J. (J.) VS. C. (P.)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002056-ME
J.J.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-J-00359
P.C.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; GRAVES,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: J.J. (father) brings this appeal from an order of the
McCracken Family Court awarding joint custody of the parties' minor child to
father and P.C. (mother) and designating mother as the child’s primary residential
custodian. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
1
Senior John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
Father and mother are the biological parents of a minor child, E.C.,
born August 21, 2002. The parties were never married and never resided together.
During the child’s earliest years, he resided with his mother but was frequently
visited by father. On June 5, 2005, father filed a petition to establish paternity,
custody, child support, and visitation. By order entered on November 29, 2006,
the parties stipulated that J.J. was the biological father of child.
On March 26, 2007, the family court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on the custody issue. During the hearing, a substantial amount of evidence was
introduced regarding mother’s mental health. On April 2, 2007, the family court
issued an order, awarding the parties joint custody and designating the father as the
child’s primary residential custodian.
Following the family court’s order, mother appealed to this Court, and
a unanimous panel of this Court, in Case No. 2007-CA-000925-ME, vacated the
family court’s order due to its failure to “make any findings of fact as required by
CR 52.01 to support its award of custody.” On remand, on September 23, 2008,
the family court held another evidentiary hearing regarding all events occurring
after the issuance of its initial custody order. After the hearing, the family court
issued an order awarding the parents joint custody and designating mother as the
child’s primary residential custodian. This appeal follows.
Father argues that the family court erred by using his motion to
relocate against him in reversing its initial primary residential custodian award.
We disagree.
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On June 6, 2007, father filed a motion for modification of visitation
and a motion to relocate. He claimed that his employer was relocating him to
Idaho Falls, Idaho, due to a staffing reduction at its Kentucky facility. On July 2,
2007, the family court issued an order denying father’s motion. The family court’s
order provided that the proposed 1,600-mile relocation would substantially restrict
mother’s visitation to approximately four times per year. Therefore, the family
court held that it was not in the child’s best interest to grant the relocation.
While father contends that his relocation should not have been a factor
in the family court’s decision, this contention, regarding the application of KRS
403.270, unduly restricts the proper scope of a family court’s analysis. The
unequivocal language of KRS 403.270(2) provides that all relevant factors,
including those enumerated by statute, must be considered when determining the
best custody arrangement for a child. Accordingly, to the extent that the family
court believed that father’s attempt to relocate the child was detrimental to the
child’s best interest, the family court permissibly used the relocation proceedings
as one of many factors in determining the best custody arrangement for the child.
Father next argues that the family court erred in its reliance on
mother’s mental health records in reaching a custody determination. He argues
that the record was clear that mother experienced significant mental health
incidents. Additionally, he argues that the family court’s decision was unsupported
by new evidence to justify changing the existing custody arrangement and, thus,
must be reversed. We disagree.
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When ruling on a child custody matter, a family court must determine
what custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child. Young v. Holmes,
295 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Ky.App. 2009). Further, KRS 403.270(2) outlines the
factors which a family court must consider in deciding its custody award. KRS
403.270(2) provides the following:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be
given to each parent and to any de facto custodian. The
court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents, and any de
facto custodian, as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and
community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals
involved;
(f) Information, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.720;
(g) The extent to which the child has been cared for,
nurtured, and supported by any de facto custodian;
(h) The intent of the parent or parents in placing the child
with a de facto custodian; and
(i) The circumstances under which the child was placed
or allowed to remain in the custody of a de facto
custodian, including whether the parent now seeking
custody was previously prevented from doing so as a
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result of domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720
and whether the child was placed with a de facto
custodian to allow the parent now seeking custody to
seek employment, work, or attend school.
Our review of the family court’s decision is limited to the clearly
erroneous standard whereby we are required to give due regard to the family
court’s determination regarding the credibility of witnesses. Reichle v. Reichle,
719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Under this standard, findings of fact are clearly
erroneous only if they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Frances
v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Ky. 2008). If the findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous, our remaining task is limited to determining if the family court
abused its discretion. Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
Because there is no dispute regarding the family court’s findings of facts, we
accept them as being conclusive for the purpose of this appeal.
While father contends that the family court improperly relied upon the
mother’s medical records, the family court’s consideration of the records was
proper and did not constitute error. Although father points out that mother had
experienced past mental health episodes, mother’s mental health therapist testified
that mother’s treatment was successfully ongoing, that she had not experienced any
major mental status changes, and that her long-term prognosis was very good.
Although father emphasizes events occurring in the past, the family court properly
decided that her recent and projected mental health status was more important in its
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decision. Frances, 266 S.W.3d at 758-59 (trial court is in the best position to
resolve competing evidence).
Father further argues that there was no new compelling evidence to
support the family court’s decision. However, this argument ignores the newly
introduced evidence regarding the parenting of the child subsequent to the family
court’s initial custody order. Specifically, the family court’s order stated that
“[t]he parents...have different approaches to parenting. The Court finds that the
parenting approach of the mother is more appropriate and nurturing than the
parenting approach of the father.” Although the family court’s determination can
be disputed, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support its conclusion.
For example, based on a Conners Rating Scale report, father believed
that his son was not experiencing any significant behavioral difficulties, but the
mother’s report indicated that she believed that her son had significant behavioral
difficulties which adversely affected his academic achievement. When the child’s
kindergarten teacher was questioned regarding this inconsistency, she agreed with
the mother’s behavioral assessment of child. Mother further testified that father
was resistant in obtaining behavioral therapy for child even though a diagnostic
test revealed that child appeared to have ADHD. Finally, the family court noted
the positive effect of the mother’s presence on the child.
While father disagrees with the family court’s decision, we are limited
to determining whether the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable,
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unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). From a review of the record, we
conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion in designating mother as
the child’s primary residential custodian.
We finally note from father’s argument that there was no new
compelling evidence to support a custody modification is misplaced. Although
citing Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ky. 1987), for the proposition that a
child custody arrangement must remain static unless a change of circumstances
necessitates modification, father misreads Chenault and fails to appreciate the
import of this Court’s decision in Case No. 2007-CA-000925-ME, the parties’
earlier appeal.
First, Chenault simply limits the modification of a “prior custody
decree,” not a child custody arrangement, to circumstances necessitating
modification for the best interest of a child. Id. Second, when an appellate court
overturns a decision of a lower court, it is as if the lower court’s decision never
existed. Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Ky.App. 1986). Consequently, due to
the reversal of the parties’ initial custody decree and the lack of a presumption for
a mere child custody arrangement, father’s argument has no basis in fact or law.
For the foregoing reasons, the McCracken Family Court’s custody
order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Delbert K. Pruitt
Paducah, Kentucky
Karen Alderdice
Paducah, Kentucky
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