MAJOR (THOMAS CLYDE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002326-MR
THOMAS CLYDE MAJOR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00017
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Thomas Clyde Major, appeals his
conviction and sentence in the Mason Circuit Court following the trial court’s
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Major was sentenced to ten years’
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and the Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
imprisonment on a guilty plea to Flagrant Nonsupport and First-Degree Persistent
Felony Offender. Having reviewed the record, the arguments of the parties, and
the applicable law, we affirm.
Major was indicted on charges of Flagrant Nonsupport and FirstDegree Persistent Felony Offender on January 26, 2007. Almost immediately
thereafter, on February 8, 2007, the Commonwealth made a plea offer of five years
on the nonsupport charge, with dismissal of the persistent felony offender charge,
and a payment of $3000.00. Major rejected the offer and the Commonwealth made
this offer twice more prior to the time that trial was to occur on July 23, 2008.
Major had been appointed an attorney from the Department of Public
Advocacy to represent him at trial. Major states that during the time leading up to
trial, he attempted to inform his counsel that he had not paid his child support
because he was a convicted felon and thereby could not find a job,2 and because for
part of the time he was supposed to be making support payments, he was
incarcerated. Major also testified that he had conducted research concerning the
punishments applicable to the offenses with which he was charged.
Major met with his counsel on the day of trial and had a conversation
in which counsel informed Major that if he went to trial, he would be found guilty
and would be sentenced to ten years, without a chance at probation. Major states
that this conversation scared him and that he began to consider entering a guilty
2
Major states, in support of this assertion, that he had taken a questionnaire to local businesses
asking them if they would hire convicted felons, with 95% stating that they would not, and the
remaining 5% refusing to provide that information.
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plea. Major’s trial counsel testified during the course of the hearing that during his
conversation with Major, he could not remember if he and Major specifically
discussed the PFO charge. Major testified that he did not realize he was pleading
guilty to the PFO charge until he was standing before the judge.
During the course of entering the guilty plea, defense counsel told the
court that Major had decided to enter a guilty plea instead of having the trial that
was scheduled for that day. At that time, the trial court asked what Major and the
Commonwealth had worked out, and the Commonwealth responded that nothing
had been worked out, and Major would be making an open plea to the Court. The
Commonwealth further stated that it was “fine” with Major entering an open plea
to both charges. Defense counsel then stated to the court that he had gone over the
elements of both charges, as well as any defenses that Major had to them.
Major then admitted his guilt to both charges. After he did so, the
trial court advised Major that the penalty range would be ten to twenty years
because of the PFO charge. At that time, Major requested permission to consult
with his attorney. Defense counsel advised the court that they would seek
probation at sentencing, and Major stated to the court that he did not need any
more time to talk with his attorney. Major acknowledged that no threats or
promises had been made to him in exchange for his guilty plea. He further
acknowledged that he had not paid child support, that he owed at least $1000.00
and that he had at least two prior felony convictions. Major also stated that he was
pleading guilty without threat, force, promises, or pressure from anyone to do so.
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Thereafter, Major filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In so
doing, Major argued that his plea was not knowingly made because he was not
advised by counsel as to the charges, the consequences of the charges and the
amount of time that could be served as a result of a guilty plea. Major claimed that
he had no intention of entering a plea to PFO First Degree, particularly after
rejecting three plea deals which offered to dismiss the PFO charge altogether.
Nevertheless, Major acknowledged that he has entered guilty pleas on many other
occasions and was familiar with the process. He also acknowledged that he and his
counsel had prepared for a previous trial date, although the trial had ultimately
been postponed because the prosecutor was ill. Major acknowledged that the
Commonwealth had made three plea offers to him, all for five years, and that he
turned them all down immediately.
Major’s trial counsel, Tom Griffiths, also testified at the hearing on
Major’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. He stated that he had met with Major
on at least five separate occasions and had also spoken with him by phone several
times. Griffiths acknowledged that he had a large caseload and had spent “all of
his time” preparing for a serious upcoming felony case which had been awaiting
trial for two years, and that, “To say I put it (Major’s case) on the backburner is not
strong enough. I pretty much took it off the stove.”3
Nevertheless, counsel stated that he had discussed plea deals with
Major several times, and had in fact discussed a plea offer in depth on March 10,
3
See VR No. 1, 10/23/08; 2:11:57.
