PERRY (LINDA L.) VS. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001516-MR
LINDA L. PERRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANTHONY W. FROHLICH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01273
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION; AND HEAD COVERS, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, CLAYTON, AND DIXON, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Linda Perry appeals the opinion affirming the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission (“the Commission”) by the Boone Circuit
Court which denied her unemployment benefits following her termination of
employment with Head Covers, Inc. (“Head Covers”) on the basis that she
voluntarily left without good cause attributable to the employment. Perry argues
that the court erred in finding that the Commission's decision was supported by
substantial evidence of probative value as Perry’s wages were improperly
garnished by her employer; thus, the employment became unsuitable and Perry did
not have any other reasonable alternative but to quit. Alternatively, Perry argues
that even if the Commission’s factual findings were correct, then the Commission
either misapplied the law or applied the wrong law. We disagree and, accordingly,
affirm the opinion of the Boone Circuit Court.
The facts that give rise to this appeal were testified to at the hearing
held by the Referee of the Division of Unemployment Insurance and have been
summarized herein below. Perry started working for Head Covers in June 2003.
Head Covers had a policy that employees are deemed to have quit after missing
three days of work without notice.
Perry had an ongoing attendance issue and was issued a warning
regarding her attendance in July 2006. She then was absent from work from
September 6th through the 8th of 2006, for which she gave notice. However, from
September 11th through the 15th Perry was again absent. She claims to have left
voicemail messages regarding her absences. Head Covers denies receiving the
messages. Perry’s boss, Ms. Fullerton, called to ask about her absence, and
testified that Perry responded that she thought she would be fired. Perry never
returned to work, even though Fullerton testified that Perry’s employment was not
terminated during the telephone conversation.
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In an unrelated issue, Perry's wages had been garnished. A set
amount of $83.20 was taken from her check, even though her wages fluctuated.
According to Perry, this often resulted in garnishment greater than the 25 percent
maximum established by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 427.010(2).1 She
complained to her boss, who consulted Head Covers’ Chief Financial Office and
the creditor's attorney, both of whom verified the garnishment was proper. Perry
also claims that the money garnished was not paid directly to the creditor, but was
instead held and paid at various times, for which she was charged 24 percent
interest. Perry discussed the matter with Head Covers in December 2005, March
2006, and August 2006.
Thereafter, on October 1, 2006, Perry filed for unemployment
benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance issued a determination
denying Perry's claim, finding that she had voluntarily quit her employment
without good cause attributable to employment. At the Referee hearing, evidence
was submitted that Perry had quit in anticipation of discharge, while Perry argued
that the employer’s improper garnishment of her wages provided good cause for
quitting.
The Referee, post-hearing, affirmed the earlier denial. In affirming
the denial of unemployment benefits, the Referee specifically found that “[Perry’s]
dissatisfaction with her garnishment played a part in her decision to quit, however,
the controlling issue is that she quit in anticipation of being discharged.” The
1
She testified to one instance where on December 16, 2005, Perry received a paycheck for $0.00,
after taxes, garnishment, and other discretionary deductions.
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Referee concluded that quitting in anticipation of discharge did not provide good
cause attributable to the employment. Perry appealed to the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission, and the Commission affirmed the denial of
benefits. She next appealed to the Boone Circuit Court, arguing that her job was
unsuitable or that she had good cause to quit. The circuit court affirmed.
In its opinion affirming the Commission’s order, the circuit court
determined that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by substantial
evidence and not unreasonable. Moreover, the court found that the Commission
correctly applied the law to those facts. While Perry submitted to the circuit court
persuasive case law from a sister state, the circuit court was unprepared to establish
a new rule of law in this Commonwealth. Thus, the circuit court was not
persuaded that the garnishment issues made Perry’s work unsuitable or that she
had good cause to quit as a matter of law in light of KRS 341.100, which defines
suitable work, and the dearth of precedent on this issue. Accordingly, the circuit
court upheld the Commission's ruling that Perry quit in anticipation of being
discharged for failing to call in and report to work on September 11-14. It is from
this opinion that Perry now appeals.
