CAUDILL (SHELBY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: APRIL 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001485-MR
SHELBY CAUDILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STOCKTON B. WOOD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00028
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND MOORE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Shelby Caudill was convicted following a jury trial in the
Fleming Circuit Court on charges of fleeing or evading police in the first degree,2
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
KRS 520.095, a Class D felony.
harassment,3 resisting arrest,4 and being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree5 (PFO I). He received a sentence of five years’ imprisonment for the
fleeing charge, enhanced to fifteen years by virtue of the PFO I charge.6 He now
appeals his conviction as a matter of right and we affirm.
On March 7, 2008, Shelby was indicted by a Fleming County Grand
Jury for fleeing or evading police in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree,7
resisting arrest, and PFO I. At a jury trial held on June 9, 2008, the evidence
established that Shelby and his wife, Debbie Caudill, were drinking heavily at their
home in Fleming County, Kentucky, on February 16, 2008, when they got into a
verbal disagreement. During the argument, Shelby shoved Debbie, causing her to
stumble backwards. Debbie, who had recently undergone a heart catheterization
procedure, began to experience chest pains. Her daughter from a previous
marriage witnessed all of the incidents and, being scared for her mother’s health,
called 911. Shelby began “freaking out” that the police would come to the
residence.
3
KRS 525.070, a Class B misdemeanor.
4
KRS 520.090, a Class A misdemeanor.
5
KRS 532.080.
6
Caudill received sentences of ninety days in jail and a $250.00 fine for harassment and twelve
months in jail and a $500.00 fine for resisting arrest. These misdemeanor jail terms were ordered
to run concurrently with the felony sentence in accordance with statutory mandates.
7
KRS 508.030, a Class A misdemeanor.
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Shortly thereafter, members of the Hillsboro Fire Department and
Fleming County EMS arrived at the home. The rescue workers refused to enter the
residence until law enforcement arrived as Shelby informed them they needed a
warrant to enter. Two deputies from the Fleming County Sheriff’s Office arrived
and were let into the residence by Debbie’s daughter. They noticed Shelby had a
bloody lip, was sweating, looked as though he had been crying, and was obviously
inebriated. The deputies directed him to sit on the couch while they assessed the
situation. Debbie informed the deputies her chest was hurting and she believed it
was her heart. She further informed them she and Shelby had been arguing and
that Shelby had shoved her with two hands. As the deputies were speaking with
Debbie’s daughter about the events of the evening, Shelby got up from the couch
and fled from the residence. Both deputies gave chase and several verbal
commands for Shelby to stop were ignored.
During the foot pursuit, Shelby ran down a steep embankment behind
the residence followed closely by one of the deputies. Shelby crashed through
trees and underbrush in his attempt to elude capture, but eventually tripped on a
stump allowing the pursuing deputy to catch up and get one handcuff on him.
Shelby rolled, kicked, and screamed to avoid being placed in restraints. Shortly
thereafter, the other deputy, accompanied by some of the rescue workers, arrived to
assist in bringing Shelby under control. Even with this additional manpower, it
took time to subdue him. Ultimately, Shelby was placed in the back of a police
cruiser where he proceeded to bang his head against the cage and side window and
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kicked at the door. Following Shelby’s arrest, Debbie reiterated her earlier story to
the officers that Shelby had shoved her during their argument, but insisted her
chest pains were the only result and she received no other injury from the push.
The jury found Shelby guilty of fleeing or evading police in the first
degree, resisting arrest, and harassment—a lesser-included offense of assault in the
fourth degree. His punishment was fixed at five years’ imprisonment on the felony
conviction, twelve months and a $500.00 fine for resisting arrest, and ninety days
and a $250.00 fine for harassment. The jury subsequently found Shelby to be a
PFO I and enhanced the felony sentence to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The trial
court sentenced Shelby in accordance with the jury’s recommendation on July 2,
2008. This appeal followed.
Shelby contends the trial court erred in failing to merge the charge of
fleeing or evading police into the resisting arrest charge. He argues this failure
violated the proscription on double jeopardy as the two crimes arose out of the
same course of conduct. Next, Shelby alleges the trial court erred in failing to
grant his motion for a directed verdict on the assault charge. Finally, he contends
the fifteen year sentence he received was grossly disproportionate to the events
which occurred. We disagree and affirm the Fleming Circuit Court.
First, Shelby argues the fleeing or evading charge and the resisting
arrest charge stemmed from the same course of conduct and the trial court’s failure
to merge these two counts constituted a violation of the proscription on double
jeopardy. Although he claims this allegation was properly preserved for appellate
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review, we find no support for this claim in the record. However, our Supreme
Court has held “double jeopardy claims fall under the palpable error rule because
this Court does not want to let stand a conviction possibly tainted by double
jeopardy.” Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641, 651 (Ky. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, reversal is mandated only if
manifest injustice results from the error. RCr8 10.26. To prove such injustice has
occurred, the Supreme Court has stated “that the required showing is probability of
a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to
due process of law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).
