WILSON (CHARLES L.) VS. CITY OF CENTRAL CITY, KENTUCKY, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001547-MR
CHARLES L. WILSON, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00469
CITY OF CENTRAL CITY, KENTUCKY, AND
HUGH W. SWEATT, MAYOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Charles L. Wilson, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s dismissal
of his case by summary judgment. In his appeal, Wilson argues that there are
questions of fact regarding the termination of his employment from the City of
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Central City, Kentucky (Central City ), Water Works Department (the Water
Works), and that summary judgment was not appropriate. Specifically, Wilson
argues that he was not an “at-will” employee; that he was not given any warning
that his job performance was deficient; that he was dismissed for reasons that were
inadequate to support his termination; and that his discharge was in retaliation for
his “whistleblower” activities. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Wilson began working for Central City in 1982 as an operator at the
Water Works. In 1985, Wilson was promoted to head operator, a position he held
until his termination in June 2003. Wilson’s termination is at the root of this
litigation; therefore, we will focus our summary on the facts surrounding that
event.
In 1983 or ’84, the Water Works purchased a computer for use in
monitoring water and chemical levels. Through the years, the Water Works and/or
Central City bought successive replacement computers. Sometime in the 1990’s,
access to the internet became available on the computer at the Water Works.
Initially, and during the times relevant herein, access to the internet was through a
dial-up account. For most of the time Wilson worked for Central City there was
only one telephone line at the Water Works. Therefore, when someone was using
the computer at the Water Works to access the internet, no incoming calls could be
received. It is unclear when, but at some time before Central City discharged
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Wilson, the Water Works got a second telephone line, making it possible to use the
telephone while also accessing the internet.
In 2000, Wilson noticed that the computer at the Water Works was
“losing data.” Wilson conducted an investigation and, with the assistance of a
computer technician, determined that one of the Water Works employees, Chris
Pentecost, was using the computer to download and play games. According to
Wilson, Pentecost was also using an internet “scrubber” in an attempt to hide his
activities. Wilson testified that, because of Pentecost’s activities, the Water Works
and/or Central City incurred unnecessary expenses making repairs to the computer.
In January 2001, Wilson fired Pentecost because of Pentecost’s unauthorized use
of the computer as well as for other infractions, including failure to perform work
duties. Wilson testified that, prior to discharging Pentecost, he had “written him
up” and warned Pentecost that he could be discharged for violating Water Works
rules and regulations. James Brown, superintendent of the Water Works, testified
that, after Pentecost was discharged, he told Wilson that no one was permitted to
use the computer at the Water Works for personal business.
In October 2002, Wilson and his wife began dissolution proceedings.
The dissolution apparently was not amicable as the parties had mutual restraining
orders. After the dissolution proceedings began, co-workers testified that Wilson
became somewhat obsessed with issues related to the dissolution, particularly those
related to custody of his son. Tony Daniel, assistant superintendent of the Water
Works, testified that he heard complaints from at least one Water Works employee
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that Wilson talked of little else. Wesley Morgan, chief operator at the Water
Works after Wilson’s discharge, testified that Wilson would come to the Water
Works at night and use the computer for four to five hours at a time to research
issues related to the dissolution. Brown testified that employees at the Water
Works complained to him that Wilson wasted work time discussing his marital
problems and using the computer for personal reasons.
In addition to the preceding, employees at the Water Works also
complained that Wilson would hunt for arrowheads during working hours; that
Wilson would go to lunch with the other day-shift employees, leaving the Water
Works unattended; and that mismanagement by Wilson resulted in employees
working unnecessary overtime. Brown testified that employee morale under
Wilson was an issue and Hugh Sweatt, mayor of Central City, testified that a
number of employees stated that they did not believe they could continue working
for Wilson.
On June 17, 2003, Sweatt wrote a letter to Brown advising Brown that
“serious personnel allegations [had] been made against Water Company employee
Chuck Wilson.” The allegations included “misuse of the city computer, falsifying
payroll time slips, and general mismanagement of the Water Plant.” Sweatt
advised Brown to conduct an investigation and, pending the outcome of that
investigation, to suspend Wilson. Brown notified Wilson of his suspension and
conducted an investigation. Based on the results of that investigation, Sweatt sent
correspondence to Wilson on June 30, 2003, stating that Wilson’s employment had
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been terminated. Sweatt stated that Wilson was being discharged because of
“[g]ross unauthorized use of a City computer located at the water plant [and]
[n]eglect of duties, mismanagement of the water plant, and abuse of authority.”