On appeal Perry presents two main arguments. First, that the circuit
court erred in finding the Commission's decision was supported by substantial
evidence of probative value; to which Perry additionally argues that the
Commission impermissibly relied upon hearsay evidence. Second, Perry argues
that the Commission incorrectly applied the law to the facts. Her argument is
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centered on the garnishment issues, the improper withholding by her employer in
light of KRS 427.010, and the employer’s failure to remit the funds to the creditor.
Perry argues that these actions made her work unsuitable. Alternatively, Perry
argues that she had a lack of reasonable alternatives to quitting her employment.
The Commission disagrees and argues that its findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence and that it correctly applied the law based on (1)
KRS 341.100, the definition of suitable work; (2) KRS 341.450, judicial review of
the Commission; (3) KRS 341.370, disqualifications for unemployment benefits;
and (4) the accompanying case law.
At the outset we note that our review of the Commission’s decision is
limited to whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and
whether the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts. Thompson v.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n, 85 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky.App.2002). In
assessing the Commission’s decision, we are a court of review, not of
reinterpretation. Thompson, supra. In so reviewing, we must bear in mind that:
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence, taken alone
or in light of all the evidence, that has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable people. If there is substantial evidence to
support the agency's findings, a court must defer to that
finding even though there is evidence to the contrary. A
court may not substitute its opinion as to the credibility
of the witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Thompson at 624 (internal citations omitted). However, Perry is correct that
matters of statutory construction are the province of the courts and thus are subject
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to de novo review. Board of Com'rs of City of Danville v. Davis, 238 S.W.3d 132,
135 (Ky.App. 2007).
In the matter sub judice, we find the statutory interpretation of KRS
341.370 to be controlling. KRS 341.370(1)(c) states that a worker shall be
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when: “[h]e has left his most
recent suitable work or any other suitable work which occurred after the first day
of the worker's base period and which last preceded his most recent work
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employment.” The claimant
bears the burden of showing that she left her job voluntarily with good cause
attributable to her employment. Thompson, supra and Brownlee v.
Commonwealth, 287 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Ky. 2009).
Our jurisprudence has required three definitive terms contained in
KRS 341.370. First, in a “voluntary quit” case, such as the case sub judice,
“voluntary” as used in KRS 341.370, necessarily bears the connotation that the
“decision to quit...is freely given....” Thompson at 625 (internal citations omitted).
Second, “good cause” as held in Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission v.
Murphy, 539 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ky. 1976), “exists only when the worker is faced
with circumstances so compelling as to leave no reasonable alternative but loss of
employment.” Third, KRS 341.100 defines “suitable work” for Chapter 341 as:
1) In determining for any purpose under this chapter
whether or not any work is suitable for a worker the
secretary shall consider, among other pertinent
conditions, the degree of risk involved to his health,
safety and morals; his physical fitness and prior training;
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his experience and prior earnings; his length of
unemployment and prospects for securing local work in
his customary occupation; and the distance of the
available work from his residence.
2) For the purpose of this chapter, no work shall be
suitable nor shall benefits be denied under this chapter to
any otherwise eligible worker for refusing to accept new
work or new conditions of work under one (1) or more of
the following:
(a) If the position offered is vacant due directly to
a strike, lock-out or other labor dispute;
(b) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the
work offered are substantially less favorable than
those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
(c) If, as a condition of being employed, the
worker would be required to join a company union
or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona
fide labor organization;
(d) If the acceptance of such work would be
prejudicial to the continuance of an established
employer-employee relationship to which the
worker is a party.
KRS 341.100. With these parameters in mind we turn to the parties’ arguments.
Perry first argues that the Commission’s findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence, to which the Commission disagrees. After a
review of the record, it is apparent that the Commission was faced with conflicting
evidence as to why Perry quit her employment. Regardless of the conflict in the
evidence, there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that
Perry voluntarily quit in anticipation of being discharged by her employer.
Accordingly, we must affirm the findings of the court below in this regard.
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Perry next argues that if there was substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that she voluntarily quit, then (1) the Commission did not
apply the correct law concerning the garnishment issue, or (2) did not correctly
apply the correct law to the facts.
