BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WOODFORD COUNTY, KENTUCKY VS. D. W. WILBURN, INC.
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RENDERED: MAY 21, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002422-MR
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000050-MR
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
WOODFORD COUNTY, KENTUCKY
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
v.
HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00242
D.W. WILBURN, INC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
AND VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: The Board of Education of Woodford County,
Kentucky appeals from the “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment”
1
Judge William L. Knopf completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of Senior
Judge service on May 7, 2010. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
entered by the Woodford Circuit Court in favor of D.W. Wilburn, Inc. in a
construction contract dispute between the parties. Wilburn has also filed a crossappeal in which it asserts that the trial court erred by failing to award the company
pre-judgment interest. After our review, we vacate the trial court’s award of postjudgment interest to Wilburn and reject Wilburn’s cross-appeal for pre-judgment
interest, but we otherwise affirm the court’s judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 21, 2003, Wilburn, a general contractor, entered into a
written contract with the Board to build the new Woodford County Middle School
in Versailles, Kentucky. Wilburn was to be paid a total of $15,624,000 for its
efforts. The contract incorporated a set of conditions referred to as the “General
Conditions of the Contract for Construction,” along with amendments mandated by
the Kentucky Department of Education, Division of Facilities Management
pursuant to 702 KAR2 4:160. JRA Architects (JRA) was to serve as the Board’s
agent for the project and was responsible for such tasks as administering the
contract and making decisions regarding changes to the project, time extensions,
and determining when the project was substantially complete. The majority of
these efforts were conducted by JRA architect Robert Deal.
General Condition 8.1.3.2 required that construction of the school be
substantially complete within 395 days of the contract execution, unless that date
was extended by a change order. General Condition 9.8.1 defined “substantial
2
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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completion” as “the stage in the progress of the Work when the Work or
designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the Contract
Documents so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its intended use.”
Thus, the project was to be substantially complete by June 19, 2004 – in time for
the following school year.
By allowing for extensions via change orders, the contract anticipated
the possibility of delays and also included a number of other provisions regarding
time extensions. For example, General Condition 4.3.7.1 provided:
If the Contractor wishes to make Claim for an increase in
the Contract Time, written notice as provided herein shall
be given. The Contractor’s Claim shall include an
estimate of cost and of probable effect of delay on
progress of the Work. In the case of a continuing delay
only one claim is necessary.
General Condition 8.3.1 further stated:
If the Contractor is delayed at any time in the
commencement or progress of the Work by an act or
neglect of the Owner or Architect, or of an employee of
either, or of a separate contractor employed by the
Owner, or by changes ordered in the Work, or by labor
disputes, fire, unusual delay in deliveries, unavoidable
casualties or other causes beyond the Contractor’s
control, or by delay authorized by the Owner pending
mediation and arbitration, or by other causes which the
Architect determines may justify delay, then the Contract
Time shall be extended by Change Order for such
reasonable time as the Architect may determine.
Under General Conditions 9.8.3 and 9.8.4, the project architect was
responsible for determining when the project was substantially complete and for
submitting to Wilburn a final list of items to be completed to finish the project.
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The contract provided that “Final Completion” of the project was to occur “21 days
following substantial [completion].” General Condition 9.10.1 explained the
process by which final completion and final payment would occur as follows:
Upon receipt of written notice that the Work is ready for
final inspection and acceptance and upon receipt of a
final Application for Payment, the Architect will
promptly make such inspection and, when the Architect
finds the Work acceptable under the Contract Documents
and the Contract fully performed, the Architect will
promptly issue a final Certificate for Payment stating that
to the best of the Architect’s knowledge, information and
belief, and on the basis of the Architect’s on-site visits
and inspections, the Work has been completed in
accordance with terms and conditions of the Contract
Documents and that the entire balance found to be due
the Contractor and noted in the final Certificate is due
and payable.
During the course of its work on the project, Wilburn submitted a
number of time extension requests to Deal that, if granted, would have delayed the
date for substantial completion beyond the original 395-day term set forth in the
contract. Wilburn claims that extensions were required for a number of delays
beyond its control, including weather delays, delays resulting from changes and
additions requested by the Board, and delays caused by casework and cabinetry
provided by the Board. Deal recommended a total of 232 days in time extensions
and provided change orders to this effect to the Board for its approval. The Board
apparently approved and executed two of those change orders – for a total of 42
days – which moved the new date for substantial completion to July 31, 2004. The
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Board acknowledges, though, that it failed to voluntarily approve any other
requests by Wilburn for extensions of time to complete the project.