Sweatt noted that Wilson’s use of the computer for his personal benefit interfered
with Wilson’s ability to perform his job duties, including the management and
supervision of employees. Sweatt concluded that these actions “constitute[d]
unsatisfactory performance of [Wilson’s] duties,” hindered “the performance of
City functions,” and formed the “grounds for dismissal.” In that correspondence,
Sweatt also advised Wilson that he could request a grievance hearing. Although
the record does not contain any documentation to that effect, it appears that Wilson
did request a grievance hearing and the hearing body or officer confirmed the
mayor’s decision to terminate Wilson’s employment.
In his defense, Wilson testified that Brown never explicitly told him
not to use the computer at the Water Works for personal business. Because he
knew that other Central City employees, including Brown, used Central City
computers for personal business, Wilson believed he could do so as well.
With regard to the alleged “whistleblower” activities, Wilson testified
that he had made a number of complaints to Brown regarding potential hazardous
conditions at the Water Works. Those complaints included faulty wiring, problems
associated with working in confined spaces, inadequate lighting, and the absence
of a telephone at the intake. It appears that these issues, with the exception of
those associated with working in confined spaces, were addressed, although not
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necessarily to Wilson’s satisfaction. It is not clear from the record when Wilson
voiced these complaints; however, it appears that it was a significant period of time
before his dismissal.
Wilson also testified that he complained at various times to Jim
Sproles at the Division of Water for the Commonwealth about Brown’s handling
of leaks and boil water advisories, the way tanks and lines were disinfected, and
about problems with handling of hazardous chemicals. We note that the
complaints were made either after Wilson’s suspension or more than a year before
he was suspended.
Based on the preceding evidence, the trial court granted Central City’s
motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court found that Wilson was an atwill employee. Furthermore, the court found that Wilson was not entitled to
protection under the “whistleblower” statute because the problems he reported had
to do with “methods of management” not violations of statutes or regulations and
any such complaints were made after his suspension or “more than a year prior to
the suspension.”
It is from the court’s summary judgment that Wilson appeals. As
noted above, Wilson argues on appeal that he was not an “at-will” employee; that
he was not given any warning that his job performance was deemed deficient; that
he was dismissed for reasons that were inadequate to support his termination; and
that his discharge was in retaliation for his whistleblower activities.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pearson
ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002). Summary
judgment is only proper when “it would be impossible for the respondent to
produce any evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest,
Inc., v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to construe the record “in
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.” Id. at 480. In Steelvest the word “‘impossible’ is used in a
practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652,
654 (Ky. 1992).
ANALYSIS
We will first address the nature of the employment relationship
between Wilson and Central City, and then we will address whether Wilson’s
actions were protected under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.101, et. seq.
(the Act).
1. Whether Wilson was an At-Will Employee
Wilson argues that, because Central City had an employment manual,
he was not an at-will employee and could not be discharged without adequate
cause. In support of his position, Wilson relies primarily on Parts Depot, Inc. v.
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Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 353 (Ky. 2005). The trial court found that Wilson’s
reliance on Parts Depot was misplaced. We agree.
In Parts Depot, employees of the Housing Department of
Middlesborough argued that the Housing Department had paid them at the
incorrect rate. In support of their argument, the employees pointed to language in
the Housing Departments’ employment manual that provided for different rates of
pay based on employee classification. The Housing Department argued that the
employment manual was merely a guide and did not create a contract.
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court of Kentucky first noted
that an employment manual may, under certain circumstances, create a contract of
employment. However, the Supreme Court favorably cited an earlier Court of
Appeals opinion (Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. App. 1987))
holding that an employment manual that contains mere precatory language does
not create a contract of employment and neither does an employment manual that
contains a specific disclaimer. The Court held that the language in the Housing
Department’s employment manual was not merely precatory and that it did not
contain a disclaimer. Therefore, the Court determined that the manual created an
employment contract.
