RICHARDS (PHILLIP) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001019-MR
PHILLIP RICHARDS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-01328
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Phillip Richards appeals from an order of the Fayette Circuit
Court denying his motion for custody credit of 802 days. Because his ten-year
Kentucky sentence was ordered to run concurrently with an eight-year Florida
sentence he was already serving, Richards claims he is entitled to immediate credit
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
against his Kentucky sentence for any time served on the Florida sentence. The
Commonwealth does not argue Richards will not receive credit for time already
served, only that the credit will not be calculated and awarded until completion of
the Florida sentence. Otherwise, Richards would erroneously receive double credit
for the time spent in custody in Florida. We affirm the denial of custody credit.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While being interviewed by police in Florida following an arrest for
trafficking in oxycontin, Richards confessed to robbing a Walgreen pharmacy in
Lexington, Kentucky, and taking a large quantity of oxycontin pills. When
Lexington police learned of the confession in May 2005, they issued a warrant and
placed a detainer on Richards.
On September 30, 2005, Richards was sentenced in Florida to serve
eight years for trafficking and burglary. In December 2005, Richards learned of
the Kentucky detainer. In January 2006, he requested final disposition of the
Kentucky case, but Florida officials did not act on the request until May 2007.
Richards was finally transported to Lexington in mid-August 2007, indicted on a
charge of robbery in the first degree2 on October 15, 2007, and arraigned on
October 18, 2007.
At a status hearing on November 9, 2007, Richards wanted to
withdraw a motion to dismiss the indictment he had filed pursuant to the Interstate
2
KRS 515.020, a Class B felony.
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Agreement on Detainers3 (IAD), plead guilty to an amended charge of seconddegree robbery,4 and be sentenced to a term of ten years that day so he could return
to Florida as quickly as possible. The court agreed to conduct the final sentencing
that day but would require Richards to remain in Kentucky until the probation and
parole office could complete its paperwork. However, when the court revealed
that the Kentucky sentence would be run consecutively to the Florida sentence,
Richards deemed this unacceptable and asked to withdraw his guilty plea.
After much debate, the matter was passed for a week and, during that
time, the court entered a written order allowing Richards to withdraw his guilty
plea. Richards also refiled his motion to dismiss the Kentucky indictment as being
violative of the IAD. The IAD issue was briefed and heard on November 29,
2007. At the hearing, the parties agreed the 180-day window permitted by the IAD
commenced running on May 14, 2007, and expired on November 9, 2007, the date
on which Richards’s guilty plea was originally accepted by the trial court. Rather
than have the trial court address whether the Commonwealth’s failure to comply
with the 180-day window was excused, the parties agreed Richards would reinstate
his guilty plea to the reduced charge of second-degree robbery, effective as of
November 9, 2007, and the Commonwealth would recommend that the ten-year
Kentucky sentence be served concurrently with the eight-year Florida sentence.
3
Codified at KRS 440.450 et seq. KRS 440.450, Art. III (1) states in relevant part, “the prisoner
. . . shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days” after notifying the prosecuting
officer of his place of incarceration and his request for final disposition of his case.
4
KRS 515.030, a Class C felony.
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Thereafter, the court sentenced Richards in conformity with the Commonwealth’s
recommendation.
At the conclusion of the final sentencing on November 29, 2007,
Richards requested credit for time served since waiving extradition in September
2005. The trial court stated it was not involved in the calculation of credit for time
served and did not know how much custody credit Richards would receive, but it
would see that he received credit for any time to which he was entitled. When the
final judgment was entered on December 13, 2007, the Kentucky sentence was
ordered to run concurrently with the Florida sentence, with a custody credit of zero
days.