Perry argues that the garnishment issues, the improper withholding in
light of KRS 427.010, and not remitting the funds to the creditor, made her work
unsuitable. We are of the opinion that this argument is better couched in terms of
whether she had good cause to quit in light of KRS 341.370.2 Perry’s argument is
misplaced. The basis for the Commission’s denial of benefits was that Perry had
voluntarily quit in anticipation of discharge, not that the employment had become
unsuitable. Since the Commission’s finding is supported by the record, we must
defer to it. Thompson, supra. As such, Perry’s legal argument is not supported by
the Commission’s factual findings and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s
decision to uphold the Commission.
While Perry argues that the Commission misapplied the law on the
garnishment issue, which was the competing theory as to why Perry quit, this
argument is not persuasive as the record supports the Commission’s findings that
Perry quit in anticipation of discharge. The Commission was faced with
conflicting reasons for Perry leaving her employment. It chose which reason to
2
In Brock v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n., 693 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Ky.App.1985), this Court
did speak in terms of an employer’s act rendering appellant's employment unsuitable. However,
the crux of the holding was that the employer’s act gave good cause to the employee for
voluntarily quitting the employment. See also Brownlee, supra.
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give credence to and as a reviewing court, we must defer to this finding. Thus, we
now turn to Perry’s second claimed misapplication of the law.
Perry briefly argues that even if we accept the Commission’s findings,
then case law within the Sixth Circuit supports the conclusion that when an
employee resigns in anticipation of being discharged, that discharge must be
judged by the same criteria as if the discharge had actually taken place for
unemployment compensation purposes. In support, Perry has submitted one
unpublished case from a neighboring state. While there is no precedent directly on
point in this Commonwealth, we do not find this argument persuasive based on our
case law which addresses similar fact situations.
In Barren River Mental Health-Mental Retardation Bd., Inc. v. Bailey,
783 S.W.2d 886 (Ky.App. 1990), this Court held that the claimant was entitled to
unemployment benefits as
Mary's departure had already been decided-it was
inevitable. Her act of leaving a few days early did not
result in Barren River's decision to discharge
her....However, her compensation begins from the date
her employer terminated her, April 29th, and not from the
date she quit, April 20th.
Id. at 888.
Similarly, in Thompson, 85 S.W.3d at 627 (Ky.App. 2002), this Court
held that “[t]he referee correctly analyzed Thompson's unemployed status during
the two-week notice period as a discharge initiated by the company, and the
subsequent period as a quitting initiated by Thompson[,]” when the claimant gave
his two-week notice of his intention to quit and the employer terminated his
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employment immediately. Thus, Thompson was only entitled to unemployment
benefits for two weeks.
In light of these cases we conclude that in order for an employee to be
eligible for unemployment benefits when they voluntarily quit, the employer must
communicate to the employee that the employer has decided to terminate the
employee. To hold otherwise would require the Commission to delve into a
nebulous fact situation where the employer may have contemplated terminating the
employment but neither communicated the fact to an employee nor actually
terminated the employee. Accordingly, the Commission did not misapply what we
believe is the law in this Commonwealth to Perry’s voluntary act of quitting in
anticipation of discharge.
Finally, we address the argument raised in Perry’s reply brief that the
Commission impermissibly relied upon hearsay evidence offered by Head Covers.
We note that this argument was first raised in Perry’s reply brief in defending her
position that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial
evidence, and lacks citation to where the issue was raised below.
It is the appellant’s duty to provide this Court with adequate citation
to the record and as to the preservation of the issue under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv)-(v). Moreover, reply briefs are to be limited “to
points raised in the briefs to which they are addressed, and shall not reiterate
arguments already presented.” CR 76.12(4)(e). Additionally, as noted in Wilson
v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n., 270 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Ky.App.
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2008)(internal citations omitted), “[i]t is well-settled that failure to raise an issue
before an administrative body precludes the assertion of that issue in an action for
judicial review . . . .” This Court is not obliged to scour the record on appeal to
ensure that an issue has been preserved. See Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103
S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003). Thus, in light of the aforementioned reasons, we will
not review this argument as it is not properly before our Court.
Having found that the Boone Circuit Court correctly determined that
the Commission’s finding of facts were supported by substantial evidence and that
the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts, we hereby affirm the Boone
Circuit Court’s opinion affirming the Commission’s order denying Perry
unemployment benefits.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Glenda Harrison
Covington, Kentucky
James Maxson
Frankfort, Kentucky
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