SONITROL OF LEXINGTON, INC. VS. GENERAL STAR INDEMNITY COMPANY
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RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000724-MR
SONITROL OF LEXINGTON, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00806
GENERAL STAR INDEMNITY COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, NICKELL, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Sonitrol of Lexington, Inc. has appealed from the March 12,
2008, order of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
General Star Indemnity Company. The underlying action involved a question of
whether Sonitrol was entitled to insurance coverage under the policy it had
obtained from General Star and whether General Star was obligated under the
policy to defend Sonitrol in relation to a civil suit filed against it in the federal
courts of Texas. The trial court found General Star was not obligated to defend
Sonitrol and that no coverage for the claims existed under the policy. After a
careful review of the record, we affirm.
Sonitrol provides security alarm systems in Lexington, Kentucky.
Sonitrol obtained a comprehensive general liability insurance policy from General
Star on September 12, 2003. This policy contained coverage for bodily injury and
mental injury, which were grouped together in the policy as “personal injury” and
defined as follows:
“Personal injury” means mental injury, anguish or shock
which arises out of false arrest, detention or
imprisonment; malicious prosecution or persecution;
wrongful entry, eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy; humiliation; libel, slander, or the
publication of defamatory or disparaging material; a
publication that violates an individual’s right of privacy.
Although such coverage was available, Sonitrol did not purchase a policy for
“advertising injury” which would cover injury arising from publication of material
that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or
organizations goods, services, or products. Such policies do not require a
“personal injury” as a precursor to coverage.
On January 22, 2004, Interface Security Systems L.L.C., a franchisee
of Sonitrol, filed suit against Sonitrol in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas1 alleging tortious interference with contract, interference
with customer contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with
1
Interface v. Sonitrol, E.D.Tx., Case No. 6:04cv23. For clarity and brevity purposes, we shall
refer to this civil action as the Interface litigation.
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prospective economic advantage, and trade disparagement. Interface alleged
Sonitrol had made false and disparaging representations designed to further its own
business and to harm Interface’s business.
Nine months after the complaint was filed, Sonitrol tendered its
defense to General Star and requested the insurer defend it in the action. General
Star offered to defend Sonitrol only under a reservation of rights.2 Sonitrol
declined the representation and ultimately settled with Interface. Sonitrol then
instituted the instant action requesting a declaratory judgment that General Star had
a duty under the insurance policy to defend and indemnify Sonitrol in the Interface
litigation, and claiming General Star had acted in bad faith and had violated the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA).3
Following a period of discovery, General Star moved for summary
judgment on the bad faith and UCSPA claims. The trial court granted the motion
on January 9, 2008, dismissing both claims with prejudice. No appeal was taken
from that order.4 On January 25, 2008, Sonitrol moved for summary judgment on
2
When an insurer has a question regarding whether coverage exists for allegations made in a
third party lawsuit, it may offer its insured a defense under what is commonly known as a
reservation of rights. In such a situation, the insurer agrees to undertake the defense of its
insured’s interests in a third party or liability claim, but maintains the right to later contest
coverage for the allegations raised in the claim based on the policy provisions or exclusions. It is
not the equivalent of a denial of the claim, but rather is a step required of the insurer to avoid
waiving coverage defenses. See Lori Massey Cliffe, Representing Your Client Under a
Reservation of Rights, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jan. 1999, at 7. An insured is under no obligation to
accept a defense under a reservation of rights. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne v. Davis,
581 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. App. 1979).
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 304.12-230.
Sonitrol successfully moved to have the “final and appealable” language removed from this
order. However, no argument is made on appeal as to the dismissal of these two claims, and
therefore no further discussion regarding them is warranted.
4
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the sole remaining claim that General Star had a duty to defend it in the Interface
litigation, as the claim against Sonitrol for trade disparagement constituted
“personal injury” and was thus covered under the policy. General Star responded
that the definition contained in the policy for “personal injury” did not cover trade
disparagement claims and further contended the claim did not arise from an
“occurrence” as that term was defined under the policy. Both parties agreed that
no genuine issues of material fact existed. On March 12, 2008, the trial court
granted summary judgment to General Star and dismissed the remaining claim
against it, specifically holding the definitions contained in the policy “make it clear
that the damages claimed in the Texas litigation were not ‘personal injuries,’ nor
did they arise from an ‘occurrence.’” This appeal followed.
