BARKER (GERALD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001312-MR
GERALD BARKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00175
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Gerald Barker appeals from an order of the Graves Circuit
Court revoking his probation. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In 2004, Barker pled guilty to nine counts of fraudulent use of a credit
card over $100, one count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
(cocaine), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, probated for five years. The conditions
of his probation mandated that Barker must “not commit another offense[.]”
In 2008, this matter came before the trial court on the
Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Barker’s probation as a result of his arrest for
four counts of fourth-degree assault. Barker appeared before the court with
counsel for a probation revocation hearing, during which the court heard the
testimony of Barker’s probation officer. The probation officer testified that she
received information that Barker had been arrested for four counts of fourth-degree
assault, the victims of which were his entire family, and that Barker incurred the
assault charges while on probation, in violation of the condition to not incur any
new charges. The probation officer verified that she was relying on information
contained in a uniform citation issued by the Kentucky State Police, as well as a
conversation with Barker’s sister, who was present when the alleged assault
occurred. The probation officer acknowledged that a trial on the assault charges
had not yet taken place, and that the court had not heard Barker’s version of the
events. Thereafter, Barker argued to the court that since he had not been convicted
of assault, the conditions of probation had not been violated and probation
revocation was premature. However, he offered no rebuttal testimony at the
hearing. Ultimately, the court entered an order revoking Barker’s probation for
“violation of the terms of probation by arrest for assault 4th degree four (4) counts”
and directed him to serve the remainder of his sentence.
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On appeal, Barker contends that the trial court violated his due
process rights by revoking his probation. In particular, he avers that the unproven
charges of assault provided insufficient grounds for revocation of his probation,
that the court improperly considered hearsay testimony at the probation revocation
hearing, and that the court failed to make written findings. We disagree.
Kentucky law requires trial courts to condition any grant of probation
upon the defendant not committing “another offense” during the period of
probation. KRS 533.030(1) provides: “The court shall provide as an explicit
condition of every sentence to probation or conditional discharge that the
defendant not commit another offense during the period for which the sentence
remains subject to revocation.” Thus, “in this Commonwealth . . . probation is a
privilege rather than a right.” Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504
(Ky.App. 1986). “One may retain his status as a probationer only as long as the
trial court is satisfied that he has not violated the terms or conditions of the
probation.” Id; KRS 533.030.
Probation revocation hearings “must be conducted in accordance with
minimum requirements of due process of law.” Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701
S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky.App. 1986) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)). KRS 533.050(2) provides: “The court may
not revoke or modify the conditions of a sentence of probation or conditional
discharge except after a hearing with defendant represented by counsel and
following a written notice of the grounds for revocation or modification.”
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“Probation revocation is not dependent upon a probationer’s
conviction of a criminal offense.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878, 881
(Ky. 2009) (citing Tiryung, 717 S.W.2d at 504). “Instead, the Commonwealth
need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer has violated
the terms of probation.” Lopez, 292 S.W.3d at 881 (citing Rasdon, 701 S.W.2d at
719). The appellate standard of review of a decision to revoke a defendant’s
probation is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Lopez, 292 S.W.3d at
881.
Here, in accordance with KRS 533.050(2), the court gave notice of,
and conducted, a probation revocation hearing, at which Barker and his counsel
were present and were afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Barker’s
probation officer, as well as to present rebuttal testimony. Barker was also
provided written notice, in the court’s order revoking his probation, of the grounds
for revocation. Specifically, the order states that Barker’s probation is revoked on
grounds of “violation of the terms of probation by arrest for assault 4th degree four
(4) counts.” Having reviewed the record, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion by reaching this conclusion.2
Barker contends further that the court’s consideration of hearsay
testimony at the probation revocation hearing violated his due process rights.
However, a panel of this court addressed this issue in Marshall v. Commonwealth,
2
We acknowledge the concerns raised by the dissenting opinion and if we were sitting as the
trial court we may have waited until the underlying charges were adjudicated. However, because
Kentucky caselaw permits the trial court to proceed as it did, we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion.
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638 S.W.2d 288 (Ky.App. 1982), and held that the admission of hearsay evidence
at the defendant’s probation revocation hearing did not violate due process. In so
ruling, the court recognized that the due process rights afforded to a defendant in a
parole revocation hearing, as set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92
S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), also apply to probation revocation hearings.
See Marshall, 638 S.W.2d at 289 (citing Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756
(the reasoning of Morrissey applies to probation revocation proceedings)). The
court in Marshall held that hearsay evidence is admissible at probation revocation
hearings “especially when the reliability of the witnesses . . . can be easily
ascertained.” Marshall, 638 S.W.2d at 289. In this case, the court was in a
position to ascertain the reliability of the probation officer’s testimony, as
described above. Reliance on said testimony in finding that Barker had violated
the conditions of his probation did not violate Barker’s due process rights and was
not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
Finally, Barker asserts that the court violated his due process rights by
failing to make written findings. While “[f]indings are a prerequisite to any
unfavorable decision and are a minimal requirement of due process of law[,]”
Rasdon, 701 S.W.2d at 719, in this case, the court’s written order revoking
Barker’s probation sufficiently discloses its findings so as to satisfy due process.
