LYVERS (RICO) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002276-MR
RICO LYVERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-01125
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Rico Lyvers seeks reversal of the trial court’s denial
of his request for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no error and affirm the
order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
On August 17, 2003 an off-duty Lexington police detective and her
female roommate were approached by Lyvers as they exited their vehicle in the
parking lot of their apartment building. Lyvers put a screwdriver to the throat of
the detective’s roommate and demanded money from the women. The detective
identified herself as a police officer but Lyvers, undeterred, collected their wallets
and ran to a car waiting at the opposite end of the parking lot. The officer would
later recall that she had seen the same car in the parking lot earlier and that two
men had been inside the car apparently arguing.
The two women followed the fleeing vehicle and called 911. The
women saw the occupants throw something out of the vehicle. Receipts from one
of the women’s wallets were later recovered from that location.
When the vehicle stopped Rico fled, but the driver stayed with the
vehicle and motioned for the detective to come over to his vehicle. She again
identified herself as a police officer and said that additional police were on their
way. The driver went into a nearby apartment just as the police arrived. A woman
who came out of the apartment stated that the man who had just entered was her
boyfriend, Rodriguez Lyvers. She identified Rico Lyvers as the other occupant of
the car. Rodriguez agreed to lead officers to his brother’s apartment. Rico was
later arrested at the rear window of his apartment. The detective who was the
victim of the robbery identified him at the scene as the perpetrator.
Officers entered the apartment through the open window and
conducted a protective sweep of the premises. They confiscated a shirt that
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matched the description from the robbery victims. During questioning, Rico
Lyvers stated he could only remember parts of the evening’s events because he had
been drinking heavily but he denied involvement in any robbery. Four days later,
while in jail, he asked to see the investigating detective and stated he wanted to
“make a deal” in exchange for a truthful statement. Although he still claimed not
to remember many details because of his level of intoxication that night, he did
admit robbing the two women.
A jury found him guilty of all charges and recommended a sentence of
10 years for each count of robbery, enhanced to 20 years because of his status as a
persistent felony offender. The jury recommended that the sentences be served
concurrently for a total of 20 years. The trial judge accepted the jury’s
recommended sentences but ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for
a total of 40 years. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that judgment in a
not-to-be-published opinion, Lyvers v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-0601-MR,
2006 WL 2452557 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2006). Lyvers then filed this RCr 11.42 motion.
Lyvers alleged that his counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
deficient because he failed to meet with Lyvers prior to trial to discuss strategy or
prepare for trial. He further alleged that his counsel was not a licensed attorney
and that he failed to contact witnesses and was under the influence of drugs or
intoxicants or was “distracted” at trial. Finally, he contended that the cumulative
effect of these errors denied him effective assistance of counsel. The motion was
denied by the trial court without a hearing and this appeal followed.
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When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are
guided by the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . .
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
Id. It is Lyvers’ burden to meet this two-part test and overcome the strong
presumption that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Moore v.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1998). On review, we give counsel’s
decisions the benefit of the doubt and avoid second guessing or hindsight.
McQueen v. Commmonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Ky. 1997).
Lyvers’ first argument, that counsel failed to meet with him, is a
conclusory statement lacking any factual basis to support it. Lyvers is unable to
provide any information that would lead us to believe additional meetings with
counsel would have overcome the strong evidence of the victim identifications of
Lyvers and the clothing worn during the robbery coupled with his confession. To
show that a deficiency by counsel resulted in actual prejudice, Lyvers must present
information that there was a reasonable probability the outcome would have been
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different. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 412 (Ky. 2002) (internal
citation omitted). He failed to meet that burden.
Next, Lyvers argues that counsel was required to contact certain alibi
witnesses. He claims that his brother would have testified that it was not Rico who
committed the robbery. But that testimony, if adduced, would have directly
contradicted his brother’s statement to police. Lyvers also identifies a woman
whom he claims would have provided alibi testimony. We fail to see how this
could have assisted in Lyvers’ defense in view of the fact that he admitted to the
police that he committed the robbery. We are at a loss to understand how
presenting witnesses who contradict their initial statements to the police or provide
an alibi after a confession would have helped Lyvers at trial. “Decisions relating to
witness selection are normally left to counsel's judgment and this judgment will not
be second-guessed by hindsight.” Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir.
1998).
Lyvers now acknowledges that his attorney was indeed licensed to
practice law in the Commonwealth and that issue is conceded. Regarding
substance abuse and mental impairment of counsel, Lyvers also admits that such
actions were unknown to him at the time of the trial. Although the attorney
apparently was later charged with possession of substances used to manufacture
illegal drugs, there is no indication counsel was under the influence while
representing Lyvers. The trial court found no factual basis for such allegations,
instead finding that counsel
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provided very effective representation given the facts and
admissions[.] Counsel cross-examined all of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, objected at appropriate
times, argued effectively for an alternative defense that
was ultimately included in the jury instructions,
suggested several alternative theories on which the jury
could find in favor of [Lyvers and] [r]easonable doubt
was raised and emphasized throughout the trial
proceeding.
Lyvers is not guaranteed errorless counsel but counsel likely to render reasonably
effective assistance. McQueen, 949 S.W.2d at 71. The record makes it difficult to
believe counsel was in any manner incapacitated.
Finally, Lyvers argues that if the individual errors were not sufficient
to find ineffective assistance of counsel in themselves, they were cumulatively
sufficient to render the trial suspect. As we found no error in any of the issues
raised, any cumulative error argument must fail.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rico Arnez Lyvers, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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