The “City of Central City Personnel Rules and Regulations” relied on
by Wilson, states in the first paragraph that:
[t]he following rules, regulations and other administrative
provisions for personnel administration (herein after
called the “Rules”) are established for the information
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and guidance of all concerned. The rules DO NOT
constitute an employment contract, or any other type of
contract, either express or implied. All employment with
the City of Central City is “Employment at will”, unless
express separate written contract is entered into.
(Emphasis in original.)
Even a cursory reading of this paragraph reveals that it contains both
precatory language - “for the information and guidance of all concerned” - and a
disclaimer - “The rules DO NOT constitute an employment contract.” As set forth
in both Nork and Parts Depot, the City of Central City Personnel Rules and
Regulations may set forth policy statements that Central City should strive to
follow; however, it does not create “an expression of a contractual agreement.”
Nork at 825. Therefore, the personnel rules and regulations did not alter Wilson’s
status as an at-will employee.
Wilson also argues that, by setting forth reasons for his discharge and
providing him with the right to request a grievance hearing, Sweatt somehow
altered Wilson’s status as an at-will employee. In Kentucky, an employer may
ordinarily “discharge an at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a
cause that some might view as morally indefensible.” Wymer v. JH Properties,
Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Ky. 2001). Wilson failed to cite any law that contradicts
the preceding or that states that the provision of cause or a review process alters the
employment relationship. Therefore, we hold that the listing of reasons for
Wilson’s termination and the provision of a grievance hearing did not act to create
an employment contract.
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It follows that, because Wilson was an at-will employee, Central City
was not required to provide him with any notice of job performance deficiencies
prior to discharging him. Furthermore, because Central City was not required to
give Wilson any reason for his termination, the adequacy of the reasons given is
irrelevant.
2. Application of the Act
At the outset, we note Central City’s argument that it is not an
employer for purposes of the Act. In support of its argument, Central City points
to two federal district court cases interpreting KRS 61.101(2). Although we are
not bound to follow those cases as binding precedent, we find them to be
persuasive.
In Baker v. McDaniel, 2008 WL 215241 (E.D. Ky. 2008), a firefighter
raised a number of complaints regarding the safety and reliability of equipment
used by the Stanford Fire Department. When the complaints were not addressed to
his satisfaction, the firefighter attempted to bring them before City Council. The
City Council did not address the complaints and the firefighter was ultimately
fired. He brought an action against the City of Stanford for wrongful termination,
claiming protection under the Act. The City of Stanford filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that it was not an employer as defined by the Act.
The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that “KRS
61.101(2) only applies to the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its ‘political
subdivisions’ and not to private entities.” Id. at *3. In support of its findings, the
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district court noted that cities, unlike counties, are not entitled to sovereign
immunity. Id. (citing to Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky.
1964); Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985);
Bolden v. City of Covington, 803 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1991)). The district court
found this distinction to be “important because the omission of municipalities from
the definition of ‘employer’ in KRS 61.101(2) must be presumed to be intentional
under ordinary rules of statutory construction.” Id. Furthermore, the district court
noted that:
[t]he language of the statute is certainly not plain or
explicit with regard to municipalities. In contrast, the
defendants point to numerous other Kentucky statutes
which plainly include municipalities when defining the
scope of a statutory scheme. In drafting these statutes,
the General Assembly considered it necessary to list
political subdivisions separately from municipalities.
Moreover, the failure to exclude municipalities from the
scope of a statute does not necessarily mean they should
be included. Rather, the enumeration of a particular
thing, in the [sic] case ‘political subdivision,’
demonstrates that the omission of another thing,
municipalities, is an intentional exclusion.
Id. (citing to Louisville Water Co. v. Wells, 664 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. App. 1984)).
In its opinion, the district court did not list the statutes referred to by the City of
Stanford. However, we have reviewed the City of Stanford’s brief in Baker and
note that it cited the following as examples of the legislature designating
municipalities as separate from either the Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions: Section 177 of the Kentucky Constitution, KRS 18A.160(2), KRS
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56.460, KRS 61.900(7), KRS 76.269, KRS 187.610, KRS 224.60-115(14), KRS
235.410(3), KRS 318.010(9), and KRS 341.055(4).