The question of when the project was ultimately due to be
substantially complete was of considerable importance given that the contract also
contained a liquidated damages provision stating that Wilburn would incur
damages of $1,500 per day for the first fifteen calendar days following the
substantial completion date and $3,000 per day thereafter for each day that
substantial completion had not occurred. On numerous occasions during the
course of construction, Wilburn requested resolution of the pending extension
requests, but it appears that the Board declined to agree to such and instead
threatened to resort to liquidated damages if the project was not completed as
scheduled. The Board also instructed Deal to double the amount of retainage
money it was withholding from Wilburn (from 5% to 10%) to assure Wilburn’s
performance – despite the fact that Deal and the Kentucky Department of
Education advised against it. Accordingly, it is fairly obvious from the record that
during the course of construction, the relationship between Wilburn and the Board
started to become more contentious and antagonistic in nature.
The parties agree that Wilburn did not deliver substantial completion
of the project until October 22, 2004 – well after the aforementioned deadline for
substantial completion.3 However, Wilburn’s remaining requests for extensions
essentially left the due date in a state of flux that would not be resolved for months.
3
The Board apparently refused to sign two certificates of substantial completion that were
prepared by Deal and tendered to the Board.
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In instances where extensions could not be agreed to by the parties, the contract –
specifically General Condition 4.4 and its various subparts – gave the project
architect the authority to determine whether time extensions were merited.
General Condition 4.4.5 provided:
The Architect will approve or reject Claims by written
decision, which shall state the reasons therefor and which
shall notify the parties of any change in the Contract Sum
or Contract Time or both. The approval or rejection of a
Claim by the Architect shall be final and binding on the
parties but subject to mediation and arbitration.
Deal made final decisions on Wilburn’s long-pending time extension requests in
June 2005, extending the substantial completion deadline by 106 days. The result
of this decision is that by delivering substantial completion on October 22, 2004,
Wilburn had met the new deadline for substantial completion.
However, the Board insists that Wilburn was in technical breach of
the parties’ contract from July 31, 2004 (the last agreed-upon date for substantial
completion) through June 2005. During this time, the Board instructed Deal to
deduct $319,500 in liquidated damages from the balance owed to Wilburn,
contending that Wilburn had failed to deliver substantial completion when due.
Deal also deducted a number of amounts as actual damages to correct a number of
alleged problems that Wilburn had failed to address.
The Board further notes that although substantial completion was
achieved on October 22, 2004, final completion was not achieved twenty-one days
thereafter, as required by the contract, or at any time within the next 327 calendar
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days through September 14, 2005. The Board also notes that the contract does not
specifically authorize requests for extension of the 21-day period; however, they
acknowledge that the industry custom was to permit such extensions. The Board
nevertheless maintains that Wilburn failed to submit sufficient requests for
extensions to move the date for final completion.
In response, Wilburn notes that General Condition 9.8.4 required the
project architect to submit to Wilburn a punch list of items to be finished and a
schedule for completion of those items once the architect signed off on substantial
completion. Deal acknowledged that this list was not provided concurrently with a
certificate of substantial completion and indicated that as a practical matter such
could not have been done given the size of the project. The record also reflects
that although an initial punch list was provided to Wilburn, additional punch lists
dealing with different areas of the school were submitted well into the summer of
2005. Deal and the Board also executed six construction change directives in
December 2004 requiring Wilburn to do additional work even though it was
acknowledged that the contract time was in dispute. Wilburn apparently
performed this work but was never paid for it despite the fact that Deal approved
the amounts to be added to the contract sum.
In July 2005, Wilburn made its last application to the Board for
payment in the amount of $425,763.50. However, Deal certified payment of only
$17,840, leaving a disputed balance of $406,990. On July 22, 2005, Wilburn filed
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suit against the Board in the Woodford Circuit Court.4 An amended complaint was
filed soon thereafter on July 28, 2005. Wilburn alleged that the Board had
defaulted under the terms of the parties’ contract by: (1) failing and refusing to pay
all owed sums; (2) failing to timely provide furnished items and information as
requested and otherwise causing substantial delays and expense to Wilburn; and
(3) failing to grant extensions of time for completion of the work, as required by
the contract and the surrounding circumstances. Wilburn claimed that the amount
owed under the contract, including sums owed as a result of change orders and
requested extras, was $424,830.00.5 Wilburn further alleged that the Board had
failed to pay for additional work and changes requested during the course of
construction, with the sum owed totaling $11,433.50.