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2008, the date the trial was initially to be held. Counsel stated that Major advised
him that he did not want that deal, and that they made a counteroffer to the
Commonwealth, which was rejected. Griffiths also acknowledged that discovery
was exchanged and stated that the defense they had prepared to present was that
Major had not been able to pay his child support because he could not get a job as
a result of his incarceration and felony record. Griffiths testified that he and Major
did not talk much about the PFO charge that morning, but did discuss the penalty
range associated with the PFO charge. Griffiths also testified that he told Major
that he did not believe Major would get probation if he went to trial. Griffiths
stated that he gave Major the best advice he could based upon the facts of the
situation.
On November 14, 2008, the trial court denied Major’s motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. In so doing, it found that Major had entered a knowing
and voluntary guilty plea and that Major fully understood what he was doing. The
court further found that Major was well-represented, that he met with his counsel
on numerous occasions prior to trial and that his attorney was present and ready to
proceed with the trial. After denying Major’s motion, the court sentenced him to
ten years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Major argues that the trial court erred to his substantial
prejudice in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea in this matter. Major
argues that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because he was not
advised by counsel as to the charges, the consequences of those charges, and the
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amount of time that they carried. Major asserts that he had no intention of entering
a plea to PFO First Degree, particularly after turning down plea offers that agreed
to dismiss the PFO altogether. In response, the Commonwealth argues that the
trial court was within its discretion to deny Major’s motion because the plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and that changing one’s mind is an insufficient
reason to withdraw a plea. We agree.
It is in the trial court’s discretion pursuant to RCr 8.10 whether to
allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. See also Bronk v. Commonwealth,
58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders
a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal
principles. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006). The
inquiry into the circumstances of the plea as it concerns voluntariness is inherently
fact-sensitive. Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination as to whether the
plea was voluntarily entered is reviewed by appellate courts under the clearly
erroneous standard. Id.
Previously, we have succinctly summarized the law concerning the
validity of guilty pleas as follows:
In determining the validity of guilty pleas in criminal
cases, the plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative course of action open to the
defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986). The
United States Supreme Court has held that both federal
and state courts must satisfy themselves that guilty pleas
are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent
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defendants. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Since pleading guilty
involves the waiver of several constitutional rights,
including the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to
confront one's accusers, a waiver of these rights cannot
be presumed from a silent record. The court must
question the accused to determine that he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequences, and this determination should become part
of the record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Sparks, supra.
The validity of a guilty plea must be determined not from
specific key words uttered at the time the plea was taken,
but from considering the totality of circumstances
surrounding the plea. Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565
S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978); Lynch v. Commonwealth,
610 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. App. 1980); Sparks, supra. These
circumstances include the accused's demeanor,
background and experience, and whether the record
reveals that the plea was voluntarily made. Sparks,
supra, Littlefield v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 872
(Ky. App. 1977). The trial court is in the best position to
determine if there was any reluctance, misunderstanding,
involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty.
Littlefield, supra, at 874. See Kotas, supra, at 447.
Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977).
Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky.App. 1990).
Having reviewed the record in the matter sub judice, we are of the
opinion that Major entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We
are not persuaded that his rejection of previous plea offers is proof that he did not
understand the plea he made before the court at the time that other offers were no
longer available from the Commonwealth. We believe the court below was correct
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in its determination that it was not required to allow Major to withdraw the plea
simply because he changed his mind. While Major’s counsel may have been busy
with many cases, our review of the record reveals that he provided adequate
counsel to Major concerning the charges he faced and the consequences of the plea
that he entered. Major entered this plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
before the court. Accordingly, we do not believe that the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw that plea.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the December
12, 2008, Judgment and Sentence on Plea of Guilty entered by the Honorable
Lewis D. Nicholls of the Mason Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd. D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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