kearns v. Brown, 627 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Ky. App. 1982).
KRS 342.690(1) states in part:
The exemption from liability given an employer by this
section shall also extend to such employer’s carrier and
to all employees, officers or directors of such employer
or carrier, provided the exemption from liability given an
employee, officer or director or an employer or carrier
shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked
physical aggression of such employee, officer or director.
This court stated in Kearns:
[T]he immunity provisions of KRS 342.690 are not
applicable to a fellow employee whose actions are so far
removed from those which would ordinarily be
anticipated by the employer that it can be said that the
employee causing the injury has removed himself from
the course of his employment or that the injury did not
arise out of the employment.
627 S.W.2d at 591.
3
Further, this includes immunity from Helton’s additional claims of negligent entrustment and
products liability against Tri-County Cycles. Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 912 (Ky.
App. 1981).
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In Haines v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 497,
499-500 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes omitted), this court stated that “[a]s a general
rule under KRS 342.690(1), an injured worker may not maintain an action at law
against a fellow employee, unless the fellow employee, i.e., the alleged tortfeasor,
committed a ‘willful and unprovoked [act of] physical aggression’ against the
injured worker.” Further, this court in Haines stated that in determining whether
the fellow employee’s act falls within the scope of his employment, “the fellow
employee’s intent in committing the act in question must also be taken into
account.” Id. at 500. In this regard, this court further explained in Haines that an
act of “horseplay” may be outside the scope of employment “if it is committed
with improper intent.” Id.
It is undisputed that Wilcheck was Helton’s supervisor and that the
accident occurred during business hours on the premises of Tri-County Cycles.
There is no allegation or evidence to support a finding that Wilcheck committed an
act of willful or unprovoked aggression against Helton. Furthermore, although
Wilcheck may have been recklessly and negligently operating the ATV at the time
of the accident, his actions were nonetheless within the scope of his employment,
thereby affording him immunity under KRS 342.690(1).4 The court did not err in
awarding summary judgment in favor of Wilcheck.
4
The ALJ in the workers’ compensation action by Helton against Myers Chevrolet determined,
contrary to Myers Chevrolet’s argument in that case, that Wilcheck was operating the ATV
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. We agree that the ALJ ruled
correctly.
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Finally, Helton argues that the circuit court erred by extending the
exclusive remedy immunity under KRS 342.690 to Myers Chevrolet because
Myers Chevrolet failed to affirmatively prove that it secured workers’
compensation insurance.
KRS 342.690(2) states:
If an employer fails to secure payment of
compensation as required by this chapter, an injured
employee, or his legal representative in case death results
from the injury, may claim compensation under this
chapter and in addition may maintain an action at law or
in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or
death, provided that the amount of compensation shall be
credited against the amount received in such action, and
provided that, if the amount of compensation is larger
than the amount of damages received, the amount of
damages less the employee’s legal fees and expenses
shall be credited against the amount of compensation. In
such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that
the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow
servant, that the employee assumed the risks of his
employment, or that the injury was due to the
contributory negligence of the employee.
In General Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007), the Kentucky Supreme
Court held:
A certification of coverage from the Department of
Workers’ Claims or an uncontroverted affidavit from the
employer’s insurer is prima facie proof that a company
has secured payment of compensation for the purposes of
KRS 342.690(1). Absent evidence that the coverage was
in some way deficient as to a worker, such a showing is
enough to invoke the exclusive remedy provision of KRS
342.690(1), if applicable.
Id. at 605.
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Although Myers Chevrolet did not produce a certification of coverage
from the Department of Workers’ Claims or an affidavit, Myers Chevrolet
produced a copy of their workers’ compensation insurance policy, which stated
that the policy was in effect from January 1, 2006, to January 1, 2007. We
conclude that this evidence coupled with Helton’s workers’ compensation award is
sufficient to invoke the exclusive remedy immunity under KRS 342.690(1). The
circuit court did not err in awarding Myers Chevrolet summary judgment.
The orders and judgments of the Knox Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
Paul J. Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
R. Craig Reinhardt
Katherine J. Hornback
Lexington, Kentucky
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