Wilburn further contended that because of certain delays caused by
events beyond its control and the Board, extensions of time were required to
complete the work. Wilburn indicated that it had submitted change orders
requesting such, but – in large part – they were rejected by the Board despite the
approval of the Board’s architect. Accordingly, Wilburn sought a declaration of
rights regarding its entitlement to the requested change orders extending the
project’s completion date, as well as a declaration concerning the Board’s
entitlement to liquidated damages.
4
Wilburn also sued the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Education, but that agency
was later dismissed from the litigation by agreed order.
5
The claimed owed balance was subsequently amended to $418,423.50.
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Despite – or perhaps because of – the filing of this lawsuit, in a letter
dated August 10, 2005, the Board gave written notice to Wilburn “to proceed
forthwith to correct defective and/or non-conforming work and, as well, complete
each and every punch list and warranty item.” Of particular concern was a
defective and non-conforming roof that had been installed by a subcontractor.6
Deal subsequently tendered a letter to the Board on August 18, 2005 advising its
members that “all punch list items [were] not yet completed, warranty items [were]
not yet completed, and non-conforming work items associated with the above
referenced project [were not completed].” Deal blamed this failure on Wilburn,
contending that it had failed to provide enough properly-skilled workmen to
address any outstanding items and had otherwise failed to act with due diligence.
Accordingly, Deal advised the Board of his belief that there was “sufficient cause
to justify termination [of the contract] . . . since the contractor has persistently
failed to supply enough workmen to complete the project and has otherwise
grossly exceeded the allotted time under the contract.” In a letter dated August 23,
2005, the Board advised Wilburn of its intent to terminate Wilburn’s employment
as the project’s general contractor. The contract was terminated the following
month, and new contractors were hired to complete any remaining work. Wilburn
claims that such was done in violation of General Condition 2.4.1 because no
change order was executed indicating the change in work and contract sum.
6
Wilburn admitted that the roof was defective because of various leakage issues, and it actually
filed suit against the subcontractor because of these issues. That claim was resolved by summary
judgment and is not part of this appeal. The record reflects that Wilburn undertook to replace the
roof in December 2005 and that issues with the roof still existed at the time of trial.
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The case ultimately proceeded to a bench trial that was conducted on
July 28, 29, and 30, 2008. Prior to trial, the Board withdrew its claim for
liquidated damages but failed to pay any additional sums to Wilburn. The Board
instead maintained that it was entitled to withhold at least some of the construction
fund balance for the subject project as compensation for close-out expenses to
finish all work left incomplete by Wilburn. According to the Board, this amount
totaled over $100,000 and included sums for services by Deal beyond his original
contract, the retention of an engineer to advise the Board on the completion of the
project, and payments to two roofing companies and a builder to finish the punch
list items and to repair the roof. The Board continued to maintain that final
completion of the project had not been performed by Wilburn.
After the trial court heard all evidence, it asked the parties to prepare
and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in lieu of giving
closing arguments. On September 19, 2008, the court entered “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment” that were essentially a word-for-word
replication of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law tendered by
Wilburn. The only difference between the two was the court’s removal of a
provision granting Wilburn pre-judgment interest. The court ruled that the Board
had breached the parties’ contract in a number of ways and awarded Wilburn
judgment for $415,430.57. By agreed order entered on October 27, 2008, the
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judgment was rendered final.7 The Board’s subsequent post-trial motions were
denied. This appeal followed.
Analysis
We first address the Board’s argument that the trial court violated
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 by adopting the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law prepared by Wilburn’s counsel rather than crafting its
own. CR 52.01 states, in pertinent part: “In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment[.]”
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Bingham v.
Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. 1982).
As noted above, the trial court entered “Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment” that were essentially a word-for-word replication of the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law tendered by Wilburn. The only
significant difference between the two was the court’s removal of a provision
granting Wilburn pre-judgment interest. The Board contends that by its wholesale
adoption of Wilburn’s proposed factual findings and legal conclusions, the court
effectively failed to meet its responsibilities under CR 52.01.
In support of its argument, the Board complains that the judgment
entered by the trial court inadequately failed to acknowledge that the Board had
7
The trial court’s “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment” did not contain any
language rendering the court’s decision final and appealable because a number of other claims –
some involving other parties – remained pending. Those claims and parties are not a part of this
appeal.
