OVERBAY (GARY D.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000762-MR
GARY D. OVERBAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00140
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Gary D. Overbay appeals the order of the Laurel Circuit
Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On April 28, 2005, at a Dollar General Store, Overbay became
involved in an altercation and shot a man. As a result of the shooting, a Laurel
County grand jury indicted Overbay for first-degree assault and carrying a
concealed deadly weapon. On December 16, 2005, Overbay entered a guilty plea
to the charges listed in his indictment in exchange for the Commonwealth’s
recommendation of a ten-year sentence.
During its plea colloquy with Overbay, the trial court asked him if he
suffered from a past mental illness, current mental illness, or suffered from any
other mental illness that would impair his judgment. Overbay responded in the
negative. The trial court then specifically asked Overbay if he was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs to which Overbay responded no. In response to the
trial court’s questions regarding the adequacy of his legal representation, Overbay
stated that he was satisfied with his counsel, that he had no complaints with
counsel’s performance, and that his counsel complied with all of his requests.
At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial court found that
Overbay’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. On January 20,
2006, the trial court sentenced Overbay in accordance with his guilty plea. On
August 9, 2007, Overbay filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his
conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Subsequently, the trial court
issued an order denying Overbay post-conviction relief. This appeal follows.
Overbay first argues that he was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to investigate the facts
of his case and to prepare for trial. Overbay claims that his counsel did not discuss
discovery with him, refused to investigate his claim of self-defense, and refused to
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interview mitigating witnesses. Therefore, Overbay argues that his conviction
must be vacated. We disagree.
On appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
are governed by the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, the two-step test promulgated
in Strickland is modified when the ineffective assistance claim is alleged to have
resulted in the involuntary, unintelligent, and unknowing entry of a guilty plea.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); see Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky.App. 1996).
Pursuant to the two-step modified test, as stated in Centers v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky.App. 1990), the defendant must
demonstrate the following:
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's
performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance as the counsel was not performing
as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and (2)
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense by
so seriously affecting the process that there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant would not have
pled guilty, and the outcome would have been different.
Finally, courts must analyze a defense counsel’s performance under the
presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Shegog v.
Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ky.App. 2008).
We conclude that Overbay’s arguments are lacking in the specificity
required to warrant post-conviction relief and, thus, find no constitutional error.
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While he makes broad generalizations of counsel error, he fails to state what
evidence his counsel could have found to support his self-defense claim and what
mitigating witness was willing and available to testify on his behalf. Without
specific factual claims of error and prejudice, a defendant will not be entitled to
post-conviction relief. Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 330 (Ky. 2005),
overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009).
Moreover, his claims are clearly refuted by the record. During his
plea colloquy, he informed the trial court that he was satisfied with his counsel’s
representation, that his counsel complied with all of his requests, and that his
counsel had fully discussed the nature of his case, including his possible defenses.
While Overbay now claims error, his open-court declarations must be given a
strong presumption of truthfulness, and his subsequent presentation of allegations
that are refuted on the face of the record were subject to summary dismissal.
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Ky. 2006).
Overbay next argues that his counsel coerced him into entering a
guilty plea while he was under the influence of mind-altering drugs. He claims
that his health problems and consumption of multiple medications rendered him
mentally incapable of entering into a guilty plea. Based on his reduced mental
state, he contends that his counsel’s failure to prevent him from pleading guilty
constituted ineffective assistance and necessitates the vacating of his conviction.
We disagree.
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In Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986), this
Court stated that RCr 11.42 allegations that are clearly refuted on the face of the
record are not entitled to relief. Id. at 727-28. In this case, during his plea
colloquy, Overbay informed the trial court that he was not under the influence of
any drugs or alcohol. In response to Overbay’s drug claims in its order denying
him relief, the trial court wrote the following:
The record reveals that the Movant appeared alert and
coherent at the time when he entered his guilty plea.
Movant stated that he was not operating under a disease
or defect that would impact his ability to think or reason.
Further and as previously mentioned, Movant assured the
Court that he was satisfied with the performance of his
attorneys at the time of his colloquy.
Our courts allocate great significance to an individual’s sworn, open-court
declarations. Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569. Accordingly, based on Overbay’s
open-court declarations and the trial court’s finding that Overbay was alert,
coherent, and not under the influence of drugs, we conclude that Overbay’s
counsel did not commit constitutional error by permitting him to plead guilty.
Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Ky. 2007) (when reviewing an RCr
11.42 appeal, an appellate court must defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and
determinations of witness credibility).
We finally note that Overbay made a third argument in his brief,
which is essentially identical to his first argument. The only difference is that he
alleges that the shooting victim told several people that he was going to kill
Overbay. While this marks Overbay’s first attempt at specificity, he fails to state
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the names of the witnesses who heard the victim or, if he did not know their
names, how and when he became aware of this evidence. Without these necessary
details, in light of Overbay’s in-court declarations, the trial court properly found
that he was not denied effective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to
investigate. Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Laurel Circuit Court
denying Overbay post-conviction relief is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gary D. Overbay, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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