WHITE (ROY E.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002120-MR
ROY E. WHITE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00073
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: FORMTEXT TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; HENRY,
SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Roy E. White brings this pro se appeal from a
November 5, 2008, order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion following an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
Appellant was found guilty of first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and improper signal. He was
sentenced to a total of twenty-years’ imprisonment. A direct appeal of his
conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Appeal No. 2006-SC000598-MR. Thereafter, appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his
sentence of imprisonment. Following appointment of counsel and an evidentiary
hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. This appeal follows.
Appellant contends that the circuit court erroneously denied his RCr
11.42 motion to vacate. Appellant initially asserts that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise a proper objection during trial under RCr 9.57.
To prevail upon an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, it
must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that such
deficiency resulted in prejudice – that there exists a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different but for counsel’s defective performance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
RCr 9.57(1) reads:
(1) If a jury reports to a court that it is unable to reach a
verdict and the court determines further deliberations
may be useful, the court shall not give any instruction
regarding the desirability of reaching a verdict other than
one which contains only the following elements:
(a) in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree to
that verdict;
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(b) jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can
be done without violence to individual judgment;
(c) each juror must decide the case, but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with the other
jurors;
(d) in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and change
his or her opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(e) no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because
of the opinion of other jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
Under RCr 9.57, the trial court may require the jury to continue
deliberations after announcing a deadlock but should instruct the jury under the
elements contained in subsection (1)(a) - (e). Com. v. Mitchell, 943 S.W.2d 625
(Ky. 1997). Also, the Supreme Court has held that a “violation of RCr 9.57 . . .
[does] not create reversible error per se[;]” rather, the trial court’s improper
comment to the jury must be “coercive.” Mills v. Com., 996 S.W.2d 473, 493 (Ky.
1999).
In this case, the record reveals that the trial court did make comments
to the foreperson of the jury at the bench after the foreperson announced the jury
might be deadlocked on one of the four charges. The record also indicates that the
trial court sent the jury back for further deliberations without complying with RCr
9.57 and that defense counsel raised no objection under RCr 9.57.
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In appellant’s direct appeal (Appeal No. 2006-SC-000598-MR),
appellant argued that the trial court violated RCr 9.57 and that such violation
resulted in palpable error under RCr 10.26. In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court held, “[f]rom our review of the court’s statements to the
foreperson, there was no coercive element to the statements.” So, while the tenets
of RCr 9.57 may have been violated by the trial court, we cannot say that
prejudicial error resulted as the trial court’s improper comments were deemed not
coercive. See Mills, 996 S.W.2d 473. Consequently, we do not believe that
appellant demonstrated that trial counsel’s failure to object under RCr 9.57 resulted
in prejudicial error.
Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly investigate the facts and the law. In particular, appellant maintains:
Appellant, however was acquitted of introducing these
drugs into the facility but found guilty of Trafficking the
same drugs which he was found not guilty of possessing.
Thus, the evidence does not support the charge of
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, as the jury found
appellant “not guilty” of First-Degree Promotion of
Contraband, (i.e. the cocaine which was found in the
trash can in the Booking Station area). Appellant
contends that counsel should have been aware of the fact
that the underlying charge of Promoting Contraband was
necessary and the only “nexus” for appellant’s conviction
of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance. . . .
Essentially, appellant argues that the jury reached inconsistent
verdicts by convicting him of trafficking in a controlled substance (Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412) while acquitting him of promoting contraband
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(KRS 520.050). In this Commonwealth, jury verdicts need not be entirely
consistent if the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s separate verdict. Com.
v. Harrell, 3 S.W.3d 349 (Ky. 1999).
The evidence at trial established that a search of appellant’s vehicle
revealed a box of plastic baggies and digital scales with cocaine residue thereupon.
At the Fayette County Detention Center, appellant attempted to discard a baggie
containing 7.4 grams of crack cocaine into a trash bin. This evidence alone is
sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt upon first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance under KRS 218A.1412. Thus, trial counsel was not
ineffective in this regard.
We view appellant’s remaining contention as either moot or without
merit.
In sum, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied appellant’s
RCr 11.42 motion to vacate sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy E. White, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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