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abandoned its claim for liquidated damages and had confessed judgment in favor
of Wilburn as to most of the contract balance, with the exception of just over
$100,000 in close-out expenses to finish construction. The Board also contends
that the court failed to acknowledge the Board’s confession of judgment relating to
the construction-charge directives and its request for an order requiring Wilburn to
submit a pay application with supporting documentation to permit Deal to approve
payment for any pending change directives. The Board argues that there is no
explanation for the trial court’s judgment having ignored these confessions of
judgment and acknowledgment of deficiencies in the Board’s evidence other than a
complete abdication of the court’s duty as fact-finder under CR 52.01.
Kentucky courts have historically – if somewhat inconsistently –
frowned upon the practice of a court’s adopting proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law tendered by counsel because of a concern that the court might
delegate, if not abdicate altogether, its fact-finding and decision-making
responsibilities under CR 52.01. See Bingham, 628 S.W.2d at 629; Kentucky Milk
Marketing & Anti-Monopoly Comm. v. Borden Co., 456 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Ky.
1969). With this said, however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that
tendered findings and conclusions adopted by a trial court should not be easily
rejected “in the absence of a showing that the trial judge clearly abused his
discretion and delegated his decision-making responsibility under CR 52.01[.]”
Bingham, 628 S.W.2d at 630. In Bingham, no reversible error was found to have
occurred since the record showed that the trial judge “prudently examined the
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proposed findings and conclusions and made several additions and corrections to
reflect his decision in the case.” Id. at 629. In a more recent case where both
parties submitted proposed findings of fact, as occurred here, the Supreme Court
held simply that it was “not error for the trial court to adopt findings of fact which
were merely drafted by someone else.” Prater v. Cabinet for Human Res.,
Commonwealth of Ky., 954 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1997).
We can certainly understand the basis for the Board’s argument that
the trial court has done nothing more here than mechanically adopt the findings of
fact and conclusions of law made by Wilburn. Unlike the trial court in Bingham,
the court here did little in terms of making additions or corrections to the proposed
findings and conclusions. Indeed, in reading the proposed judgment and the actual
judgment side-by-side, one would be pressed to see any difference at all between
them with the exception of the court’s elimination of a provision for pre-judgment
interest. With this said, we decline to hold that the trial court abdicated its factfinding responsibilities in this case simply because the court adopted the findings
drafted by Wilburn. See id. A number of the Board’s complaints are merely
quibbles about the fact that the court did not acknowledge its concessions in a
more direct manner, but this alone does not render the court’s judgment faulty.
Whether the court’s findings of fact were incorrect or otherwise deficient,
however, is a different question that leads us to the Board’s next argument.
The Board contends that the trial court erred in awarding Wilburn the
total amount of the disputed contract balance because the evidence did not
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establish that Wilburn was entitled to the entirety of that sum. The Board further
contends that it presented other uncontested evidence that supported a decision in
its favor as to its entitlement to certain close-out damages. Because these issues all
involve the trial court’s findings of fact, we review those findings for clear error.
CR 52.01; Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-54 (Ky. 2003). A trial court’s
findings of fact are not erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Deloney, 20 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Ky. 2000). “The test of
substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone or in the light of all the
evidence it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men.” Ky. State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky.
1972). “Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact
that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, ‘due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses’ because judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are
tasks within the exclusive province of the trial court.” Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354,
quoting CR 52.01. If the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous,
“then the appellate court’s role is confined to determining whether those facts
support the trial judge’s legal conclusion.” Deloney, 20 S.W.3d at 473-74.
The trial court ultimately concluded that the Board breached the
subject contract in multiple ways, including withholding funds owed to Wilburn,
refusing to execute valid change orders or to sign certificates of substantial
completion, and otherwise delaying and hindering Wilburn’s efforts to achieve
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final completion. The court also concluded that the Board had failed to adequately
establish that it was entitled to certain close-out expenses. Because of this, the
court concluded that Wilburn was entitled to the full amount of the contract
balance. Although the record before us does not overwhelmingly support the
court’s decision, we cannot say that its findings of fact were clearly erroneous or
its conclusions of law otherwise wrong. We question the court’s apparent
allowance of certain procedural deficiencies by Wilburn in requesting (or failing to
request) change orders for extensions of the time for final completion while
frowning upon such deficiencies for the Board in other areas or in its failure to file
a counterclaim for close-out expenses. However, the court’s decision was based
on a number of other grounds, so we cannot say that any errors in this respect are
fatal to that decision. Thus, the Board’s assertion that the portion of the court’s
judgment awarding Wilburn the full contract balance and denying its claim for
close-out expenses was made in error is rejected.