In Kindle v. City of Jeffersontown, 2009 WL 69231 (W.D. Ky. 2009),
two police officers complained that their superior had created a hostile work
environment. Ultimately, the officers were discharged. The district court, in
addressing whether the officers’ actions were protected by the Act, stated as
follows:
There is little in the plain language of KRS 61.101 et seq.
[sic] to guide the court in determining whether
municipalities are political subdivisions of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky under the statute.
Application of the traditional textual canons provides
little assistance. Statutes in pari materia [sic] reveal that
state lawmakers have used the terms “political
subdivisions” and “municipalities” both conjunctively
and disjunctively across the whole spectrum of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes. However, because the
Whistleblower Act defines “employer” as “the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political
subdivisions” to the exclusion of “municipalities,” which
are distinct from counties in nature and from agencies
and counties based on sovereign immunity, the court
finds that municipalities are not political subdivisions
under the statute. Therefore, Jeffersontown is not an
employer under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act.
Id. at *6.
As did the federal district courts, we believe that the separate listing of
“the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions” from “municipalities” shows an
intent by the legislature to treat those entities differently. This conclusion is
further supported by opinions of the Supreme Court holding that municipalities are
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not entitled to the sovereign immunity extended to the Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions. See Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky.
1964); Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985);
Bolden v. City of Covington, 803 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1991).
We agree with the federal district courts that the exclusion of
municipalities from the definition of employer in KRS 61.101(2) must be deemed
intentional. Applying the district courts’ conclusions to the case at hand, we hold
that Central City, a municipality, is not an employer under KRS 61.101(2).
Therefore, although it did so for different reasons, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment.
Although we need not do so, we will address Wilson’s argument that
the trial court improperly interpreted KRS 61.103(1)(b) as mandating dismissal of
his claim of protection under the Act. In support of his argument that he was
wrongfully discharged, Wilson cites to complaints that he made to the Division of
Water between 1999 and 2003 and to the Occupational Safety & Health
Administration after he was suspended. We note that Wilson testified that several
of his complaints to the Division of Water were made after his suspension.
Furthermore, he testified that complaints that he made to the Division of Water
before his suspension, were made more than a year earlier.
KRS 61.102(1) provides that no employer may retaliate against any
employee who in good faith reports or discloses
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any facts or information relative to an actual or suspected
violation of any law, statute, executive order,
administrative regulation, mandate, rule, or ordinance of
the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or
any of its political subdivisions, or any facts or
information relative to actual or suspected
mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
An employee alleging a violation of KRS 61.102 may bring a civil
action. KRS 61.103(2). An employee, who files a civil action under KRS 61.102,
bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his
disclosure was “a contributing factor to the personnel action.” KRS 61.102(3). A
contributing factor is one that “tends to affect in any way the outcome of a
decision.” It is presumed that a contributing factor existed “if the official taking
action knew or had constructive knowledge of the disclosure and acted within a
limited period of time so that a reasonable person would conclude the disclosure
was a factor in the personnel action.” KRS 61.103(1)(b).
The trial court found that Wilson’s whistleblower activities occurred
either after his suspension or more than a year before his suspension. Central City
argues and the trial court found that, as a matter of law, none of Wilson’s activities
could have been contributing factors to his discharge. We agree that no reasonable
person could conclude that activities that occurred after Wilson’s suspension could
have contributed to that suspension.
However, we believe that Central City and the trial court “over read”
KRS 61.103(1)(b). KRS 61.103(1)(b) states that an employee is entitled to a
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presumption that a disclosure was a contributing factor to a personnel action if the
two occur within a limited time frame. It does not state that, absent that temporal
juxtaposition, an employee is foreclosed from proving that a disclosure was a
contributing factor in the personnel action. We cannot say, as the trial court did
and as Central City argues, that a disclosure made more than a year before a
personnel action is, as a matter of law, too distant in time to be a contributing
factor. Therefore, the trial court’s finding on that issue was erroneous, although of
no consequence herein.
CONCLUSION
Because Wilson was an at-will employee and because Central City is
not an employer within KRS 61.101(2), the trial court properly granted Central
City’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, although for different reasons,
we affirm the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard E. Peyton
Madisonville, Kentucky
Randall L. Hardesty
Madisonville, Kentucky
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