The order specifically states that Barker “appeared in Court with counsel, and the
Court having heard testimony and being sufficiently advised from the record, finds
that the Defendant [Barker] has violated the conditions of probation” by “arrest for
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assault 4th degree four (4) counts.” Thus, Barker’s assertion that the court’s
written findings are insufficient lacks merit.
The order of the Graves Circuit Court is affirmed.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I recognize and respect the
minority’s well-reasoned opinion that the trial court denied Appellant due process
in revoking his probation. However, I am convinced the majority opinion reflects
prevailing Kentucky law and am not persuaded that the trial court’s action
amounted to a denial of constitutional rights. Because the trial court did not abuse
its discretion, see Lopez and Tiryung, I concur with the equally well-articulated
majority opinion.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: A look beneath the
surface of the artfully drafted majority opinion reveals an appalling lack of due
process in this case. Perhaps the majority opinion reflects prevailing Kentucky
law, but it fails to satisfy due process as articulated by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).
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Although Appellant had a substantial history of contact with the
criminal justice system,3 what brought him before the court for revocation of his
probation were misdemeanor charges of assault in the fourth degree brought by
members of his own family. Following these charges, but before any adjudication
of the merits, Appellant’s probation officer sought probation revocation. At the
revocation hearing defense counsel requested postponement until the underlying
charges were adjudicated. That request was denied. The only witness to testify
was Appellant’s probation officer and her testimony disclosed that her information
was based solely upon information from others. In its brief, the Commonwealth
summarized the probation officer’s testimony as follows:
The Commonwealth called Appellant’s probation and
parole officer, Robin McGuire to testify. Officer
McGuire testified that she received information that on
May 29, 2008, Appellant had been arrested for attacking
his entire family. Officer McGuire explained the
information that she received concerning the charges and
Appellant’s arrest came from a Uniform Citation issued
during Appellant’s arrest. Officer McGuire then
discussed the details set forth above concerning the
Appellant’s attack on his family members.
Upon this testimony alone, the trial court concluded the nine-minute probation
revocation hearing with the following statement:
I decide these cases on hearsay evidence and I have
hearsay, first-hand hearsay, but hearsay nonetheless, to
the fact that he had been drinking and he assaulted four
family members. That would be a violation of the
conditions of his probation. For that reason the court
3
Appellant was convicted in 2004 of nine counts of fraudulent use of a credit card over $100,
one count of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, cocaine, and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia.
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finds that he has violated the conditions of his probation.
His probation is revoked and he is remanded to the
Department of Corrections to serve out the remainder of
his sentence.
At the outset, it should be observed that when a probation revocation
for violation of the law occurs before adjudication of the underlying charge, the
defendant is faced with the dilemma of standing mute and preserving his privilege
against self-incrimination or testifying and waiving the privilege. Thus, even a
denial of the charges or a plea of self-defense will be, in most cases, unavailable to
the defendant in the pre-adjudication probation revocation proceeding.
The use of hearsay evidence during a probation revocation proceeding
is particularly pernicious. The only witness to testify against Appellant was his
probation officer, one who had no direct knowledge of the facts. As such,
Appellant had no right of meaningful cross-examination. There was no
opportunity to test the truth of the evidence presented as the probation officer could
only repeat what others had told her.
In Gagnon the Supreme Court of the United States declared that in
probation revocation, minimum requirements of due process include “the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” 411 U.S. at 786, 93
S.Ct. at 1762. The Court explained its view as follows:
[D]ue process requires that the [factual] difference be
resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the
probationer or parolee and the State have interests in the
accurate finding of fact and the informed use of
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discretion – the probationer or parolee to insure that his
liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to
make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a
successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently
prejudicing the safety of the community.
Id., 411 U.S. at 785, 93 S.Ct. at 1761. As Appellant was denied his confrontation
rights, this proceeding failed to meet federal due process standards.
Though perhaps not amounting to a denial of constitutional rights, it is
disturbing that the probation revocation hearing took place before adjudication of
the fourth-degree assault charges; that the revocation hearing was so brief; and that
the trial court failed to make written findings of fact. Probation revocation should
not be a cut-and-dried summary proceeding that merely doffs its hat to procedural
due process.
We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee
[probationer], although indeterminate, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination
inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee [probationer] and
often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to
deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee’s
[probationer’s] liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ By
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen
as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Its termination calls for some orderly process, however
informal.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 93 S.Ct. at 2601.
There is generally no great sympathy for persons who have committed
felonies, are then granted probation and thereafter violate the terms of probation. I
express no such sympathy here. It is true, however, that standard probation terms
and the terms required of Appellant would put a deacon to the test. For one
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convicted of a crime with the culture from which felony convicts emerge, the task
is particularly onerous.
In circumstances where violation of any one or more of the multiple
conditions of probation will suffice to revoke probation and send a defendant to
prison, it is fundamental that due process rights be fully observed. Courts should
require more than pre-conviction hearsay statements from a misdemeanor
complainant and double hearsay contained in a police report. Unless there is some
compelling reason to do otherwise, probation revocation for commission of a
criminal offense should be postponed until guilt is established. And at a minimum,
trial courts should make findings of fact as to their view of the evidence presented,
if for no other reason than to permit meaningful appellate review.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frederick W. Rhynhart
Burlington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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