Sonitrol contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of General Star as the trade disparagement claim in the Interface litigation
“potentially, possibly, or might” have come under the protection of the insurance
policy, thus requiring General Star to defend it in the suit under the mandates set
forth in O’Bannon v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 678 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Ky. 1984).
Sonitrol argues the trade infringement claim falls under the “personal injury”
definition of the policy, the alleged injury resulted from an “occurrence,” and the
trial court erred in not so finding. General Star maintains that it owed no coverage
to Sonitrol under the policy for the Interface litigation and that the trial court was
correct in granting summary judgment in its favor.
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The standard of review for the grant of a summary judgment is
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Since factual
findings are not in issue, we owe no deference to the trial court’s decision, id.
(citing Goldsmith v. Allied Bldg. Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky.
1992)), and we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Cinelli v. Ward,
997 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1998). In the case sub judice, because the parties
agreed that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the determination to be
made by this Court is whether the trial court correctly applied the law to those
undisputed facts in granting summary judgment.
The overriding theme of this litigation is whether General Star owed a
duty to defend Sonitrol in the Interface litigation under the terms of the insurance
policy it issued. To properly resolve that issue, two questions must be answered:
1) did the complained of acts amount to a “personal injury” as defined in the
policy; and 2) if there was a “personal injury,” did that injury result from an
“occurrence”? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, coverage was due
and summary judgment in favor of General Star was improper. Conversely, if the
answer to even one of the questions is in the negative, no coverage was owed and
summary judgment was proper. After a careful review of the record and the
arguments of the parties, we believe the latter to be true.
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Sonitrol contends the claims for trade disparagement arose from “the
publication of defamatory or disparaging material” and that they are thus covered
under the policy definition for “personal injury.” It argues the definition contained
in the policy is facially ambiguous and that all ambiguities must be resolved in its
favor, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870
S.W.2d 223, 227 (Ky. 1994), Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky.
1984), and Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass’n v. Webber, 187 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ky.
1945). General Star counters that no ambiguities exist and that making disparaging
remarks about a competitive company cannot result in the “mental injury, anguish
or shock” required by the plain language of the definition for “personal injury”
contained in the policy as business organizations cannot experience such emotional
injuries. We agree with General Star.
A plain reading of the definition for “personal injury” reveals that
coverage for publication of disparaging or defamatory remarks is triggered only by
the “mental injury, anguish or shock” arising from such publication. Sonitrol’s
argument that the requirement of “mental injury, anguish or shock” applies only to
personal injuries arising from “false arrest, detention or imprisonment” and not to
any of the other categories of injury enumerated in the definition for “personal
injury,” is logically and grammatically incorrect. We see no ambiguity in the
definition for “personal injury” and we will not “stretch the allegations beyond
reason to impose a duty on the insurer.” Holloway Sportswear, Inc. v.
Transportation Ins. Co., 58 Fed.Appx. 172, 175 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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It is well-settled that courts will give insurance contracts “a practical and common
sense construction, not a strained or technical one.” General Acc., Fire & Life
Assur. Corp. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 193 S.W. 1031, 1033 (Ky. 1917). “We
must give the policy its plain meaning and are constrained from enlarging the risks
contrary to the natural and obvious meaning of the insurance contract.” Walker v.
Economy Preferred Ins. Co., 909 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Ky. App. 1995).
The reading urged upon this Court by Sonitrol is untenable as such a
reading would trigger coverage based upon a cause alone, and not upon the
resulting damage such as “mental injury, anguish or shock.” Further, the coverage
Sonitrol seeks would clearly fall under a provision for “advertising injury,” a
coverage it did not purchase. Were we to accept Sonitrol’s reading of the instant
policy, we would be granting it coverage for which it had not contracted. We
refuse to do so. As the trial court correctly found, the trade disparagement claims
raised in the Interface litigation did not constitute a “personal injury.”
Since we have held the trade disparagement claims were not covered
under the “personal injury” provision of the insurance policy, we need not address
Sonitrol’s argument concerning the requirement that the injuries result from an
“occurrence.” There was no coverage and the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of General Star.
We must note Sonitrol’s arguments that General Star admitted the
disparagement claims fell under the policy definition of “personal injury” and
resulted from an “occurrence” are without merit and are based on a faulty reading
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of a letter explaining General Star’s position regarding providing a defense only
under a reservation of rights. Thus, these arguments warrant no further discussion.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons the order of the Fayette Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Don A. Pisacano
Lexington, Kentucky
Donald L. Miller, II
Maureen P. Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky
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