Reviewing courts are to “plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine
whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.”
Id. at 4.
A violation of the proscription on double jeopardy “does not occur
when a person is charged with two crimes arising from the same course of conduct,
as long as each statute ‘requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not.’” Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Ky. 1996) (quoting and
readopting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.
306 (1932), as the appropriate test). See also KRS 505.020(1) (“When a single
course of conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one
offense, he may be prosecuted for each such offense.”). This test is used to assess
the charging of two different crimes for the same course of conduct. The analysis
8
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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focuses “only on whether each statute, on its face, contains a different element.”
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583, 591 (Ky. 2008).
The two statutes at issue in the instant matter clearly require proof of
different elements. To be charged with fleeing or evading of police in the first
degree under KRS 520.095(1)(b), one must flee immediately after committing an
act of domestic violence. Resisting arrest contains no such element. Likewise, a
police officer’s verbal command to stop must be disobeyed to charge one with
fleeing or evading but resisting arrest contains no such requirement. In contrast,
resisting arrest requires proof of the use or threat of force or otherwise creating a
substantial risk of causing physical injury meant to impede a police officer from
effectuating an arrest. Fleeing or evading contains no such similar requirement.
Thus, on their face, the two statutes clearly contain different elements and no
double jeopardy violation occurred. Id.
Next, Shelby argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the assault charge. He contends the Commonwealth failed to
prove Debbie sustained any physical injury thus completely precluding a
conviction for assault. He further contends the trial court should have granted him
a directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of harassment. We disagree.
On a motion for a directed verdict, a trial court is required to
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence
in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
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the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)). A reviewing court is not
permitted to “reevaluate the evidence or substitute its judgment as to the credibility
of a witness for that of the trial court and the jury.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 880
S.W.2d 544, 545 (Ky. 1994) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bivins, 740 S.W.2d 954,
956 (Ky. 1987)).
We first note that Shelby did not move for a directed verdict of
acquittal on the harassment charge. He raises this argument for the first time on
appeal. It is well-settled that a trial court must be given an opportunity to rule and
a defendant “will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and
another to the appellate court.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222
(Ky. 1976). Thus, we decline to further discuss this allegation of error.
At a bench conference discussing Shelby’s motion for a directed
verdict on the assault charge, the trial court indicated it believed that the
Commonwealth had presented more than the scintilla of evidence required to
overcome the motion. Although the court believed the evidence might have been
weak, it believed it would be reasonable for a jury to find guilt. We agree. The
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Commonwealth presented uncontroverted evidence that there was a physical
touching9 initiated by Shelby that resulted in Debbie almost immediately having
chest pains. The Commonwealth further presented testimony that Shelby was
aware of Debbie’s heart condition and that she had only recently undergone a heart
catheterization procedure. Thus, we believe the Commonwealth carried its burden
sufficiently to overcome a motion for directed verdict on the assault charge as the
trial court found.
Finally, Shelby argues the sentence he received was grossly
disproportionate to the events that transpired. He contends his sentence is so
excessive it violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.10 See Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3008, 3016, 77 L.Ed.2d 637
(1983) (Eighth Amendment prohibits extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed). See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Shelby admits this issue is
unpreserved for review, but requests relief under the palpable error standard. We
perceive no such error.
9
Conflicting testimony was given on the issue of whether Shelby shoved or bumped Debbie.
However, the testimony was consistent that Shelby’s actions caused Debbie to stumble
backwards following the contact.
10
The Constitution of Kentucky contains a similar prohibition. However, the proscription
contained therein is against “cruel punishment” rather than “cruel and unusual punishments.”
Our Supreme Court has held this to be “a distinction without a difference.” Riley v.
Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622, 633 (Ky. 2003).
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Shelby was convicted by a jury of his peers of the offense of fleeing
or evading police, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to the statutory maximum
term of five years’ imprisonment. See KRS 532.060. He was also sentenced as a
PFO I, which means the jury could have sentenced him to anywhere between ten
and twenty years’ imprisonment. See KRS 532.080. The jury chose fifteen years.
During the PFO stage, the jury heard of Shelby’s previous felony
convictions for burglary and criminal mischief. Possibly because his record was
not extreme in the eyes of the jurors, they fixed his sentence in the middle of the
permissible penalty range. That decision was reasonable under the facts of this
case. The PFO statutes were designed by the legislature to lengthen the period of
incarceration for those with a criminal history. It is axiomatic that states are
justified in sentencing repeat offenders more harshly than first-time offenders.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 296, 103 S.Ct. at 3013. Thus, as the jury’s sentencing
recommendation was within the applicable penalty range, Shelby’s sentence is not
grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed. Riley v. Commonwealth, 120
S.W.3d 622, 633 (Ky. 2003) (“if the punishment is within the maximum prescribed
by the statute violated, courts generally will not disturb the sentence.”). No error
occurred.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fleming
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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