On April 16, 2008, Richards moved for custody credit of 802 days
under KRS 197.035(2). This figure represented the time served from September
30, 2005, when he began serving his Florida sentence, until December 11, 2007,
when he was returned to Florida following his guilty plea and sentencing in
Kentucky. The motion was denied by the trial court on April 30, 2008, based upon
a letter provided by a Kentucky Probation & Parole Investigator. That letter stated
in relevant part:
This letter is to inform the court that Mr. Richards does
not receive any additional credit for Indictment #07-CR1328. In regards to Mr. Richards custody credit the only
way he would (sic) awarded credit for this offense would
be any time he spent in jail for this offense prior to his
sentencing, which is not the case in regards to this
indictment. Mr. Richards was never arrested for this
offense when it was committed. Mr. Richards came to
Kentucky, committed the offense of Robbery, and then
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fled back to Florida. When he returned to Florida he was
arrested and began serving time for another felony
conviction that was committed in Florida and had
nothing to do with his Kentucky offense. He received
eight years to serve for his Florida conviction. Mr.
Richards was in custody in Florida when he was served
with the warrant for the Kentucky offense and when he
was sentenced on 07-CR-1328 his sentence was ran (sic)
concurrent with Florida. However, that does not award
Mr. Richards any additional time for his Kentucky
offense due to the sentences being ran (sic) currently
(sic). Mr. Richards’ custody credit has (sic) calculated
by way of Florida Department of Corrections.
Therefore, Mr. Richards still receives 0 days custody
credit for Indictment #07-CR-1328.
Once Mr. Richards has completed his eight year sentence
and has to be returned to Kentucky to finish the
remainder of his sentence for Kentucky than (sic) at that
point Offender Information Services will calculate any
custody credit Mr. Richards may be entitled to receive.
Offender Information Services staff will contact Florida
for documentation of time served on Mr. Richards (sic)
Florida sentence and credit it toward his Kentucky
sentence as credit for time served.
This appeal followed. We affirm.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that the Commonwealth recommended and the trial
court imposed concurrent sentencing. We have not been cited, nor have we
located, authority specifically holding when credit for time served is calculated and
applied to a Kentucky sentence being served concurrently with a previously
imposed sentence by a foreign state. However, we have determined Brock v.
Sowders, 610 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1980), to be instructive, particularly the portion
stating:
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[w]hen sentences are to run concurrently—when do
they start and when do they end? The Kentucky
legislature has provided answers. KRS 197.035(2) states:
“If the additional sentence is designated to be served
concurrently . . . (a confined prisoner) shall be considered
as having started to serve said sentence on the day he was
committed on the first sentence.” KRS 532.120(1) states:
“. . . When a person is under more than one
indeterminate sentence, the sentences shall
be calculated as follows: (a) If the sentences
run concurrently, the maximum terms merge
in and are satisfied by discharge of the term
which has the longest unexpired term to
run. . . .
Therefore, [the defendant’s] Kentucky sentence
began to run the day he was confined in the [foreign]
prison on his [foreign] conviction. His Kentucky
sentence terminates at the discharge of the term of the
longest sentence . . . . Consequently, he is entitled to
Kentucky credit for all time served in [the foreign state]
and only if the Kentucky sentence is longer than the
[foreign] sentence would the Kentucky officials have the
authority to detain [him], and then only at the discharge
of the term of the [foreign] sentence for the time
remaining on the Kentucky sentence.
Based upon Brock and KRS 197.035(2), we know Richards began serving his tenyear Kentucky sentence commensurate with service of his eight-year Florida
sentence. However, until Richards completes the shorter Florida sentence, the
amount of credit for time served to which he is entitled cannot be calculated. This
fact was explained in the letter provided by the Kentucky Probation and Parole
Officer. Furthermore, because Richards was already serving the eight-year Florida
sentence while in Lexington to resolve the Kentucky robbery charge, he received
credit from Florida authorities for his time in Kentucky towards service of the
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eight-year Florida trafficking sentence. For Kentucky to award Richards another
802 days in custody credit would constitute a double award for which there is no
legal authority.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court
denying the motion for custody credit is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Davis B. Abner
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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