We next address the question of whether Wilburn was entitled to prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest. For reasons that are unclear from its
judgment, the trial court awarded Wilburn post-judgment interest on the contract
balance but declined to award pre-judgment interest. The Board has appealed from
the court’s award of post-judgment interest, and Wilburn has cross-appealed from
the court’s failure to award pre-judgment interest. Wilburn claims that it was
entitled to pre-judgment interest pursuant to KRS 360.010 and that it should have
applied to the $319,500 that was improperly withheld as liquidated damages
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beginning at the point at which Wilburn first applied for pay after damages began
being withheld. The question of whether Wilburn was entitled to interest is a pure
question of law requiring interpretation of a statute and application of precedent.
Therefore, it is subject to de novo review. See Neurodiagnostics, Inc. v. Ky. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2008).
“It is a well-settled principle that neither a state nor public agency is
liable for interest on public debts unless there is statutory authority or a contractual
provision authorizing the payment of interest.” Powell v. Board of Educ. of
Harrodsburg, 829 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Ky. App. 1991). Moreover, because of
sovereign immunity principles, “a statute waiving immunity must be strictly
construed and cannot be read to encompass the allowance of interest unless so
specified.” Id.; Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 140 (Ky.
2003). Wilburn contends that interest was authorized in this case pursuant to KRS
45A.2458 of the Kentucky Model Procurement Code (KMPC). In support of its
position, Wilburn cites to Univ. of Louisville v. RAM Eng’g & Const., Inc., 199
S.W.3d 746 (Ky. App. 2005), in which this Court held that the General Assembly
8
KRS 45A.245 provides:
(1) Any person, firm or corporation, having a lawfully authorized written contract with the
Commonwealth at the time of or after June 21, 1974, may bring an action against the
Commonwealth on the contract, including but not limited to actions either for breach of contracts
or for enforcement of contracts or for both. Any such action shall be brought in the Franklin
Circuit Court and shall be tried by the court sitting without a jury. All defenses in law or equity,
except the defense of governmental immunity, shall be preserved to the Commonwealth.
(2) If damages awarded on any contract claim under this section exceed the original amount of
the contract, such excess shall be limited to an amount which is equal to the amount of the
original contract.
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had waived sovereign immunity for contract actions involving agencies of the state
with the enactment of KRS 45A.245. Id. at 749.
In response, the Board argues that the aforementioned precedent is
inapplicable in this case because KRS 45A.245 lies outside the scope of the
provisions of the KMPC that may be adopted by a local government entity such as
a board of education. KRS 45A.343(1) gives local public agencies9 the option of
adopting the provisions of KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 of the KMPC, and it appears
that such has occurred here. KRS 45A.343(1) further provides that “[n]o other
statutes governing purchasing shall apply to a local public agency upon adoption of
these provisions.” The Board contends that in light of this clear, unequivocal
language, KRS 45A.245 cannot be held to apply here. We agree.
Wilburn objects to what it perceives as the inherent unfairness of this
position, claiming that the General Assembly could not possibly have intended that
a local public agency adopting the KMPC could avoid paying interest for a breach
of contract.10 However, we cannot utterly ignore the plain meaning of the words in
a statute. Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005). In fact,
“[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what the
9
The parties appear to be in agreement that the Board – or, more specifically, the school district
governed by the Board – is a “local public agency” as defined by KRS 45A.345(11).
10
Wilburn also argues that KRS 45A.245 must apply here because it provides for the
Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity in contract cases. However, KRS 160.160 is
the statute that actually operates to waive a board of education’s sovereign immunity and to
render it subject to suit. KRS 160.160(1); Powell, 829 S.W.2d at 941. We also note that
applying KRS 45A.245 in this case would raise the potentially thorny jurisdictional question of
why this action was brought in Woodford Circuit Court since that statute plainly provides that
applicable contract actions “shall be brought in the Franklin Circuit Court[.]” However, because
we hold that KRS 45A.245 does not apply here, we need not address that question further.
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legislature intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its
interpretation on any other method or source.” Id. (citation omitted). If the
General Assembly wanted KRS 45A.245 to apply to local public agencies who
have adopted the KMPC, it could have so provided or otherwise incorporated an
interest provision into the portions therein applicable to such agencies.
Consequently, Wilburn was not entitled to either pre- or post-judgment interest.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Woodford Circuit Court’s
award of post-judgment interest to appellee D.W. Wilburn, Inc. but otherwise
affirm the judgment of that court. We also deny Wilburn’s cross-appeal requesting
pre-judgment interest. This matter is remanded for correction of the judgment
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Robert L. Chenoweth
Grant R. Chenoweth
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael R. Eaves
Jason M. Colyer
Richmond, Kentucky
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